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Abstract 
Can resource-poor countries bear any stringent obligations in the pursuit of equity in 
the distribution of global health opportunities between individuals globally? 
Distributive justice is primarily about resource transfer from those who have more 
than enough to those who are suffering severe scarcity. In the particular case of 
distributive justice in global health, given that most health opportunities cost money 
and given that the idea of ‘resource-poor countries’ entails that such countries lack 
sufficient resources in general and in particular health resources, the question of this 
work may seem a rhetorical one, seeking “no” as an obvious answer. On the contrary, 
however, despite the reality of severe resource scarcity among poor countries, the 
main thesis defended in this work is that poor countries (and in fact all countries 
whose economic situations qualify them for a moral right to external economic 
assistance) ought to bear certain stringent obligations in the pursuit of global 
distributive justice in general. This obligation applies even in the specific case of the 
pursuit of justice in the global distribution of certain basic health opportunities among 
individuals globally.  
This work is based on a general claim that in efforts to ensure distributive justice it is 
not enough to look at what amounts of resources should flow from the global haves to 
the global have-nots. The work demonstrates that even though resource flow from the 
global rich to the global poor is a necessary condition for achieving distributive 
justice in the current global circumstances, there is evidence which suggests that this 
may not be a sufficient condition for the achievement of global distributive justice; or 
at least reducing the current global inequities. Bearing in mind that global injustice, in 
this case, means unjust distribution of global resources and opportunities rather than 
global inequality per se, this work suggests that potential beneficiaries of 
redistribution (governments and citizens of Low and Middle Income Countries) need 
to behave in ways which confirm that current inequalities in global distribution of life 
chances and all opportunities for survival and human well-being are unjust in a sense 
that the current global maldistribution of resources cannot be attributed to their 
(victims) moral fault. If the current global inequalities can be attributed to their moral 
fault, then they ought to bear morally binding obligations to their (LMIC 
governments) citizens and those whose resources are to be redistributed. Short of this 
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proviso it will not be possible to achieve global distributive justice in the strict sense 
of the word. It is this proviso that leads to an enquiry into possible obligations of poor 
countries in ensuring global distributive justice. This reasoning about what it may 
necessarily take to achieve global distributive justice is motivated by an insight that 
ignoring the victims’ (LMICs) obligations may lead to further injustice especially if 
affluent countries are morally required (with potential enforcement) to transfer their 
resources to cover deficits in victim countries, which deficits arise out of the moral 
fault of those governments. The insight also extends to the possibility that current 
efforts might fail to achieve the desired global threshold distribution of material and 
social well-being for poor country citizens especially if their governments behave like 
economic ‘black holes.’ 
The first chapter of this work examines existing literature on global justice, 
particularly global distributive justice, ultimately focusing on justice in the 
distribution of global health opportunities. The analysis confirms the existence of 
morally binding and potentially enforceable obligations of all countries in ensuring 
justice in global resource distribution. Using the case of efforts towards fair 
distribution of global health opportunities, the analysis shows how failure to think 
about resource-poor country obligations makes it extremely difficult both in theory 
and practice to achieve global health equity. The second chapter asks and attempts to 
answer a critical question regarding why the efforts of mutually reinforcing discourses 
on ‘global justice’ and ‘human rights’ have not succeeded in achieving justice in the 
global distribution of health opportunities. The analysis of this question leads to a 
conclusion that the futility of countries’ obligations for global distributive justice, 
which are mainly framed as human rights obligations, is due to their constrained 
specificity and stringency which is inherent in current obligations. The analysis leads 
to a proposal that in order to eschew this futility or at least reduce it significantly, 
morally binding obligations of countries to contribute to global distributive justice 
should be specified in terms of how much resources should be contributed by poor 
countries on the one hand, and affluent countries on the other in order to cover a 
certain minimum level of health resource distribution to all individuals globally. The 
third chapter uses the case of Uganda to demonstrate the nature of reasoning about the 
practical and moral necessity of thinking about potential obligations of poor countries 
in ensuring global distributive justice in general. The major insight demonstrated in 
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this chapter is that if global justice is to be achieved, then poor country governments 
should not be seen merely as victims of unethical global politics and economics but 
also as agents who can avoid and mitigate some external harms and who, therefore, 
bear morally binding obligations to their citizens and to those whose resources are to 
be redistributed. Chapter four makes use of the special case of efforts to ensure justice 
in the global distribution of health opportunities to propose and demonstrate a 
mechanism which can be used to achieve justice in global health resource distribution. 
This proposal is based on the conception of obligations of poor countries as a 
necessary complement to those (obligations) of affluent countries in the pursuit of 
justice in the global distribution of health opportunities. The proposal is also based on 
the claim that distributive justice requires proportionate allocation of burdens between 
all the actors involved in the process of redistribution towards a certain threshold of 
distribution. That is, justice in this case requires that there ought to be equitable 
burden-sharing between the beneficiaries of redistribution and those whose resources 
are to be redistributed.  This chapter proposes that a certain minimum level of health 
opportunities for all individuals be specified in form of the minimum health 
expenditure per capita (for each country) and the cost of guaranteeing these minimum 
health opportunities should be covered entirely using pooled public resources 
contributed by both external actors (donor country governments) and domestic actors 
(poor country governments). This proposal demonstrates the ethical and practical 
importance of obligations of poor countries in ensuring global justice, particularly 
justice in ensuring equitable distribution of health opportunities globally.
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Chapter 1 
Understanding the Context and Challenges in Conceiving 
Obligations for Global distributive Justice: The Case of 
Equity in Health Opportunities 
1.0 Introduction
Discussions regarding obligations of countries to contribute to efforts to ensure justice 
in global health take place within the broader context of obligations for global justice, 
particularly obligations of country governments in ensuring global distributive justice. 
Therefore in order to make intelligible the challenges and/or gaps in discussions and 
practical efforts to ensure justice in global health, it is important to place the 
discussions of obligations of countries to contribute to the achievement of justice in 
global health (equity in global health) in the broader context of the general obligations 
of countries for global distributive justice. There are two major ideas raised in this 
chapter and they run through the whole work. The first idea is the concept of the 
complementarity of obligations of rich and poor country governments to contribute to 
efforts towards global distributive justice. In this work this idea is taken as a 
necessary condition for the achievement of global distributive justice, otherwise it 
will remain extremely difficult to achieve global distributive justice. The idea of 
complementarity is that obligations of High Income Country (HIC) governments on 
the one hand, and those of Low Income Country (LIC) governments, or Low and 
Middle Income Countries (LMICs) on the other, must all be fulfilled in order to 
achieve global distributive justice. It is this idea of the complementarity of HIC and 
LIMC governments’ obligations that is the basis of the conception of poor country 
obligations for global distributive justice. The second major idea is that of equitable 
sharing of burdens/costs of achieving a certain global minimum distribution of goods 
and services, particularly health goods and services (or health opportunities).  
The discussions in this chapter indicate that on-going discussions and practical efforts 
to ensure global justice, and in particular justice in global health, fall short of the ideas 
of the ‘complementarity of obligations’ and at the same time they do not guarantee 
proportionate (equitable) sharing of burdens or costs of ensuring a certain global 
minimum distribution of goods and service between the various global actors. The 
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line of reasoning underlying these two ideas is that it is very difficult to achieve global 
justice unless the ideas of ‘complementarity of obligations’ and ‘equitable sharing of 
burdens/costs’ are reflected in practical efforts towards global distributive justice in 
general and, in particular, justice in global health. In turn this line of reasoning is 
based on a claim that global distributive justice requires equal access, by all 
individuals globally, to basic means of survival and well-being and equitable sharing 
of the burdens/costs of guaranteeing to all individuals these relevant (or requisite) 
goods and services. From the two major ideas mentioned above (Complementarity 
and Equity), the general position defended in this chapter and demonstrated in the rest 
of the chapters, is the need to identify and implement obligations of poor countries’ 
(or LMICs’)1 governments in the pursuit of global distributive justice with particular 
focus on justice in global health. 
In the first part of this chapter I provide a brief description of the key and general 
issues of concern in discussions concerning global justice with particular emphasis on 
global distributive justice. In the second part I present and examine the claims made in 
theories and systematic views on global distributive justice, particularly views 
regarding the question of whether there are, or ought to be, morally binding
transnational obligations for global distributive justice. A critical analysis of these 
views affirms the existence of these obligations which are not necessarily of the same 
category as those defended by liberal cosmopolitans. I conclude this part by observing 
that even though affirming and fulfilling these obligations (of international resource 
transfers) is a necessary condition for the achievement of global distributive justice in 
the current global circumstances, these obligations need to be complemented by 
obligations of developing countries, which are currently ignored in mainstream 
discussions. In part III I explain the major concepts involved in the discussions that 
follow and at the same time I define the conceptual scope of the discussion. Part IV is 
dedicated to the examination of the specific issue of justice in global health. In this 
part I show that the challenges or gaps identified in debates about general obligations 
1In this work the focus is on obligations of countries which are potential recipients of external aid if 
individuals in such countries are to achieve a certain (globally accepted) threshold distribution of basic 
goods and services. These countries are obviously poor or Low Income Countries and probably some 
Middle Income Countries. Therefore, in my arguments for obligations of poor countries I will be using 
terms LICs and LMICs interchangeably to refer to all, and only, those countries that potentially need 
external assistance in order for their citizens to achieve the targeted minimum distribution of goods and 
services. 
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of global distributive justice are the same gaps found in the discussions and practical 
efforts towards justice in global health. Using the case of global health financing I go 
ahead to demonstrate how failure to identify and implement obligations of developing 
country (or LMICs) governments in the pursuit of global distributive justice leads to 
falling short of the idea of complementarity of HIC and LIC governments’ obligations 
as a necessary condition for achieving justice in global health. I also show that 
without identifying and implementing developing country governments’ obligations it 
is not possible to achieve equity in global health financing and, therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to achieve justice in global health.2
Part 1 
1.1  An Overview of Key Issues in Discussions on Global Justice 
The concept ‘Global Justice’ is broad and intricate particularly with regard to which 
actions and/or inactions are required for the achievement of what it entails. A critical 
analysis of literature on the required actions and/or inactions reveals at least three 
categories of country governments’ obligations and these categories represent three 
major dimensions of global justice. All these three dimensions of global justice and 
the three categories of obligations they give rise to must be fulfilled if global justice is 
to be achieved. That is, all the three categories of countries’ obligations identified 
below are necessary conditions for the achievement of global justice in the present 
global socio-economic circumstances.  The three dimensions of global justice are: 
international legal justice; global political (or institutional) justice; and, global 
distributive justice. The latter two are fondly treated by most authors as one under the 
heading of ‘social justice’, but as I will show later there are good reasons to treat them 
separately. Further, a deeper analysis of the various contributions to literature on 
global justice reveals that some works on global justice emphasize only two out of 
these three categories in different combinations, while some emphasize only one. 
2 The underlying claim here is that equity in global health financing is a necessary condition for justice 
in global health. Later I illustrate the validity of this claim by arguing that global ‘distributive justice’ 
requires equitable access to certain minimum amount of goods and services for all individuals and 
ensuring that the cost of ensuring such minimum distribution is proportionately shared by all actors 
involved. 
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Regarding the categories of countries’ obligations for global justice, the United 
Nations Organization (UN) has emphasized that the achievement of global justice 
requires fulfilling obligations of international law as well as obligations of global 
distributive justice between individuals globally (UN 2006). In the view of the UN, 
the relevant obligations for international justice arise from “the principles of sovereign 
equality, non-intervention, and equal voting rights constituting the legal aspects of 
international justice” (emphasis in original) (UN 2006, 11). On the other hand 
obligations of global distributive justice arise from, “equality of rights for all peoples 
and the possibility for all human beings, without discrimination, to benefit from the 
economic and social progress disseminated and secured through international 
cooperation” (UN 2006). On the same issue regarding the requirements of global 
justice and the categories of obligations they impose on all countries, Charles Beitz 
has distinguished between “global political justice” and global distributive justice. 
According to Beitz, whereas global political justice is concerned with the fairness of 
global institutions, the latter is concerned with redistribution of resources necessitated 
by market failures and other sources of vulnerability (Beitz 2005).Thomas Pogge too 
emphasizes two kinds of obligations: those of designing and implementing fair 
(and/or harmless) global institutions and obligations relating to global resource 
redistribution (if “we” harm the poor) (Pogge 2008). On the other hand John Rawls 
defends international law obligations (international legal justice) as the only required
obligations for global justice (Rawls 1993).  
In the current discussion of requirements of global justice, there is no dispute about 
the necessity of countries’ respect for international law and everyone agrees with the 
need to design and implement just global institutions. However, there is no general 
agreement regarding stringent obligations pertaining to global resource redistribution. 
Since obligations relating to global resource redistribution are more controversial than 
the rest of the requirements, this work is concerned with analyzing this category of 
obligations, with specific interest in global health-resource distribution as a key step 
(or requirement) towards justice in global health. The choice of this dimension of 
global justice (global distributive justice) is based on two reasons or claims: one is 
that ‘unless obligations of global resource redistribution are divested of their current 
controversies and later implemented along other requirements, it will remain 
extremely difficult to achieve global justice in the current global socio-economic 
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circumstances.’ This claim implies that in the current global socio-economic realities 
obligation of global resource redistribution is a necessary condition for the 
achievement of global justice. 
The second and major reason/claim underlying my choice to examine obligations of 
distributive justice is that an intellectual position which simply affirms obligations of 
external actors (governments) to assist developing country governments identifies and 
affirms just one of the necessary conditions for achieving global distributive justice 
but this alone is not a sufficient condition for achieving the desired end. It is this 
particular category of reasoning which is missed in the trend of current discussions 
and practical efforts towards global justice. It is this latter reason that leads to the 
major concern of this work – an attempt at identifying, defending and illustrating both 
the practical and moral necessity of obligations of resource-poor country (or LMIC) 
governments in the pursuit of justice in global health, with particular illustrations from 
the case of global health financing. But before I address the major question of the 
necessity of resource-poor country governments’ obligations in the pursuit of justice 
in global health I want to pursue the first claim I have made above (the claim about 
necessity of resource redistribution) in order to make it more intelligible. It is this 
claim that will set a background for better understanding of the specific and major 
issue of justice in global health. Even though the claim that obligations of distributive 
justice, particularly international resource transfers, as a necessary condition for the 
achievement of global justice should be self-evident, there are a number of views 
which deny this way of reasoning about requirements of global justice. Therefore, it is 
important to show briefly how all the three dimensions of global justice mentioned 
above are necessary complements for the achievement of global justice.
Generally in the literature about requirements of global justice, it is common for some 
contributors, such as John Rawls (Rawls 1993) to claim that global justice requires 
fulfilment of only one (or two in case of other authors) of the three categories of 
obligations mentioned above. Such views can be regarded as false if they claim that 
only one or two of the of the above categories of obligations is/are enough for the 
achievement of global justice; while they are partially correct if they state one or two 
of these requirements simply as what they believe global justice requires without 
excluding the possibility of other requirements. On the other hand, such views are 
correct if they claim that one or two of these requirements are just one or two of the 
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requirements of global justice, thus leaving open lines of enquiry into other possible 
obligations. However, this would still be an incomplete account of what global justice 
requires until all the necessary (sufficient) categories of obligations have been 
identified. In other words, global justice requires fulfilment of international legal 
duties and obligations; it also requires fair inter- or transnational social/political 
institutions and processes; and, most importantly, global justice also requires a 
mechanism for addressing other sources of avoidable global destitution which cannot 
be morally blamed on the victims. Such causes are market failures and other natural 
causes of human vulnerability which lie beyond the victims’ control.  
Those who argue that only one or two of the above three requirements are adequate to 
achieve global justice fail to see how each of these three categories of obligations is a 
necessary condition for the achievement of global justice in the current global socio-
economic circumstances and yet, by itself, an insufficient condition. For instance, as I 
argue later, in the current global circumstances it is possible to imagine a situation in 
which all countries have fulfilled their international legal obligations and, 
political/social institutions have reformed their rules to give every global individual 
formal equality of opportunity3 and yet, remain with avoidable destitution in many 
countries which (destitution) is beyond the control of the victims. To describe such a 
world as unjust is to make an axiomatic claim. This reasoning is widely reflected in 
views about social justice at a national level and, particularly, in actual governments’ 
redistributive policies and programs, even in non-welfare economies, especially 
affluent countries. Therefore, intuitively it can be accepted that an account of 
obligations of global justice that ignores any of these dimensions is incomplete. Such 
an account would imply a wrong assumption that in the current global circumstances 
sources of injustice are limited to those of a legal nature and unjust rules governing 
present global institutions of governance. Such an account implicitly denies the 
validity of other sources of destitution such as market failures, historical factors etc. as 
sources of injustices from which morally valid claims to distributive justice can be 
3 There is need to distinguish between ‘formal equality of opportunity’ and ‘substantive equality of 
opportunity’. The implementation of institutions which operate on fair or impartial rules simply 
guarantees ‘formal equality of opportunity’ rather than ‘substantive equality of opportunity’ except, if 
such rules provide for resource redistribution. Otherwise ‘Substantive equality of opportunity’ requires 
more than just fair play guaranteed by a just institutional regime. In the current global circumstances of 
unequal distribution of capital, technology, historical factors, quality of governance among others, it 
means that the fairness of global institutions’ rules does not guarantee elimination of avoidable 
destitution, and which destitution cannot be morally blamed on the victims. 
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made by the victims or their agents. Therefore, actions which are based on such an 
account do not guarantee global justice. That is to say, since global justice is a three-
pronged concept in terms of what it takes to achieve it, then it means that an account 
of global justice that excludes any of these three categories of obligations leaves other 
ground(s) or sources of injustice intact, hence the persistence of global injustice. 
1. 2 From Global Justice to Global Distributive Justice 
There are a number of unresolved issues about countries’ obligations for global 
distributive justice. I earlier mentioned that of all the three categories of obligations of 
global justice, countries’ obligations for ensuring global distributive justice are the 
most controversial. Even among those who accept this category of obligations as one 
of the moral requirements of global justice, there are divergent views regarding where 
the focus should be: that is, whether more effort should be dedicated to the 
justification of the moral ‘bindingness’ of this category of obligations upon external 
actors; demonstrating the importance (utility) of these obligations to the global poor; 
or whether focus should be on the appropriate ways or channels through which these 
obligations (to assist) can be fulfilled. For example, with specific regards to achieving 
justice in global health, James Dwyer has recommends that “Rather than debating, in 
general terms, the justification and importance (utility) of the duty to assist, we focus 
more attention on the aims of this duty and the various ways of fulfilling it” (Dwyer 
2005, 473). Hence in his view, the most fundamental questions are not ‘whether to 
assist’ but rather why4 and how to assist.5 The importance of the question regarding 
how to assist has been widely implied especially among those who are concerned 
about the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries (Easterly and Easterly 
2006, Collier 2008, Terry 2013). Therefore, Dwyer and some of these contributors in 
the discussion of global justice seem to imply that the major problem facing the duty 
to assist is the manner in which assistance is delivered to those who are entitled to it. 
Certainly this is one among the grand challenges in current efforts to ensure global 
distributive justice. However, as I will argue in part II, the major problem facing 
obligations of global justice is not how to assist. It is not even the issue of what utility 
4 In this case, “why” asks about the utility of assistance to those who receive it, rather than the why 
external agents should be morally required to assist. 
5 In his view the essence of the duty to assist “is to help societies to create and maintain just (or decent) 
basic institutions so that the assisted societies [eventually] become autonomous and good members of a 
just federation of peoples” (Dwyer 2005:474). 
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the assistance in question will give to those assisted. Rather the real question is, 
according to the dominant debate, whether the assistance in question is, or ought to 
be, a stringent obligation of justice which is potentially enforceable. 
My major concern in this work is not any of these questions (above) which have been 
widely researched. Even though in part II below I dedicate some effort to examining 
views on whether transnational obligations of distributive justice are morally binding, 
this is for the purpose of setting a background that will help understand the special 
question I want to answer. For this reason in my later discussion and specific 
illustrations I will treat all the above questions as settled with positive results. But 
even more importantly it is from this analysis that I intend to show how global action 
based on the positive answer to this question (of whether) by itself misses the two 
major ideas of complementarity of obligations and equitable distribution of burdens
and, therefore cannot global distributive justice. These two major ideas 
(complementarity and equity) suggest an essential question: that is, ‘If obligations of 
rich and resource-poor countries are supposed to be complementary in the pursuit of 
global justice, how much (or what proportion) should each set of actors (HICs versus 
LICs) and eventually individual actors (countries) contribute in order to achieve an 
equitable distribution of the burdens/costs of achieving global distributive justice?   In 
this work I will be majorly concerned with the following question: How much
assistance should constitute a moral requirement on the part of external actors 
(donors) in the name of global distributive justice and how should it be determined if 
equity is to be achieved in the allocation of obligations (burdens/costs) for global 
distributive justice to different global actors? It is the second part of this question 
which points to the need to identify and implement obligations of resource-poor 
country (or LMICs’) governments as a necessary complement to HIC government 
obligations in the pursuit of global distributive justice. In answering this question 
later, a specific mechanism will be proposed with particular focus on LIC government 
obligations in global health financing. 
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Part II 
1.3  Making Sense of Contemporary Debate on Obligations for Global 
Distributive Justice 
Earlier I mentioned that the achievement of global justice requires fulfilment of at 
least three categories of obligations: 1) observing requirements of international 
law/justice; 2) (re)designing and implementing global political institutions which 
fairly distribute opportunities to all individuals and countries globally and, 3) global 
resource redistribution necessitated by market failures and other sources of human 
vulnerability which are beyond the victims’ control. I emphasised that whereas there 
is limited controversy about the necessity of the first two categories; that is, if there is 
any controversy at all, there is a deep disagreement surrounding the third category of 
these obligations. There are a number of competing views on the issue of global 
distributive justice. The widely discussed views relate to moral responsibility for the 
existing global injustice; the moral legitimacy of countries’ stringent transnational 
obligations for global (re)distributive justice; the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
alleviating global destitution; the means through which aid should be transferred from 
the global rich to the global poor etc. In all these, the deepest part of the controversy 
concerns the question of whether there are any morally binding (and potentially 
enforceable) transnational obligations for global distributive justice. My examination 
of this controversy aims at two outcomes: being able to take a position in this debate, 
and later being able to demonstrate how an answer to the question of whether (these 
obligations exist or ought to exist) does not guarantee justice (equity) unless another 
question has been posed and answered. The second question whose answer guarantees 
equity arises from the claim I made earlier: that is, ‘the achievement of distributive 
justice requires that beneficiaries of redistribution also bear certain obligations.’ The 
justification of resource-poor country obligations will consist in successfully 
demonstrating the validity of this claim. In this part, I will start by summarizing the 
nature and ideological basis of the controversy regarding the moral ‘bindingness’ of 
transnational obligations of countries for global distributive justice; I will them 
present the two major and conflicting views on the scope of robust principles and 
obligations of distributive justice and, next I will examine these views in light of the 
current global socio-economic realities (globalization) and take a position on the 
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question of whether there are, or ought to be, morally binding transnational 
obligations of countries for global distributive justice. Finally I will identify the gaps 
left by the current discussion on global distributive justice. 
1.3.1 The Controversy 
In contemporary discussions of global justice the mainly contested question is 
‘whether robust principles of distributive justice and their consequent obligations go 
beyond national borders.’ The relevant facts for justifying the various claims in this 
debate seem to be rooted in a contention regarding ‘whether the conditions which 
justify robust principles of distributive at a national level exist at a global level to 
warrant an extension of the same principles and consequent obligations to all global 
citizens.’ This question became even more deeply divisive in the wake of John Rawls’ 
work called A theory of justice. Whereas the principles of distributive justice he 
developed in this work were theoretically appealing to many, Rawls’ refusal to extend 
the same principles beyond the domestic to the global arena intensified debates 
regarding the legitimate scope of robust principles of distributive justice and the kind 
of obligations they give rise to. 
John Rawls is unequivocal regarding the limits of the principles of distributive justice 
developed in A theory of justice. These principles apply only at a domestic or national 
level. In his work The Law of Peoples which is the work he intended to be a 
contribution to issues of global justice, John Rawls categorically clarifies that “By the 
law of peoples I mean a political conception of right and justice that applies to the 
principles and norms of international law and practice” (emphasis added) (Rawls 
1993, 36).To emphasize his point he refers to section 58 of his work, A Theory of 
Justice, in which he indicates “how from ‘justice as fairness’ the law of peoples might 
be developed for the limited purpose of addressing several questions of a just war” 
(emphasis added) (Rawls 1993, 36) as opposed to global resource (re)distribution. The 
only distinction between international law and the law of peoples he makes is that the 
law of peoples is what provides moral legitimacy to international law, rather than 
being international law itself (Rawls 1993, 43).This is seen in his key objective for the 
elaboration of the law of peoples. With reference to the changes in international law 
that took place after World War II; that is, a tendency to restrict a state’s right to wage 
war to cases of self-defense and to limit its right to internal sovereignty, he 
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emphasizes that “What is essential is that our elaboration of the law of peoples should 
fit – as it turns out to do – these two basic changes and give them a suitable rationale” 
(Rawls 1993, 42). 
Therefore, whereas John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples is an important contribution to 
the requirements of global justice it does not address other necessary conditions for 
global justice, one of which is distributive justice. With regards to global resource re-
distribution, it is important to underscore that whereas Rawls endorses duties of 
international assistance, he firmly states that these are not obligations of justice 
(Rawls 1993) which are potentially enforceable. Hence according to Rawls the 
conditions that justify robust principles of distributive justice at a state/national level 
do not exist at a global level to justify the extension of the liberal principles of justice 
for the sake of justifying transnational obligations of resource (re)distribution. This 
tendency to limit robust principles of distributive justice and their consequent 
obligations to a state/national level has been described as “Statism” by Charles 
Beitz(Beitz 2005) or what has been understood as ‘compatriot favoritism’ or ‘patriotic 
priority thesis.’ These latter phrases are mainly associated with the works of Michael 
Blake and Richard Miller (Miller 1998, Blake 2001). Thomas Nagel has described 
this conception of distributive justices as “a political conception of global justice” 
(Nagel 2005).  
Alternative views regarding the scope of principles and obligations of distributive 
justice fall under what is popularly known as ‘liberal cosmopolitanism’. Unlike 
Statists who defend state-circumscribed principles and obligations of distributive 
justice, liberal cosmopolitans claim that conditions that justify the application of 
liberal principles of justice at a national level also exist at a global level and, 
therefore, the same distributive principles which apply at a domestic level should be 
extended to a global level. In order to examine these two views it is important to 
identify the conditions that justify robust principles of distributive justice and their 
consequent obligations at a national level, and then try to see if the same conditions, 
or at least conditions that closely imitate them, exist at a global level to justify a 
transnational application of these principles and consequent obligations to which they 
give rise. The significance of examining this controversy is that if the scope of 
principles and obligations of distributive justice does not go beyond national borders, 
then the concept of global justice is limited to only two requirements – observance of 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
international law and the political obligation to design and implement a fair global 
institutional order. Below I examine both of these positions (Statism and Liberal 
Cosmopolitanism) with a goal of establishing the ‘consistency and feasibility’6 of each 
in the present global socio-economic circumstances.
1.3.1.1 Ideological Influences on views on Global Justice
Contemporary views regarding the scope of distributive justice are not spontaneous. 
They reflect certain ideologies. The ideologies are: Cosmopolitanism and Statism. 
Traditional theories of social justice whether in communitarian, liberal or libertarian 
traditions, were all conceived in the context of a nation-state as a sovereign 
commonwealth with (perceived) few and highly restricted interactions with other 
similarly independent commonwealths. It is for this reason that principles and 
obligations of distributive justice, despite their many differences in different theories, 
are commonly understood to apply exclusively to compatriots. I will call this tendency 
of thinking about social justice Statism as an ideology.7 On the other hand, with the 
popularity of the concept of globalization there is another ideology, though not new, 
which has lately gained prominence in explaining the meaning, basis and scope of 
distributive justice; that is, Cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is starkly opposed to 
most of the claims made by Statism particularly regarding the basis (justification) and 
scope of obligations of global justice. 
1.3.2 Statism-based Theories and Views on Distributive Justice 
By Statism I mean a predisposition to think about the notion of social/distributive 
justice as being possible only within state or national borders and, therefore, robust 
principles and morally binding obligations of distributive justice being nationally 
circumscribed. Traditional theories of distributive justice reflect a Statist
6 The relevant questions to be answered here are: One, Given the specific conditions which justify the 
application of robust principles of distributive justice at a national level, is it rational (consistent) to 
limit such principles to a national level in the current global socio-economic realities (globalization)?’ 
Two, ‘Is it practically feasible to apply perfectly similar principles of distributive justice at both 
national and global level? 
7 Statism and Cosmopolitanism are treated as ideologies because these two are the major sources (or 
mindsets) that shape and guide ideas (theories and systematic points of view) regarding the basis, 
nature and scope of obligations of global (or social) justice. 
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outlook.8Examples of such theories include Robert Nozik’sEntitlement theory of 
justice (Nozick 1974, 149-182); Hayekian theory of social justice derived from 
Friedrich Hayek’s views  (Morison 2005); A theory of justice (Rawls 1999) (1971); 
views in Utilitarian and Welfare Economics; the Classical Marxist theories such as 
The Labour theory of value (Meek 1956, Cohen 1979); The theory of 
exploitation(Roemer 1982) among others. Despite all their differences in their 
assertions regarding the nature and requirements of distributive (or social9) justice, 
they all share one thing in common: that is, whatever obligations of justice these 
theories defend, they are limited to within state boundaries. What is crucial to note 
here is that even if all these theorists had no concept of ‘the global’ by virtue of the 
socio-economic realities of the times they were developed; their influence is reflected 
in some contemporary systematic views about global justice. What some 
contemporary (Statist) views share with the theories outlined above is that the idea of 
social or distributive justice is possible only within state borders. All views with such 
a tendency are hereinafter referred to as ‘Statist’ views while those who hold and 
defend these views are referred to as ‘Statists’. 
In contemporary discussion on global justice, there are many systematic views that 
reflect a Statist mindset. Some of these views include: In Defense of Nationality 
(Miller 1993); The Law of Peoples(Rawls 1993); Distributive Justice, State Coercion, 
and Autonomy (Blake 2001); The problem of Global justice(Nagel 2005); National 
responsibility and Global justice (Miller 2007); Just Health (Daniels 2008) among 
others. In all these views and more others the central claim is that robust principles 
and obligations of distributive justice apply and, are limited, to the national level. All 
they accept at a global level are ‘duties of humanity’ rather than morally binding 
obligations of justice. According to Statists the conception of justice, distributive 
justice is possible if, and only if, concerned parties are subject to the same sovereign 
coercive regime. For lack of space it is not possible to outline all the nitty-gritty 
details of the specific claims made by each theory or view, but a few examples will be 
enough to summarize the most important claims shared by these views. 
8 The interest at this point is not examining the relevance or accuracy of these theories in their temporal 
and spatial circumstances, but simply to assert that they all reflect a Statist character in their scope – 
they were concerned with distributive justice between individuals within a sovereign nation state. 
9Heyak in particular does not believe in the concept of ‘social justice’ howsoever defined because he 
does not believe in the concept of ‘the social,’ in the first place. 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
The central claim shared by all Statist views on global distributive justice is that “we 
must give priority to helping less needy compatriots over more needy non-
compatriots” (Gillian and Moellendorf 2001:5). In particular, Micheal Blake 
categorically states a position that is representative of Statist views about global 
distributive justice. In his view: 
“[…] a globally impartial theory is not incompatible with distinct principles of 
distributive justice applicable only within the national context. […]. A concern with 
relative economic shares is a plausible interpretation of liberal principles only when 
those principles are applied to individuals who share liability to the coercive network 
of state governance. Such a concern is not demanded by liberal principles when 
individuals do not share such links of citizenship” (Blake 2001 , 258). 
In the same vein, Thomas Nagel’s view is that there is no possibility of global 
distributive justice in theory or practice in a world organized the way it is today 
(Nagel 2005). Statists do not deny the existence of global injustice nor do they deny 
the need to achieve global justice. However, what they consider to be global justice is 
a kind of fair play between sovereign states rather than the redistribution of resources 
between individuals globally. Such is the spirit of Rawls’ views in The Law of peoples
referred to earlier. In the same spirit as Rawls, Nagel argues that global justice 
“requires us to pursue our ends with boundaries that leave them free to pursue theirs, 
and to relieve them from extreme threats and obstacles to such freedom if we can do 
so without serious sacrifice of our own ends” (emphasis added) (Nagel 2005, 131). 
The question of the basis, nature and scope of obligations of global justice according 
to Statists can be answered by looking at the material circumstances necessary for the 
conception of distributive justice. 
1.3.2.1 Material Basis of Statist Views on Distributive Justice
The reason for Statists’ circumscription of stringent obligations of distributive justice 
to compatriots is based on the ‘Associative Duties’ account which is central to their 
conception of justice. The ‘Associative Duties’ account is explained and defended 
using two arguments: the Cooperation argument and the Coercion argument. The 
cooperation argument is that whereas all human beings have some universal 
obligations of humanity to one another, associative duties arise whenever members 
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are cooperating in some joint venture (Ypi, Goodin et al. 2009, 119). In this way 
associative duties imply or lead to special mutual duties among cooperating members, 
in this case compatriots. These views reflect Ronald Dworkin’s idea of special duties. 
Dworkin’s claim is that generally, people who are members of the same association 
owe things to one another that they do not owe to people who are not members of the 
association (Dworkin 1986, 195-206). Such special obligations do not extend beyond 
national borders because Statists do not believe that there is any significant level of 
cooperation between individuals at a global level. In other words, what gives rise to 
associative duties is the fact that people are mutually engaged with others within the 
association in a dense network of cooperative relations of a certain sort (Ypi, Goodin 
et al. 2009, 106). 
On the coercion argument “Associative Duties” are rooted in the fact that members of 
the association are all subject to the same coercive authority” (emphasis added (Ypi, 
Goodin et al. 2009, 119) . Here the underlying reasoning is that since coercion 
threatens the liberal idea of autonomy, it is often claimed that citizens can authorize 
the use of force by the state only if such force is paired with an institutional concern 
for relative deprivation among fellow associates (Blake 2001 275 – 296, Nagel 2005). 
The general position offered by the Associative Duties account is that robust 
principles distributive justice are only required within the context of a domestic legal 
system because such principles become relevant only in the context of certain forms 
of coercion or certain forms of cooperation and those forms of cooperation are not 
found outside the domestic arena (Ypi, Goodin et al. 2009, 107). 
According to this political conception of distributive justice, therefore, the 
presumption against arbitrary inequality which is the core of justice “comes from a 
special involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from membership in a 
political society […] (Nagel 2005, 28). The basic argument is that the rules of society 
that determine its basic structure are coercively imposed rather than a voluntary 
association. It is this fact that creates a special presumption against arbitrary 
inequalities in the way systems treat us (Nagel 2005, 128-129). Therefore, special 
duties and obligations are based on a claim that citizens of a state are not given a 
choice to belong or no to belong to a given state. They are simply assigned a role in 
the collective life of a particular society in which they find themselves, and society 
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makes them responsible for its acts which are taken in their name.  The people accept 
its norms in virtue of the fact that they give support to the institutions through which 
its advantages and disadvantages are created and distributed (Nagel 2005, 128-129). It 
is these special circumstances, according to Nagel, that justify special obligations 
between co-nationals in a way that is [allegedly] absent between individuals at a 
global scale which lacks such characteristics that justify perfectly uniform obligations 
for global citizens. He concludes thus: 
In short, the state makes unique demands on the will of its members—or the members make 
unique demands on one another through the institutions of the state—and those exceptional 
demands bring with them exceptional obligations, the positive obligations of justice. Those 
obligations reach no farther than the demands do and that explains the special character of the 
political conception [of distributive justice] (Nagel 2005, 30). 
Hence from the Statists’ conception of distributive justice some key claims can be 
outlined: 1) Belonging to the same association is what justifies special duties and 
obligations to fellow members of the association and, a state is one of such category. 
2) Social Cooperation and being subject to the same coercion are the two necessary 
and sufficient features that confirm the existence of an association. 3) Conceived as 
such, Statists imply that obligations of distributive justice are stringent in a sense of 
being morally binding and potentially enforceable within the state (or association); 
and, 4) obligations of distributive justice apply to all members of the association (or 
compatriots/citizens).  
1.3.2.2 Implications of Statist Claims about the scope of Distributive Justice
From the claims made and implied by Statists regarding the basis and scope of 
principles of distributive justice, what is implied is that if there is to be any conception 
of global justice, such a conception must avoid concerns about global resource 
(re)distribution which imposes a moral requirement on states to transfer their 
resources to other people who are not citizens of that state. On this account Statism 
implies that global justice requires the fulfilment of only two of the three categories 
of obligations out of the three categories identified earlier: that is, obligations imposed 
by international law and, obligations to design and implement just global institutions 
which distribute opportunities equally among states. Therefore, the statist account of 
the scope of justice does not allow a discussion of any reliable transnational 
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mechanisms for off-setting the effects of global market failures on human survival 
and well-being or any other sources of global destitution. It does not allow a 
discussion of morally binding or potentially enforceable transnational obligations to 
alleviate global destitution which arises out of circumstances beyond the victims’ 
control as long as such victims are no citizens of certain states. As seen above, the 
reasoning behind this Statist position is unambiguous: ‘outsiders (non-compatriots) 
have no moral right to resources beyond those in their country’s borders.’ According 
to Statists, outsiders are not members of their association; global individuals are not 
involved in any kind of cooperation with those outside their national borders, and 
they are not under any common (global) coercion. Whereas Statists obviously agree to 
assist external members to achieve distributive justice within their own states, they 
think that international or global inequalities in access to resources, howsoever gross, 
should not justify morally binding and potentially enforceable transnational 
obligations of equitable global resource distribution. 
Therefore, since the achievement of global justice requires the third category of 
obligations, then a Statist account of global justice remains incomplete until it 
integrates in its views a mechanism for off-setting global market failures and other 
causes of destitution which causes are beyond the control of the global poor citizens. 
But since Statists give very clear reasons for limiting principles and obligations of 
distributive justice to a national level, the strategy for the possibility of extending 
these principles to the global arena is to examine the consistency in limiting these 
reasons (conditions) to the domestic arena in the era of globalization. What is implied 
by this strategy is that a move-away from a discussion of justice at a national level to 
a global level is necessitated by the phenomenon of globalization and its defining 
socio-economic realities. However, before undertaking the task of examining the 
limits of Statist views on the scope of justice, I will first present competing views 
against of Statism. The importance of presenting these views is to examine them to 
see if they give sufficient and uncontroversial reason(s) to expand the scope of justice 
from a national to a global level. 
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1. 3.3 Cosmopolitanism and Requirements of Distributive Justice 
The important question in examining cosmopolitan views on global justice is whether 
cosmopolitanism’s claims provide sufficient and uncontroversial justification for 
imposing on governments morally binding transnational obligations for distributive 
justice, and also the feasibility of applying perfectly similar obligations at the national 
and global level. Generally, Cosmopolitanism is ‘a philosophy’ (Brock and Brighouse 
2005) (to some a ‘doctrine’ (Tan 2010), yet to some others an ‘ideology’ 
(Schwarzmantel 2008)) which sees the world as a single society, implying that all 
human beings are citizens of this same and one unit (Ribeiro 2001, 19). At present 
cosmopolitanism is expressed in a number of versions – Moral cosmopolitanism, 
political cosmopolitanism and cultural cosmopolitanism. I will distinguish between 
only the first two of these versions because it is these that have direct bearing on the 
conception of global justice. “Moral cosmopolitanism is the philosophical perspective 
which posits that all human beings ought to be morally committed to an essential 
humanity above and beyond the reality of one’s particularistic attachments (such as 
nationality, kinship, religion) (Nowicka and Rovisco 2012, 3). On the other hand, 
political cosmopolitanism is “an ethico-political ideal that seeks to respond to 
limitations of the nation-state unit in addressing global challenges and problems” 
(Nowicka and Rovisco 2012, 4). Political cosmopolitanism fosters new forms of 
supranational and transnational governance as well as the emergence of a robust 
global civil society (emphasis added) (Held 1995). This conception is what Thomas 
Pogge called ‘legal cosmopolitanism’ – a commitment to “a concrete political ideal of 
a global order under which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, 
are fellow citizens of the universal republic” (Pogge 1992, 49).
According to Charles Beitz, the idea of cosmopolitanism can be clearly understood by 
contrasting it with its opposite – Statism. He explains that cosmopolitanism is “a 
perspective that seeks to encompass the whole world” (2005:15), while Statism is an 
idea with three related elements: “the principal bearers of rights and duties are states 
rather than persons; they [states] are obliged to follow a system of norms analogous to 
those that apply to individuals in the state of nature; the value of equality is expressed 
in a principle requiring to treat each other [states]  as equal moral persons” (Beitz 
2005:16). He adds that “If one takes the morality of states to posit that state 
boundaries are limits to the scope of justifications, then cosmopolitanism is not 
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compatible with it” (Beitz 2005:17). Cosmopolitans imply that the basis of political 
cosmopolitanism is moral cosmopolitanism; that is, political cosmopolitanism seeks 
to organise the world in a manner that is consistent with a universally accepted 
metaphysical belief in the moral equality of all human being. 
Regarding the history cosmopolitanism, other than the Stoics who perceived 
themselves as global citizens and to whom the whole idea of cosmopolitan politics is 
attributed (Brown 2006), the conception of a cosmopolitan doctrine in the governance 
of the universe is, among others, traced from Kant’s third law for achieving world 
peace as well as from his Idea of a Universal History. In the Idea of a Universal 
History Kant provides a teleological account of cosmopolitanism. He argues that the 
greatest problem of human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, 
is that of attaining a civil society which can administer justice universally (Kant 
1784). In his cosmopolitan law Kant is concerned with the status of individuals as 
human beings rather than citizens of certain states (Kleingeld 1998, 72). He grounds 
the justification of the cosmopolitan law in the 'original community of the land' and 
the inevitability of human interactions globally. In Towards Perpetual Peace (PP) 
Kant says that before any particular acquisition of property, the earth is in common 
possession. After such acquisition, others no longer have a rightful claim to use or 
occupy what is mine […]. But all parts of the earth, Kant argues, continue to be 
thought of as parts of the whole to which everyone had an original right. This implies 
that all nations stand in a community of possible physical interaction (Kant 1996, Art. 
3). Hence, it would be an injustice, Thomas Pogge argues, to exclude some people 
from the use of these natural resources without compensating them for this loss 
(Pogge 2008, 207-209). Generally contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitanism can 
be seen in the works of Charles Beitz(Beitz 1975, Beitz 1979); Thomas Pogge(Pogge 
2010); (Nussbaum 2010); Simon Caney (Caney 2001); and (Tan 2010) among others. 
1.3.3.1 Cosmopolitanism’s claims about the scope of justice
Regarding particular views of cosmopolitanism about social justice the starting point 
can be Charles Beitz’s claims about the force of moral cosmopolitanism;  
[…] the force of moral cosmopolitanism is clearest when we consider what it rules 
out: cosmopolitanism stands as opposed to any view that limits the scope of 
justification [of principles and obligations of distributive justice] to the members of 
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particular types of groups, whether identified by shared political values, communal 
histories, or ethnic characteristics. It also stands opposed to any view that allows the 
justification of choices to terminate in considerations about the non-derivative 
interests of collective entities such as states or social groups (2005:17).  
In other words Beitz is opposed to a view of national or state interests if those 
interests are not understood to be interests of individuals who compose such states. 
This is a direct attach against the implication of the Statists’ negation of individuals’ 
interests in preference to those of states in discussions of global politics. That is, Beitz 
is starkly opposed to this conception of ‘state interests’ which fails to recognise that 
individuals within such states are the ultimate holders of whatever state or national 
interests or rights may exist. Therefore, Statists’ negation of individuals’ interests in 
global politics is inconsistent with the very idea of a state or a nation since it 
impossible to construe a state without individuals. State or national interests are 
simply a sum of individual interests. 
In Beitz’s view, the challenges that face cosmopolitanism appear “when we ask, not 
what cosmopolitanism rules out, but what it requires, for then the view seems to be far 
less determinate.” In his view, “moral cosmopolitanism is agnostic about the content 
of global political justice: it does not commit itself for or against the proposition that 
there should be a sovereign global authority. There is no automatic inference from 
cosmopolitanism to cosmopolitanism about institutions” (2005:18).  He explains that 
the initial importance of cosmopolitanism “is to provide a moral framework that ought 
to guide individuals in different sovereign states in thinking about other individuals in 
other sovereign states.” In summary, Beitz understands as pivotal to cosmopolitanism 
the assertion that: “… we live in a shared world and humanity is uniform hence, the 
exploitation and allocation of resources at a national level should take into account the 
needs of other human beings of equal human worth, but who reside outside their 
national borders” (Beitz 1999).  
In general, the cosmopolitan conception of distributive justice, which is synonymous 
with global justice, is based on the metaphysical belief in the moral equality of all 
human beings. From this belief cosmopolitans posit two normative claims with direct 
implications for distributive justice: one is that “every human being has a global 
stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern” (Pogge 1992, 169). Secondly, 
individuals command equal moral concern wherever they may be as a requirement of 
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justice, to the extent that state boundaries should not guarantee any exclusive or 
primary obligations of justice between co-nationals per se (Jones 2001). Hence 
political justice has a global character. It is individuals qua individuals that are owed 
justice rather than states or nations per se. Basing on this understanding Tan argues 
that the cosmopolitan doctrine about justice holds that:  
The baseline distribution of material goods and resources among individuals should 
be decided independently of the national and state boundaries within which 
individuals happen to be. Such contingencies ought not to affect one’s legitimate 
entitlements and the purpose of justice, accordingly, is precisely to mitigate the 
biased effects of such arbitrary factors on people’s life chances (emphasis in original ) 
(Brown and Held 2010, 183-184). 
1.3.3.2 Implications of Cosmopolitanism in Relation to Statism
As opposed to the Statists who allocate moral privilege to citizenship as such in 
determining the weight of moral claims individuals have for help, Cosmopolitan 
views imply that citizenship is an ethically irrelevant consideration in evaluating the 
relative weight of claims of individuals for help. On this view obligations of global 
distributive justice are not, or ought not to be, limited to the domestic arena. 
Obligations of distributive justice ought to transcend state boundaries to the 
consideration of the needs of individuals wherever they may be. What is most 
important to note is that according to cosmopolitanism stringent obligations of global 
justice are sufficiently derived from the concept of moral equality that characterises 
humanity rather than anything like the ‘Associative Duties’ account of distributive 
justice presented by the Statists. The source of disagreement between Statism and 
cosmopolitanism is that whereas Statists accept moral equality of all human beings, 
their arguments imply that this is not a sufficient reason or condition for justifying 
robust principles and obligations of distributive justice on a global level. It is for this 
reason that according to Statists even though there exists moral equality between all 
human beings globally, morally binding claims of distributive justice can be possible 
between people who are engaged in some kind of ‘association’ an analogue of which 
is a sovereign state or nation. It is in this association that costs and benefits occur that 
require just distribution among compatriots. Hence, unless there is evidence that there 
is anything like social cooperation and coercion at a global level, Statists would argue, 
cosmopolitans are not warranted to impose stringent globally-sweeping obligations of 
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distributive justice. This claim casts doubt on the cosmopolitan views regarding the 
scope of obligations of distributive justice. 
A critical question which arises out of the Statists’ denial of the sufficiency of 
humanity as such in justifying robust transnational principles of distributive justice: If 
the moral equality of human beings is not a sufficient basis for morally binding 
transnational obligations of distributive justice, why should Statists’ beliefs or claims 
about the scope of obligations of social justice change to extend to all individuals 
globally? For clarity it needs to be noted that the doubt about the views of liberal 
cosmopolitanism is not based on the doubt of the relevance of individuals’ moral 
equality in moral reasoning about how resources and opportunities ought to be 
distributed. Rather the doubt comes from a possibility that this may turn out to be an 
insufficient condition for applying perfectly uniform obligations to all individuals 
globally.  
Whereas the cosmopolitan justification of the application of uniform obligations of 
(and entitlements to) global distributive justice may be theoretically appealing it 
seems to be based on a flawed moral psychology which can be known intuitively. Just 
like it may not be reasonable to expect that all things being equal (especially need in 
this case) individuals will toss a coin in order to decide who to help between a distant 
stranger and a close neigbhour, liberal cosmopolitans may not be entitled to expect 
that all things being equal robust principles of distributive justice and their resulting 
obligations can be applied in a perfectly uniform way to all individuals globally 
without any further qualification be mere humanity. Instead what is reasonable to 
expect is that all things being equal, in the distribution of assistance individuals will 
give priority to their neigbhours or those they are more connected to economically, 
socially or otherwise. On this account, therefore, it is reasonable to give Statists a 
temporary benefit of doubt if they claim that robust principles of distributive justice 
which give rise to potentially enforceable obligations are justified, on top of the moral 
equality of individuals, by social cooperation (and coercion). It is indeed unintelligible 
to claim that enforceable obligations of distributive justice arise naturally except in 
very few exceptional cases such as parenthood (obligations of parents to their 
children). Otherwise Statists come close to being convincing if they claim that 
potentially enforceable obligations of distributive justice arise out of human 
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interactions such as what they describe as an association. The two major problems 
with Statism is an outright denial of differences in human needs as a ground for 
affirming priority to non-compatriots and an attempt to limit human interactions 
(cooperation and coercion) to a domestic arena. 
Given that it is disputable whether the ‘moral equality’ of all human beings is a 
sufficient justification for morally binding transnational obligations of distributive 
justice, I will now turn to examining Statists’ own conditions which they claim justify 
robust principles of distributive justice at a domestic level, for the purpose of deciding 
whether Statists’ position of circumscribing these principles to a national level in the 
era of globalization is rational (or consistent). For the purpose of this argument, I will 
hypothetically accept the Statist claim that ‘on top of moral equality of all human 
beings, robust principles of distributive justice and their attendant obligations are 
justified by the existence of a kind of association which depends for its existence on 
two conditions: social cooperation for mutual benefit and being subjected to common 
coercion.’ After this hypothetical acceptance I will take up a challenge set by Charles 
Beitz: the challenge is that “The real task of liberal cosmopolitanism is either to 
successfully deny that this kind of structure (Statist) is “not” (sic) a necessary 
condition for the conception of global social justice but some other reason, or accept 
that these conditions of coercion are necessary for the conception of social justice and 
then go ahead to show that there are analogues of these at a global level” (Beitz 1999).  
Out of this challenge, I will take the latter option; that is, accepting that coercion and 
cooperation are necessary to justify potentially enforceable obligations of distributive 
justice. Hence, my examination of the consistency of the Statists’ views regarding the 
scope of robust principles and obligations of distributive justice in the era of 
globalisation will involve adducing evidence to the effect that the phenomenon of 
globalisation presents something that can be called, even though loosely, a global 
association, characterised by a global cooperation and global coercion. 
1.3.4 Whether Statist Views on the scope of Distributive Justice are Consistent in 
the Current Global Realities 
From the above description of the Statist material circumstances that justify the 
application of robust principles of distributive justice, it has emerged that they are two 
conditions: social cooperation for mutual benefit and being subject to the same 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
coercion, both of these conditions form what Statists call an association to which a 
state is an analogue. Therefore, in order to legitimately claim that there exists, or 
ought to exist, a global association and coercion (global association) it is important, 
first of all, to enquire into the relevant nature of association (cooperation and 
coercion) which should be looked up in the current global socio-economic realities. 
1.3.4.1 What is the Relevant Nature of Association that Justifies the Application of 
Robust Principles of Distributive Justice? 
Martha Nussbaum has convincingly shown that in thinking about global justice all 
Statists subscribe to a social contract theory of a state (Nussbaum* 2004). It is for this 
reason that they understand obligations of justice within a nation state as contractual 
obligations between compatriots. In summary, Statists claims about justice in a state 
imitate Thomas Hobbes’ reasoning that due to the circumstances in the state of nature 
(where might made right), all people surrender their freedom to the ‘Leviathan’ 
(sovereign government) so that the ‘Leviathan’ can administer justice between them 
all (Hobbes 1991). Therefore, the nature of Association implied by the Statist account 
of social justice is an unwritten and involuntary social contract based on the tacit 
consent of the so-called citizens regarding whether they want to be part of this or that 
association. It is a kind of an association in which people simply find themselves (by 
birth or other conditions beyond their control – most cases) and there is very little they 
can do to get out of that association. Further, as seen earlier, another qualification for 
the existence of that association is that group members affect, and are affected by, 
others in many socio-economic ways by this contract.  
The importance of analysing the nature of an association referred to by Statists is to 
advance an argument that ‘a global association does not have to be a written contract 
between all global citizens but rather a global association should be understood in 
terms of some global socio-economic circumstances in which all individuals are 
finding themselves without having consciously chosen so nor can they easily escape 
them’. The difficulty to escape such realities is clear coercion. 
Therefore, by Social Cooperation Statists imply that people in the same state 
undertake various joint ventures – whether consciously or unconsciously – for their 
mutual benefit, which cooperation produces costs and benefits in a manner that is 
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likely to put certain members of the association at a social-economic disadvantage in 
relation to their fellow members. In other words, social cooperation refers to the 
mechanisms in which the natural, human, financial and other kinds of resources are 
jointly owned and managed for the benefit of all citizens of a given state.  But taking 
into account the reality of human vulnerability, differences in capacities of human 
beings, natural factors etc., Statists realize, by implication, that the benefits and costs 
of the cooperation cannot automatically distribute themselves fairly. Hence, justice 
requires deliberate redistribution of these costs and benefits in a fair manner to all 
members of the association. Therefore, one of the two things that an argument for 
morally binding transnational obligations of distributive justice needs to show is that 
the global economy is organised in a way that confirms a significant level of 
cooperation between all individuals globally. 
Regarding Coercion, the Statists imply that since all states have rules and institutions 
that coerce individuals against their autonomy, these rules and institutions should treat 
them equally as a compensation for the lost freedom. Coercion in this case can be 
understood in terms of overt coercion manifest in explicit legal rules of the state and 
also covert coercion involved in a number of things such as unequal bargaining 
powers in transactions between individuals and the resulting vulnerabilities; diffuse 
social pressure to tolerate certain forms of behaviour for the purpose of ‘fitting-in’, 
among others.  Therefore, another fact that needs to be proved in order to assert the 
existence of a global association is that globalisation involves a significant level of 
coercive influence upon countries (and individuals therein), whether this coercion is 
overt or covert. Once a significant level of global cooperation and coercion has been 
proved, then this will constitute a reasonable justification for the extension of the 
scope of robust principles of distributive and obligations they impose from a domestic 
to a global level.  
1.3.4.2 Whether ‘Globalisation’ Entails a ‘Global Association’
Generally the phenomenon of ‘Globalization’ is highly controversial to define with 
precision especially when it is approached as a term rather than a concept.10 However, 
10 The controversies arising from the various attempts to define ‘globalization, are due to failure to 
distinguish ‘globalization as a term’ from ‘globalization as a concept’. A term is a word or an 
expression with special, fixed, precise and concrete meaning, usually used in a particular activity, or 
profession. On the other hand, however, a concept is a general, pervasive or fundamental idea 
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looking at how different attempts to define it as a term treat it gives an idea of what 
the concept essentially entails. To preempt my point, the gist of these definitions 
combined seems to be consistent with the idea of a ‘global association’. In order to 
explicate the meaning of the term ‘globalisation’ Scholte (Robertson and Scholte 
2007) has surveyed four usages of globalisation as a term: that is, globalization as 
Internationalisation, globalization as Liberalisation, globalization as Universalisation
and globalization as Planetarisation.  
According to Scholte, when understood as Internationalisation, “globalization refers 
to a growth of transactions and interconnectedness among countries.” He adds that the 
impact of internationalisation is that “A rise in the number, range and frequency of 
transactions between countries also increases the impacts the events and conditions in 
one land can have on circumstances in others” (Scholte 2007, 527). In a related sense, 
when defined as Liberalisation, “globalization entails the removal of officially 
imposed restrictions on cross-border flows among countries” (Scholte 2007, 527). In 
this sense globalisation entails a significant reduction in the restrictions imposed by 
national borders and rules in all aspects of economic life – foreign exchange 
restriction, trade [and investment] barriers, capital controls, [labour migration] among 
others. On the other hand, when globalisation is understood as Universalisation it 
“depict[s] a process whereby increasing numbers of objects and experiences are 
dispersed to all people in habitable locations across the earth” (Scholte 2007, 527). 
Finally, as Planetarisation, globalisation is regarded as “a trend whereby social 
relations increasingly unfold on the scale of the earth as a whole” (Scholte 2007, 527). 
In this way globalisation is shown to be characterised by trans-planetary linkages in 
all spheres of life between people, and, therefore, creates a reconfiguration of social 
geography. As a result,  
[…] the planet becomes a social location in its own right, more than and distinct 
from territorial places. Indeed, inasmuch as planetary social relations are less defined 
by territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders than are local, national 
and regional frameworks, some analysts associate globalization-as-planetarization 
with processes of deterritorialization”  (Scholte 2007, 527). 
concerning many similar things derived from a study of particular instances. This paper is interested in 
‘globalization as a concept’ rather than a term. 
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What can be quickly inferred with certainty from these definitions is that since 
economic and other kinds of transactions are a category of those features that 
characterise life in a state and, therefore, partly justify the application of principles 
and obligations of distributive justice at a domestic level; and the truth about 
globalisation being that the same transactions and their impact on individual lives are 
geographically unlimited, this is one of the reasons why principles and obligations of 
distributive justice which apply at the national level may legitimately be to extended 
to a global level. 
Further, David Held (Held 1999, 1-28) has also surveyed an array of views about the 
existence and nature of globalisation all of them confirm what the Statists would call a 
global association. He examines these views under three theses: the hyperglobalist
thesis, the sceptical thesis and the transformationalist thesis. The most important 
thing to note about the views expressed in these theses is that none of them denies the 
existence of the current global socio-economic features from which the existence of a 
‘global association’ can be inferred. In summary, according to Held, 
“Hyperglobalizers argue that economic globalization is bringing about a 
‘denationalization’ of economies through the establishment of transnational networks 
of production, trade and finance.” The consequence of globalization, according to 
Held’s presentation of the hyperglobalist thesis is that “many hyperglobalizers share a 
conviction that economic globalisation is constructing new forms of social 
organisation that are supplanting, or will eventually supplant, traditional nation-states 
as the primary economic and political units of world society” (Held 1999, 3). To 
hyperglobalizers, “Since the national economy is increasingly a site of transnational 
and global flows, as opposed to the primary container of national socio-economic 
activity, the authority and legitimacy of the nation-state are challenged: national 
governments become increasingly unable to either control what transpires within their 
own borders or to fulfill by themselves the demands of their own citizens” (Held 
1999, 4-5). This inability of states to fully control what transpires within their own 
borders is a confirmation of another condition for the existence of a global 
association; that is, global coercion. 
On Held’s reading of globalisation sceptics’ views, they do not deny the existence of 
economic interdependence as it exists in the world today. Rather they claim that 
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contemporary levels of economic interdependence are not unprecedented, and are not 
as ideal [intense] as they are portrayed to be. In comparison with the classical Gold 
Standard era, some globalisation sceptics argue that the world economy is 
significantly less integrated than it was during the Gold Standard era (Boyer, Drache 
et al. 1996). In other words, globalisation sceptics are simply denying that 
internationalisation is bringing about a profound or even significant restructuring of 
global economic relations (Held 1999, 6). However despite their internal differences, 
all sceptics agree that “internationalization has not been accompanied by an erosion of 
North-South inequalities but, on the contrary, by growing economic marginalisation 
of many ‘Third world’ states as trade and investment flows within the rich North 
intensify to the exclusion of much of the globe (Hirst and Thompson 1996) as quoted 
by Held (Held 1999, 6). 
Finally, according to Transformationalists, globalisation is a process of 
transformation of how the world is organised in all spheres of life, and no one knows 
where it is leading or can predict what its end-state will look like. What globalisation 
requires is that “governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a 
world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and 
domestic, external and internal affairs.” Held interprets these views, (Castells 1996) 
and (Ruggie 1996), as arguing that in this era of transformation (globalisation) 
“national economies are being reorganised by a process of economic globalisation 
such that national economic space no longer coincides with national territorial 
borders (emphasis added) (Held 1999, 8). While they recognise the legal supremacy 
of a nation-state over what occurs in its territory, transformationalists also point at the 
expanding jurisdiction of institutions of international governance and the obligations 
derived from international law. Examples cited in this case include the EU and WTO 
and their impact on life in national jurisdictions. Other institutions that exert 
significant coercive influence on nations, especially poor nations, are the World Bank 
(WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Generally, the various definitions and points of view about globalisation are 
supplemented by many other views such as those of Habermas(Habermas and Pensky 
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2001, 58-112)11 in proving the existence of a ‘Global Association’, in a sense of an 
association described by the Statist account of distributive justice. As seen above, 
according to ‘globalisation sceptics’ these interactions which imply the existence of a 
‘global association’ exist except that at one point in time the intensity of these 
interactions was stronger than now. Most importantly ‘globalisation sceptics’ 
recognise that these interactions have perpetuated and entrenched global inequalities 
through marginalisation of certain parts of the world – specifically the so-called 
‘Third World’ countries.  
Further, there cannot be any reasonable doubt that almost everything that used to be 
regarded as public goods at a domestic level have inevitably become “Global Public 
Goods”(Kaul, Grunberg et al. 1999). For example, “The control of infectious diseases 
has been a staple of international diplomacy for more than a hundred years” (Kaul, 
Grunberg et al. 1999, 264). Again there is no doubt that all concerns about, and efforts 
to ensure, global peace and security, global climate, global health, stable global 
finance, secure global trade and investment, human rights et cetera, attest to the 
existence of a ‘global association’ howsoever it is governed. In other words no single 
view on globalisation seems to imply a denial of the existence of a ‘global 
association’. However, many controversies are potential about its intensity, impact, 
driving force, moral acceptability etc. or how to respond to its existence, especially 
with regard to its implication for principles and obligations of distributive justice. 
Hence, even though David Held politely defines globalisation as a mere “widespread 
perception that the world is rapidly being moulded into a shared social space by 
economic and technological forces and the developments in one region of the world 
can have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals or communities on 
the other side of the globe;” (emphasis added) (Held 1999, 1) this is not a mere 
perception but a reality. Hence, there exists a ‘global association.’ 
11 In his work The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, Habermas presents the 
realities in globalisation as posing a dilemma to a national constellation and he is concerned with how 
and whether a postnational constellation can be democratically governed. So, Habermas would agree 
that a global association as described by the Statist account of social justice already exists but it faces 
problems of democratic governance. 
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1.3.4.3 Historical evidence of Global Cooperation and Coercion
Apart from what can be sieved from the current views on globalisation in proving the 
existence of a ‘global association’ there have been attempts to assert and prove the 
existence of global cooperation and coercion from an historical point of view (Ypi, 
Goodin et al. 2009). Ypi, Goodin and others argue that colonial history ties all 
individuals of the world, whether directly or indirectly, in a web of cooperation and 
common coercion. They argue that as long as the colonial masters coercively 
interfered in, and influenced, the affairs of the colonies, this interference gave rise to 
indelible associations between the colonies and their masters. The ventures they 
jointly engaged in and the ground institutions they jointly brought into existence 
continue to bear on what goes on in each of these territories, much less the former 
colonies. Hence, since the present socio-economic institutions, particularly in former 
colonies, were established through the cooperation of the colonies and their masters, 
and the same institutions continue to influence the affairs of these colonies, then their 
resulting benefits and costs should be equitably shared between those through whose 
cooperation the institutions were established. 
Ypi, Goodin and others further argue that the colonies whether under direct or indirect 
rule were subjected to the same coercive rule as citizens of their masters and even 
then, they were never treated equally as justice would have demanded based on the 
common coercion account. Even though there might have been mutual benefit 
between the colonies and their masters as it may be argued, this would add to the body 
of evidence that they are connected in some way, and that what takes place in each 
territory is partly influenced by that history. Ypi, Goodin and others add that if the 
essence of the argument from the Associative Duties account is that individuals 
should significantly influence each other’s lives and that is what is needed to ground 
robust principles and obligations of distributive justice, then facts from colonial 
history are enough to justify the application of such principles at a global level. From 
this historical account of a global association, one of the three duties identified by 
Ypi, Goodin and others is “A duty to share fairly the benefits of any cooperative good 
or venture created during the period of association to which all parties (coloniser and 
colonised) contributed and to recompense for the continuing damage done by 
arrangements instituted during that period but persisting afterwards” (Ypi, Goodin et 
al. 2009, 124). 
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1.3.4.4 General Position from the Analysis
From the above analysis it can be seen that if the existence of an association between 
individuals characterised by social cooperation and coercion are the basis for stringent 
obligations of distributive justice, then in the face of the concept of globalisation and 
the socio-economic realities it entails, Statists’ circumscription of morally binding 
obligations of distributive justice to states and nations in the era of globalisation is not 
consistent with their claim regarding the basis of robust principles of distributive 
justice and consequent obligations. That is, if we accept that principles of distributive 
justice are justified by socio-economic cooperation between individuals and coercion, 
then it means that in the era of globalisation a claim that ‘morally binding obligations 
of distributive justice are nationally circumscribed is irrational (self-contradictory)’. 
Hence, if the Statist conception of distributive justice is to be rational in the era of 
globalisation, they need to integrate the concept of globalisation and its socio-
economic realities into their theories or systematic views about distributive justice. 
Once this has been done then Statists will have to accept its logical implications for 
the scope of principles and obligations of distributive justice. So far such a 
consequence is that ‘there exists morally binding transnational obligations for global 
distributive justice’. This means that affluent countries are morally required to 
transfer some of their resources to resource-poor countries as a matter of justice. 
1.3.4.5 Potential Objection
Given the overwhelming evidence of socio-economic cooperation and coercion 
entailed in the phenomenon of globalisation, the Statists’ objection to the above 
argument is not likely to be a denial of the existence of globalisation or any of its 
socio-economic features. Instead, in response to the proof of the existence of a ‘global 
association’ as a justification for extending the principles of distributive justice and 
resulting obligations from a domestic to a global level, Statists can argue that the 
phenomenon of globalisation and the socio-economic features it entails are not as 
intense as those at a domestic level to prove the existence of a “global association.” 
For this reason they might insist that the loose cooperation and coercion (association) 
entailed in the socio-economic realities of globalisation are not strong enough to 
justify the application of perfectly similar principles of distributive justice at both 
arenas. There are two ways to respond to this objection. 
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First, if Statists argue in this manner, then they should bear the burden of proof that 
unlike an association entailed in life at a national level, the kind of an ‘association’ at 
a global level is not strong enough to justify the application of principles of 
distributive justice at a global level. They need to solve the ‘sorites dilemma’ by 
defining with objectivity and precision the degree of intensity of cooperation and 
coercion that is sufficient to justify the application of robust principles of distributive 
justice and consequent obligations whether at a national or a global level. If they 
cannot convincingly do this, then their rejection of the extension of the scope of 
distributive justice to a global level in the current global socio-economic 
circumstances is arbitrary and, therefore, should be rejected.  
The second way to respond to this objection is to make a partial concession to it. The 
concession consists in admitting that the intensity of cooperation and coercion at a 
national level is stronger than one at a global level. Therefore, a national association is 
stronger than a global association. From this point it can be reasonably agreed that all 
things being equal (especially need), domestic governments owe more to their 
citizens, as a matter of right, than they owe to outsiders. However, this is not to say 
that domestic governments (of affluent countries) owe nothing at all, as a matter of a 
moral right, to the citizens of other (developing) countries. A concession of this kind 
leads to a position which says that ‘there are, or ought to be, certain minimum 
obligations for transnational distributive justice which are morally binding upon all 
individuals globally, albeit, through the agency of their national governments’. If it 
were possible to quantify the intensity of global cooperation and coercion, it could as 
well be required that such morally binding transnational obligations of distributive 
justice be directly proportional to the intensity of global cooperation and coercion. But 
this being a very tedious and impossible task, we should settle for a position which 
simply confirms the legitimacy of morally binding obligations of all countries to 
contribute to guaranteeing a certain minimum distribution of goods and services to all 
individuals globally, and this obligation includes obligations of affluent countries to 
assist developing countries. Once this position has been reached the next step is to 
design a mechanism which will distribute equitably the burden of ensuring that all 
individuals globally have access to a certain minimum share of goods and services 
sufficient for their survival and achieving a certain minimum level of well-being. 
Further, given the extreme difficulty of quantifying the intensity of the current global 
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association as mentioned above, the allocation of obligations to countries should 
depend on the amount of resources needed to achieve the minimum distribution of 
goods and services and the resource capacity of different actors (governments). This 
position is consistent with the two major ideas of ‘complementarity of HIC and LIC 
government obligations and ‘equitable distribution of burdens’. 
1.3.4.6 Summary of the Debate
There is no significant disagreement, if any at all, regarding the fact that principles of 
distributive justice are robust and impose morally binding obligations upon all 
individuals covered by the relevant (geographical) scope of distributive justice. Rather 
in this era what is debatable is the geographical scope of these principles and their 
consequent obligations. This is the centre of the debate between Statism and 
Cosmopolitanism in debates about global distributive justice. From the Statist account 
of what justifies morally binding obligations of distributive justice, it is the existence 
of an ‘association’ characterised by social cooperation between, and coercion of, all 
the members in the association, analogous to which is a nation state. On the other 
hand cosmopolitans argue that the mere partaking in humanity by all individuals 
globally is a sufficient reason to justify the application of the same principles of 
distributive justice and obligations at a national and global level. Since these two 
positions are starkly opposed to each other, for purposes of argument I have accepted 
the Statist argument that in addition to the moral equality of all human beings, robust 
principles of distributive justice and the resulting obligations are justified by the 
existence of an association between the individuals concerned, characterised by socio-
economic cooperation and coercion. I have further argued that the socio-economic 
realities of globalisation prove the existence of a global association, howsoever weak 
or loose this association may be, and howsoever it is governed (with no single 
recognised sovereign). I have come to a position that even if Statists were allowed to 
argue that the intensity of a national association is stronger than a global association; 
it is still possible to affirm the existence of morally binding transnational obligations 
of global distributive justice. These obligations should be limited to ensuring that all 
individuals globally get access to a certain minimum amount of goods and services 
that can enable each of them to attain a certain minimum level of well-being rather 
than obligations that seek to achieve a perfectly equal distribution. 
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1.3.5 Gaps in the Debate and the Way Forward 
The centre of current debates about global distributive justice is entirely on 
obligations of affluent countries to transfer resources to Low and Middle Income 
Countries as the discussion above has shown. In these discussions the major question 
is whether citizens and governments of one country (HICs) are morally required to 
transfer some of their resources to citizens in other countries, particularly Middle and 
Low Income Countries. The attempts to justify stringent obligations of transnational 
resources transfer as a moral requirement is crucial because, even though Statists such 
as John Rawls agree that it is a good thing for such transfers to take place, they argue 
that this is not a moral requirement and, therefore, it does not impose morally binding 
obligations of global distributive justice. Secondly, the position I have reached above 
purports to settle this question of ‘whether’ in affirmative – that is, in the pursuit of 
global justice affluent countries are morally required to transfer some of their 
resources to poor countries. 
However, even if the position reached above were to be implemented to the letter this 
in itself does not guarantee global distributive justice. This is because the achievement 
of equity, as a necessary condition for justice, requires that the costs and benefits in 
the process of achieving a certain desirable end be shared proportionately between all 
parties concerned, taking into account the resource capacity of each actor. In this case 
the aim of the global justice agenda, particularly global distributive justice, is to 
guarantee a certain minimum amount of goods and services to all individuals globally 
if such individuals are to survive long enough and have an opportunity of achieving a 
certain minimum level of well-being. So the emerging question which is not answered 
by the position I have reached above is this: How much of their resources should the 
affluent countries be morally required to transfer to developing countries and what 
does equity demand in determining the size of this obligation? The moral reasoning 
involved here and which is missed in the current mainstream discussions is that 
injustice would persist if affluent countries were required to contribute more than 
(what would turn out to be) their proportionate share of the burden for the sake of 
guaranteeing to all individuals globally a certain minimum distribution of material and 
social goods. This is a looming obstacle to the achievement of global distributive 
justice and it is not solved by the position reached above. The position reached above 
simply says that transnational obligations of resource transfers exist. This position 
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neither addresses the issue regarding the size of these obligations, nor on how to 
determine the size of such obligations in order to achieve equitable sharing of 
burdens.12
Therefore, the lurking danger of injustice persisting in global resource (re)distribution 
emanates from a tendency of the mainstream discussions about global distributive 
justice as shown above to be exclusively concerned with obligations of resource 
transfers from affluent to developing countries without daring to explore the question 
of how proportionately the burden of achieving a globally acceptable minimum 
distribution of goods and services should be shared between the affluent and 
developing countries. This question can be answered by looking at obligations of 
ensuring global distributive justice from a developing country perspective. That is to 
say, if affluent countries have morally binding obligations of ensuring global 
distributive justice, what are the corresponding (or complementary) obligations of 
developing countries? Therefore, the idea of the ‘complementarity of obligations’ of 
HICs and LMICs as well as the idea of ‘equitable sharing of burdens’ can be taken 
care of by an enquiry into possible obligations of resource-poor countries in ensuring 
global distributive justice.  
In part VI, I will illustrate how the current trend of discussion of obligations of 
countries for global justice with its two major weaknesses are reflected in discussion 
and practical efforts towards justice in global health.  I will go ahead to show (in part 
VI) how a conception and implementation of poor country (or LMIC) government 
obligations are necessary in order to overcome these two weaknesses, thus providing 
better chances of achieving justice in global health. Before I proceed to use the above 
understanding of issues in global distributive justice to examine issues of justice in 
global health, I will first take time to explain some of the major concepts in the on-
going discussion as well as to define the conceptual limits of the on-going discussion. 
12 The 1969 Pearson Report recommended the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of 0.7 per cent 
of GNP (later GNI) of OECD – DAC. However, the Report justified this target from the point of view 
of what the Pearson Commission thought was the shortfall of finances among the developing countries 
rather than justifying this target from the point of view of equitable sharing of burdens. 
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Part III 
1.4 Conceptual Analysis and Scope of the Discussion
For a better understanding of the arguments being made in this work, there are some 
key concepts that need to be analysed and distinguished from each other. This 
exercise is also intended to define the scope for the discussion. These concepts are 
‘justice’ and ‘distributive justice’; ‘global justice’ and ‘global distributive justice’; 
‘obligations of justice’ and ‘duties of humanity’; ‘global inequalities’ and ‘global 
inequities’ and their relation to Global Justice; and, a distinction between ‘global 
distributive Justice’ and ‘global Egalitarianism’. Even though none of these concepts 
is new in the literature about global justice, sometimes they are used in a manner that 
obscures the arguments made in the discourse; while some of them, such as “global 
distributive justice” versus “global egalitarianism” are sometimes exploited to 
advance straw man’s arguments against certain positions. Further, an analysis of, and 
distinction between, these concepts will be useful in setting the conceptual scope of 
this work and set a background for a better interpretation of the arguments advanced. 
1.4.1 ‘Justice’ and ‘Distributive Justice’ 
In order to clearly understand the necessity of the three categories of obligations for 
global justice outlined earlier, it is important to make a distinction between the 
concepts ‘justice’ and ‘distributive justice’ and how they relate to each other. In the 
history of philosophy the concept of justice has never been uncontroversial and 
because of these controversies it has evolved radically from its original usage by 
classical philosophers to its contemporary usage. Failure to appreciate this evolution 
leads to a misconception of what dimensions of human endeavours affect justice 
among individuals and groups of individuals – whether local communities, nations or 
global regions. It is from these dimensions of human endeavours that the various 
categories of obligations for ensuring justice can be sifted.  
In the classical usage of the term ‘justice’ there is no distinction between ‘justice’ and 
‘social or distributive justice.’ Whereas the common usage of the concept among 
classical philosophers was general – without explicit distinction between legal, 
political/institutional and distributive justice – its usage had stronger connotations of 
political and distributive justice. In the view of classical philosophers justice had more 
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to do with the legislator’s duty to ensure socio-economic ‘fairness’ between and 
within social classes. For instance, according to Plato (380 BC) justice required that 
each individual received goods and services they deserved on the basis of their 
prescribed position in the social strata (emphasis added) (Grube 1974). On the view of 
his student, Aristotle (384-322 BC), justice is a principle which guaranteed social 
order by regulating the distribution of economic and social benefits (emphasis added) 
(Aristotle 1980). In other words, the classical view of justice, notwithstanding the 
controversy of what constitutes “fairness” or “desert,” is primarily a political virtue 
that requires fairness in the distribution of social and economic goods and services. 
People are morally entitled to what they ‘deserve’ as members of certain social 
classes. The major weakness in the classical conceptions of justice is to limit the 
application of this principle of fairness only to individuals who occupied the same 
stratum of hierarchical social order.  According to classical ideas of justice, unequals
in the social hierarchy are to be treated unequally. These ideas did not challenge the 
social structures of society, but worked within them.13 However, with the influence of 
some civilisations such as the Roman civilisation (law) and later with the increasing 
prominence of the French revolutionary ideals of ‘Equality, Liberty and Fraternity’ 
from ca.1789, there came an increase in popularity of legal justice as a separate 
requirement of justice distinct from social and distributive justice.14  Ultimately for 
this reason legal justice became closely connected with ideals of human equality and 
liberty, while fraternity is reflected in social and distributive justice movements (Karl 
Marx & Angels Frederick 1888). 
What is most important for this work is to recognise that in its current usage the 
concept of justice evolved into a clearly three-pronged concept with each dimension 
imposing different kinds of obligations, all which must be fulfilled if the concept (or 
virtue) of justice is to be satisfied. Another improvement from the classical conception 
of justice is that the current conception of justice is based on a belief in the 
metaphysical equality of all human beings and, therefore, it makes a distinction 
13 There is evidence that in classical Greece there was a system of legal justice, although this was more 
limited to a system of criminal justice. The mainstream discussion of the concept justice, for example 
in the The Republic, does not emphasize any distinction between the various components of justice as 
they exist now; that is, legal justice, institutional justice and distributive justice. 
14 There is evidence that in classical Greece there was a system of legal justice, although this was more 
limited to a system of criminal justice. The mainstream discussion of the concept justice, for example 
in the The Republic, does not emphasize any distinction between the various components of justice as 
they exist today; that is, legal justice, institutional justice and distributive justice. 
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between privileges and moral rights or entitlements of individuals qua individuals 
without any distinction based on contingent features such as nationality, sex, race etc. 
Current conceptions of justice reflect a clear distinction between legal rights based on 
political values of equality and liberty; and institutional justice achieved through just 
social institutions which fairly distribute power and opportunities; and a mechanism 
for deliberate redistribution of resources to the benefit of those whose material and 
social well-being falls below a certain threshold through no (moral) fault of their own. 
Both of the latter categories of obligations are based on the ideal of ‘fraternity.’ It is a 
combination of these three dimensions of justice (legal, institutional and 
redistribution) which define the meaning and requirements of global justice. The 
outcome of this distinction is that any of these three dimensions of justice, including 
distributive justice, is an essential component of the concept of justice. At a more 
general and fundamental level this work is work is concerned with distributive justice 
as one of the necessary conditions for the achievement of justice. 
1.4.2 ‘Global Justice’ and ‘Global Distributive Justice’ 
The importance of distinguishing between ‘global justice’ from ‘global distributive 
justice’ is to emphasise the claim that global justice is a much broader concept than 
requirements of international law and ‘formal equality of opportunity’, promised by a 
hope for just global institutions. The distinction is meant to corroborate the point 
made above regarding ‘global distributive justice’ as a necessary component of the 
whole concept of global justice. Therefore, the distinction and relationship between 
‘global justice’ and ‘global distributive justice’ is a corollary of the above distinction 
between ‘justice’ and ‘distributive justice’. The concern of this work, with due regard 
to other requirements of global justice, is limited to a discussion of global distributive 
justice with particular focus on the global distribution of health opportunities in form 
of health goods and services. 
1.4.3 ‘Obligations of Justice’ and ‘Duties of Humanity’ 
The analysis in part II above (on the existence of potentially enforceable transnational 
obligations of distributive justice) has been mainly necessitated by a tendency to mix 
up ‘obligations of (distributive) justice with ‘duties of humanity.’ In discussions of 
distributive justice in a global context virtually all contributors agree about the need to 
transfer some of their resources to those that suffer severe scarcity of these resources. 
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However, the discussion becomes divisive on the question of whether the need for 
global resource redistribution imposes ‘obligations of justice’ or ‘duties of humanity.’ 
From a philosophical point of view, ‘obligations of justice’ are moral requirements on 
the part of the agent addressed (to act or not to act in certain ways) in respect of the 
moral rights of the agent for whose benefit such obligations are borne and fulfilled. 
So it means that ‘obligations of justice’ are potentially enforceable, and so are the 
obligations for global distributive justice. On the converse, however, ‘duties of 
humanity’ are simply morally praiseworthy actions performed by one agent for the 
benefit of another who has no moral claim/right to such beneficent action from the 
acting agent. Charity and benevolence are typical examples of duties of humanity. A 
distinction between obligations of justice and duties of humanity can be made 
immediately intelligible by looking at what David Hume calls circumstances of justice 
on the one hand, and the concept of moral rights. According to David Hume, 
‘obligations of justice’ are contrasted with acts of benevolence or charity. On Hume’s 
account benevolence is a human sentiment which is possible only in circumstances of 
unlimited abundance. On the other hand, justice which imposes enforceable 
obligations arises because of scarcity of resources which inhibits the sentiment of 
benevolence and, therefore, makes enforcement necessary (Hume 1777). On this 
view, therefore, whereas duties of humanity are not morally binding and, 
unenforceable, obligations of justice are morally binding and potentially enforceable.  
Further, from the philosophical understanding of justice as mentioned above, justice 
arises from specific moral rights held by all individuals. Since the concept of rights is 
synonymous with entitlements, it means that justice spells out what human beings are 
morally entitled to which must be granted to them. In the global context this moral 
right imposes morally binding and potentially enforceable transnational obligations on 
the agent who is addressed or who is said to bear such obligation. Therefore, in 
discussions of global distributive justice there is need to emphasise the distinction 
between ‘obligations of global distributive justice’ and ‘duties of humanity’. Whereas 
there is no dispute about the approval of ‘duties of humanity’, what is clearly 
disputable in the pursuit of global justice is whether there are, or ought to be, 
transnational obligations of global distributive justice as the analysis in part II above 
revealed. With due regard to the importance of duties of humanity in global resource 
redistribution, the analysis in this work is limited to a category of ‘morally binding 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
obligations of countries for global distributive justice’ as a necessary complement of 
the other two categories of international law, and transnational political/institutional 
justice in order to achieve global justice. 
1.4.4 Global ‘Inequalities’ and ‘Inequities’ in Relation to the Global Justice 
Agenda 
In this work global social ‘inequalities’ refer to differences in access to goods and 
services necessary for human survival and well-being, and the resulting differences in 
human well-being among individuals between and within countries. On the other hand 
global social ‘inequities’ refer to undeserved15 and avoidable inequalities in access to 
goods and services and consequent material and social well-being. Therefore, whereas 
the concept of global social inequalities is ethically neutral in a sense that inequality 
per se is not a moral wrong, global social inequities are ethically reprehensible and 
can be approved under no circumstances. In moral philosophy, and in this particular 
analysis of obligations of countries to ensure global justice, the ultimate concern is on 
global inequities in access to material and social goods and services between 
individuals globally and the resulting inequalities in human well-being on the one 
hand, and equity in the allocation of responsibilities to countries for alleviating such 
inequities. 
The distinction between ‘inequalities’ and ‘inequities’ in the discussion of global 
distributive justice is necessary in order to emphasise the point that global justice does 
not aim at eliminating inequalities as such or in-themselves.  Instead, the ultimate goal 
of global distributive justice is, or ought to be, equity in access to a certain threshold 
amount of goods and services and equity in the allocation of costs and burdens for 
guaranteeing such a threshold. This means that any effort to eliminate or reduce 
global inequalities of whatever category must not be blind to concerns of equity. One 
of the implications of this distinction is, as I argued earlier, that whereas the current 
trend in the discussion of obligations of countries has the capacity to guarantee to all 
individuals globally equal access to a certain minimum of goods and services, this 
15 As I show later the qualification ‘undeserved’ implies that potential beneficiaries of redistribution 
bear certain obligations which, if fulfilled, might prevent or mitigate the destitution. In other words, it 
may not be an injustice if victims of are not assisted to overcome destitution for which they are morally 
responsible. 
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does not guarantee that there will be global equity. I showed that the concept of equity 
requires that the burden of achieving the targeted minimum be shared proportionately 
between all concerned global actors, and it is for this reason that an enquiry into 
obligations of beneficiaries of global justice (resource-poor countries) becomes very 
crucial. In summary, since this work is ultimately concerned with equity, the main 
issue in the discussion pertains to ‘how to share in a proportionate manner between 
affluent countries and resource-poor countries, the burden of guaranteeing to all 
individuals globally a certain minimum of health goods and services necessary for 
their survival and basic well-being’. 
1.4.5 ‘Global Justice’, ‘Global Egalitarianism’ and the “Minimal Conception of 
Justice” 
Generally pessimism has been cast on the aspiration of global justice, particularly 
global distributive justice as seen from a liberal cosmopolitan perspective. This is on 
grounds that it is aiming at ‘global egalitarianism’(Brock 2013). Brock argues that 
“What characterises the cosmopolitan position, at any rate, is a broad commitment to 
global egalitarianism understood as a demand of justice, stemming from the moral 
equality of persons” (Brock 2013, 44). Unfortunately Simon Caney too portrays the 
quest for global justice as a global egalitarian agenda due to his cosmopolitan 
sympathies (Caney 2000, Caney 2001, Caney 2008, Caney 2011). Generally since the 
concept of global distributive justice is mostly associated with the idea of liberal 
cosmopolitanism, critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes tend to employ a straw-man’s 
argument against global distributive justice by purporting that it is synonymous with 
‘global egalitarianism’, a political view that may sound quite utopian and absurd to 
many as Brock argues above. In reaction to this way of arguing against global 
distributive justice Charles Beitz has thus warned about the tendency in discussions of 
global justice to frame the debate “as if the most important practical consequence of 
taking justice seriously would be a requirement to advocate large increases in inter-
country transfer payments” on a model of foreign development assistance or as no-
strings-attached grants to poor country governments (Beitz 2005). On the contrary 
however, the concept of global distributive justice as used in this work evades any 
egalitarian connotations. It is limited to guaranteeing to all individuals globally a 
certain minimum share of socio-economic opportunities and well-being rather than 
perfect equality of distribution or opportunity suggest by global egalitarianism.  
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On the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s “minimal conception of social justice” it ought to 
be understood that global distributive justice aims at achieving “a list of entitlements 
that have to be secured to citizens if the society in question is a minimally just one” 
(Nussbaum* 2004, 13). Therefore, the concept of global justice as used in this work is 
defined by its ultimate goal of distributive justice which represents “a belief that there 
are (is a minimum of) some things which people should have, that there are basic 
needs that should be fulfilled, that burdens and rewards should not be spread too 
divergently across the community, and that policy should be directed with 
impartiality, fairness and justice towards these ends (Falk, Hampton et al. 1993)”. The 
capabilities approach to global justice as proposed by Martha Nussbaum is a proposal 
for guaranteeing to all individuals a certain minimum of opportunities for well-being. 
Nussbaum describes these as fundamental capabilities (Nussbaum* 2004). Therefore, 
if criticisms against efforts towards global justice as conceived in this manner are to 
be successful they ought to look elsewhere for levers to pull rather than wrongly 
equating ‘global distributive justice’ to ‘global egalitarianism’. 
1.4.6 Achieving the Global Minimum Fairly 
In the first and second part I emphasized two major ideas and these ideas must be 
emphasised all through. These are the ideas of complementarity of obligations of two 
sets of global actors (rich and resource-poor countries) and the idea of equitable
distribution of burdens/costs. It is by taking these two ideas into consideration that it 
can be possible to achieve a certain global minimum distribution of goods and 
services and achieve it through a fair process. For instance, the idea of undeserved
inequalities in the definition of ‘global inequities’ (above) implies that obligations of 
distributive justice, especially those of external actors, are based on a presumption 
that ‘potential beneficiaries of redistribution are suffering significantly from avoidable 
harms arising from circumstances beyond their control.’ The emphasis of the proviso 
of circumstances beyond their control is crucial because it entails that the virtue of 
redistributive justice ought not to be abused (or engender further injustice) by 
requiring external agents to reward recklessness among potential beneficiaries of 
redistribution or their agents (governments). This intuition suggests that obligations of 
redistributive justice are two-pronged, operating in a complementary relationship as I 
emphasized earlier: that is, obligations of potential beneficiaries of redistribution 
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and/or their agents on the one hand, and obligations of those required to redistribute 
part of their resources to the benefit of the victims. Failure to take this intuition into 
account in discussions of distributive justice whether at domestic or global level has 
high potential for engendering injustice against those whose resources are to be 
redistributed.  
The tendency to ignore obligations of potential beneficiaries of redistribution is also 
prone to a slippery-slope danger of never achieving the targeted impact of 
redistribution as I argue later. For example unless aid-recipient governments fulfil 
certain obligations relating to the external resources received such resources cannot 
have the desired impact on the level of resource distribution among citizens of the 
country in question. Hence a discussion of obligations of global justice that ignores 
possible obligations of potential beneficiaries of global redistributive justice is 
incomplete, while one that gives too much prominence to one of these sets of 
obligations risks complacence among the other obligation bearers.  
Further, since an argument for global distributive justice is based on a presumption 
that the victims’ lack of the minimum opportunities for well-being is beyond their 
control, potential external obligation bearers for remedying such global destitution do 
not necessarily have to be either morally or causally responsible for the suffering of 
the potential beneficiaries of redistribution. For obligations of redistributive justice to 
be morally binding upon external agents it only needs to be shown that avoidable 
destitution exists and the victims cannot be blamed for their destitution, while external 
agents have sufficient means to address such destitution. In other words whereas, as 
Thomas Pogge has rightly argued that obligations of global justice are automatically 
justified by the moral responsibility of the rich for the suffering of the poor, (Pogge 
2008) the arguments in this work are based on a claim that there are additional 
grounds for affirming obligations of global distributive justice even if there were fair 
play between the victims and beneficiaries of global injustice. This insight is based on 
David Miller’s discussion of the ground for assigning remedial responsibility (Miller 
2007, 81-109). 
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  Part IV 
1.5 Leanings in Discussions and Actions on Justice in Global Health 
In this section I will illustrate that the trend in the discussions regarding justice in 
global health imitates the above trend in the discussion of obligations of global 
distributive justice in general. I will also go ahead to show how an outcome based on 
this trend (which merely affirms HIC obligations of resource transfer) does not in 
itself guarantee equity in global health. The reasoning is the same as one I emphasised 
earlier which, in this case, is that the burdens (costs) for ensuring justice in global 
health (a certain minimum level of health opportunities for all) is proportionately or 
equitably shared by all the actors involved. In particular I will demonstrate the need to 
emphasise the ‘complementarity of obligations’ of two sets of actors: donor 
governments and aid-recipient governments. It is in this way that I hope to show the 
necessity of obligations of poor countries in facilitating the achievement of global 
health equity. Without undermining the importance of other types of obligations 
which must be fulfilled to ensure justice in global health, I will use the case of global 
health financing to illustrate my argument. 
Even though in general discussions of global justice the question of whether affluent 
countries are morally obliged to transfer resources to developing countries is still 
deeply divisive, in the specific discussion of justice in global health this question is 
for the most part treated as settled with an affirmative answer. Most contributors to 
the discussions regarding justice in global health reflect a firmly held belief that there 
are morally binding obligations borne by affluent countries to transfer health 
resources to resource-poor country settings. The tendency to treat this question as 
settled is seen in the practical measures at a global level for ensuring justice in the 
global distribution of health opportunities. However, at a theoretical level there is 
evidence of a lurking persistence of the controversy about the existence of morally 
binding transnational obligations for global health justice, as exemplified by some of 
Norman Daniel’s arguments in his book Just Health (Daniels 2008). But since I am 
treating this question as having been settled in part II, and settled elsewhere in the 
specific case of justice in global health (Ooms and Hammonds 2010), in this part I 
want to concentrate on illustrating how the practical suggestions regarding global 
health financing in developing countries focus exclusively on obligations of the 
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affluent countries to transfer health resources to developing countries without daring 
to specify stringent obligations of potential recipients of health-aid (LIC 
governments). I will then show how failure to integrate obligations of developing 
countries in health financing misses the two major ideas of ‘complementarity of 
obligations’ and ‘equitable sharing of burden/costs, thus making it extremely difficult 
to achieve global health equity. I will go ahead to propose and explain three important 
issues that ought to guide discussions and other steps towards justice in global health. 
I will start by asking and answering a general question regarding what justice in 
global health requires. I will then emphasise the role of national governments as 
primary obligation bearers to ensure justice in global health. I will also show the 
sources of concern about justice in global health by providing a brief background 
which explains the lop-sidedness of discussions and actions on injustice in global 
health. 
1.5.1 What Does Justice in Global Health Require? 
In an effort to answer the question of what justice in global health requires James 
Dwyer has rightly argued that unlike individual health, population health depends on 
political justice. His argument is that whereas “health depends on susceptibility to 
illness, exposure to risks, access to resources  and care, the social consequences of ill 
health and many other factors,” all these factors are influenced by the justice of the 
social environment (Dwyer 2005, 463). He outlines three types of duties necessary for 
the achievement of global justice in health, especially improving living conditions of 
the world’s poor populations. The three duties are Duty not to harm, Duty to 
reconstruct and Duty to assist (Dwyer 2005, 469 - 474). Whereas he correctly treats 
the first two as straightforward (needing no justification), he treats the duty to assist in 
a manner that is debatable. Given his endorsement of Rawlsian political conception of 
global justice, Dwyer’s duty to assist seems to fall under the category of duties of 
humanity rather than an obligations of justice. Again since this issue has been 
addressed in part III above, I will not go back to it here. Secondly, Dwyer 
recommends, as mentioned earlier, that “Rather than debating, in general terms, the 
justification and importance of the duty to assist, we focus more attention on the aims 
of this duty and the various ways of fulfilling it” (2005, 473). Hence in his view, the 
most fundamental question is, as I mentioned in part II, not whether but how to assist. 
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He therefore seems to imply that the major problem facing the duty to assist is the 
manner in which assistance is delivered to those in need of it. However, the current 
practices in ODA, both health-specific and general ODA indicate that the major
problem is not how to assist but rather whether the assistance in question is a stringent 
obligation of justice. In this part I am not concerned with any of these questions but 
the question regarding how much health-aid should be a moral requirement and what 
equity requires in the process of determining its size.
My analysis of what justice in global health requires is guided by the answer 
regarding what global justice in general requires. Given the minimal conception of 
justice adopted in this work, the answer to the question at hand can be given in two 
sentences. On top of observing all aspects of international law relating to health and 
other social determinants of health, and ensuring that global institutions are designed 
in a manner that distributes health opportunities equitably on a global scale, justice in 
global health requires that all global health actors contribute to efforts that guarantee 
to all individuals globally a certain minimum of health goods and services. Secondly 
and most importantly, justice in global health requires that the burden of guaranteeing 
a certain minimum level of health opportunities to all individuals globally be shared 
proportionately by all actors in global health, primarily national governments as the 
major actors. The major contention of this work is that even if the first (of the above 
two) requirement is part of the rhetoric in discussions of responsibility for global 
health, the latter has not gained as much prominence as it deserves.  
1.5.2 Obligations of National Governments towards Global Health Justice 
With regards to responsibility for global health, there is no doubt that national 
governments are the major (political) actors. Therefore, since the distribution of health 
opportunities such as medical and general health care and other social determinants of 
health depend on public policy and its implementation, with due regard to the role 
played by a multiplicity of non-governmental actors in global health, the primary 
responsibility for ensuring justice in global health falls on national governments. It is 
for this reason that my concern is to examine issues in the complementary obligations 
of national governments of both developed and developing countries rather than those 
of other global actors such as civil society organization, pharmaceutical companies 
etc. 
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In examining the nature of responsibility for ensuring justice in global health the 
World Health Organization (WHO) recognises that in global health social justice is “a 
matter of life and death. It affects the way people live, their consequent chance of 
illness, and their risk of premature death.” But most importantly the WHO goes ahead 
to note that inequities in health “arise because of the circumstances in which people 
grow, live, work, and age, and the system put in place to deal with illness.” All this is 
the primary responsibility of national governments. As a remedy, the WHO advises 
that, “It is essential that governments, civil society and other global organisations now 
come together in taking action to improve the lives of the world’s citizens” (Marmot, 
Friel et al. 2008, iii).  
Prioritising the responsibility of national governments in ensuring global health equity 
within and between countries is appropriate for two reasons. One is that formally, 
national governments bear the primary responsibility for the health of their people 
through the four key functions of service delivery, input production, health financing 
and the stewardship role for health sectors (WHO 2000). Secondly, as stewards of the 
health sectors, national governments have the ultimate authority  in regulating, 
directing and coordinating the activities of other actors such as the civil society (local 
and international), bilateral and multilateral activities, industry, and all ministries and 
sectors that impact population health. Even though the primary position occupied by 
national governments suggests that they have many duties and obligations to fulfil in 
order to ensure equity in health domestically and globally, I will limit my scope of 
analysis to obligations of countries in health financing that would, among other 
obligations, facilitate global health equity. 
The analysis that follows takes as axiomatic a claim that inequities in global health are 
a consequence of “unequal distribution of power, income, goods and services, 
globally and nationally [and] this unequal distribution of health-damaging experiences 
is not in any case a ‘natural’ phenomenon but is the result of a toxic combination of 
poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements and bad politics” 
(Marmot, Friel et al. 2008, 1). It is important to emphasise the point that despite the 
rapidly growing power of multinational companies and other global health actors, 
national governments still wield the political power for the final say in international 
health policy and politics. It is for this reason that the WHO has insisted that in 
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tackling inequitable distribution of power, money and other resources there is need to 
“place responsibility for action on health and health equity at the highest level of 
government and ensure its coherent consideration across all policies; make health and 
health equity corporate issues for the whole government …” (Marmot, Friel et al. 
2008, 11). In the case of low income countries this means that despite real scarcity of 
resources at the disposal of governments, domestic governments are still the major 
actors in efforts towards global health equity domestically and globally. The rejection 
of resource scarcity as a potential excuse for governments to evade their responsibility 
for the health of their people partly justifies an enquiry into developing country 
obligations in facilitating the achievement of justice in global health, despite their 
severe scarcity of resources. 
Given this understanding my analysis of countries’ obligations for global health 
equity is based on the reasoning that obligations for global health justice take place at 
two levels. One is a domestic level while the second is a transnational or global level. 
These two levels are complementary to the extent that it would be impossible to 
achieve global health equity without giving due regard to each of them. What this 
means, as I argue later, is that even if external obligation bearers fulfil their 
obligations by transferring health resources to LIC governments, if such governments 
do not fulfil specific obligations it will not be possible for the transferred international 
health resources to achieve the targeted health improvements. Further, bearing in 
mind what equity requires, if recipient governments are unwilling to allocate “the 
maximum of their available resources” to the health sector to fulfil people’s right to 
health (ICESCR, General Comment 14) and, for the sake of guaranteeing the 
minimum health good and services to all individuals such governments end up 
imposing a disproportionate burden onto citizens and governments of high income 
countries, this situation engenders injustice against external obligation bearers.  
1.5.3 Source of Concern about Justice in Global health 
The source of concern about justice in global health is the gross avoidable inequalities 
in the health status within countries, but most importantly between countries. This 
concern is strengthened by the trend of these inequalities which has been deepening 
over the years and is deepening further. Other than inequalities in health statuses 
between individuals globally, the concern about justice in global health is due to the 
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steep gradient in health opportunities also within and between countries. Generally the  
concern is that poor populations both within and between countries have very poor 
health statuses and at the same time they have very unequal access to health care and 
other social determinants of health, a situation that is a kin to that described by Julian 
Tudor Hart using what he termed as “the Inverse care law”16(Hart 1971). Since this 
situation is known to be changeable by human efforts, it follows that if nothing is 
done about it, and those who have the means to do so are morally required to mitigate 
such a situation, then if they do not do so they can be blamed for tolerating injustice 
or even doing injustice.  
My intention in examining the source of concern about injustice in global health is not 
to provide comparative statistics of the health statuses of the global poor versus the 
rich. Instead I want to concern myself with the distribution of health opportunities. 
But still since health opportunities are quite many, I will be concerned with health 
financing which is I believe is pivotal for all other health opportunities. Of course this 
is not to say that health financing directly affects all other social determinants of 
health – such as education, religious and cultural beliefs, neighbourhood, among 
others. My choice to focus on health financing is because all immediate responses to 
ill-health (all health interventions) cost money, whether directly or indirectly. 
1.5.3.1 Disproportionate Distribution of Global Health Resources
Globally the allocation of health resources between countries is disproportionate. By 
proportionality here I mean the allocation of health resources to specific population 
groups basing on the global distribution of the global burden of disease and the 
estimated cost of addressing such causes of ill-health.  This (proportionality) is far 
from being the case in current trends in the distribution of health resources on the 
globe. Health financing for medical and general health care services, health Research 
and Development (R&) as well as other social determinants of health are distributed 
in a manner that is not consistent with idea of a proportionate distribution as defined 
above. This trend in the distribution of health opportunities has perpetuated injustice 
16 With specific reference to the distribution of medical services within pupations, according to Hart, 
the Inverse care Law is that “The availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the 
need for it in the population served” Hart adds that “The inverse care law operates more completely 
where medical care is mostly exposed to market forces, and less so where such exposure is reduced”.  
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by imposing a disproportionate burden on the global poor in an effort to guarantee to 
all individuals a certain minimum level of health opportunities.  
With regards to the distribution of health opportunities, the summary of the World 
Health Expenditure Atlas (2012) will be useful. Even though the global total health 
expenditure per capital is US$948, it has been shown that in 34 WHO member states 
the actual total health expenditure per person is less than US$50. In at least seven 
member states it is less than US$20. In this report the WHO further shows in what has 
been referred to as the “20/80 syndrome”, that 84 per cent of the world’s health 
resources are consumed by only 18 per cent of the world’s population. The WHO’s 
examination of these figures which links them to the distribution of global morbidity 
and mortality has revealed that global allocation of health resources is highly 
disproportionate. In summary, the analysis revealed that: 
[…] though the poorer WHO regions like AFR [Africa Region] and SEAR [South 
East Asia Region] account for the largest share of the global burden of disease (over 
50% of global disability-adjusted life years lost) and 38% of the world's population, 
they spend only 2.5% of global health resources. The Western Pacific (WPR) region 
without the four OECD Member States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Republic 
of Korea, accounts for 24% of the world's population (dominated by China), about 
16% of the global burden of disease but only 4.8% of the world's health resources. 
The region of the Americas (AMR) and Europe (EUR), excluding the OECD 
countries, account for 12.7% of the world's population, 11% of the global burden of 
disease and spend only 7% of health resources. Richer countries with smaller 
populations and lower disease burden use more health resources than poorer countries 
with larger populations and higher disease burden (WHO 2012, 3). 
Further, the 2014 global health expenditure report indicates that whereas the global 
average total expenditure for health per person per year is US$ 1008, the average 
amount spent per person on health in countries belonging to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is US$ 4584. At the same time, 
whereas the WHO estimates of minimum spending per person per year needed to 
provide basic, life-saving services is US$ 44, in 26 WHO Member States where health 
spending – including spending by government, households and the private sector and 
funds provided by external donors – is lower than US$ 44 per person per year. The 
same report shows that the Eritrea has the lowest per capita expenditure on health 
with US$ 12 per person per year, while Norway, the country with the highest per 
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capita expenditure on health spends US$ 8436 per person per year (WHO 2014). This 
means that the amount of health resources which are allocated to one individual in 
Norway is equal to that allocated to 703 people in Eritrea. 
1.5.4 Contemporary Responses to Injustice in Global Health 
Against the backdrop of the above experience, on-going response to the existing 
injustices in the global distribution of health opportunities, particularly health 
resources, there has been a tendency to emphasise the need for affluent countries to 
increase the size of health-resources transfers to LMICs in order to reduce the current 
disparities both in health financing and, consequently, in health outcomes. There are a 
number of recommendations being made and actions being taken to improve health in 
the developing countries and here I will only provide a summary of these efforts. 
These efforts are by both government and non-governmental actors. However, what is 
noteworthy about the various efforts (recommendations and practical measures 
already being implemented) is that they all focus on how to increase health resource 
transfers from affluent to poor countries and no significant effort has been made to 
enquire whether there is anything developing countries (or LMICs) must do 
themselves in order to ensure that their citizens achieve certain levels of well-being. 
The assumption that can be inferred from this attitude is that poor health outcomes in 
poor countries is due only to lack of sufficient resources to the extent that resource 
transfers from rich to poor countries will automatically translate into health 
opportunities. This assumption is false. It can be true only if health-aid recipient 
country governments fulfill certain obligations. 
Therefore, the essence of presenting the summary of these efforts is not to criticise 
them for being wrong or unnecessary, but to prove a point that they all focus 
exclusively on health resource transfer from the affluent to the developing countries. 
It is from this evidence that I want to make a case for the need to also focus on 
potential obligations of developing countries in health financing and other efforts in 
order to ensure that the burden of guaranteeing the targeted minimum of health 
opportunities to all individuals is proportionately shared between the developed and 
developing countries on the one hand, and between the developing countries 
themselves. 
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1.5.4.1 Proposals and Actions against Inequitable Distribution of Health 
Opportunities
With specific reference to health-specific ODA, the Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health has observed that despite the importance of aid, its volume is 
appallingly low. “It is low in absolute terms (both generic and health specific); 
relative to wealth in donor countries; relative to commitment to a level of aid 
approximating 0.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) made by donors in 1969; and 
relative to amounts required for sustainable impact on the MDGs. […] “A step-shift 
increase [in ODA] is required” (Marmot, Friel et al. 2008, 12). Further, in view of the 
current global inequalities in wealth and health, there have been numerous calls on 
donor countries to increase their general as well as health-specific Official 
Development assistance (ODA) (OECD 2014, Pielbags 2014, UN 2015). 
Some practical efforts to ensure fair distribution of health opportunities, particularly 
monetary resources, have been undertaken through a number of initiatives, most of 
which involved partnerships between the public and private sector. All these major 
initiatives aim at raising extra resources from the affluent countries to the developing 
countries. One of these initiatives is the Global Fund. The Global Fund which was 
founded in 2002 is one of the typical examples of the current efforts to ensure justice 
in global health by advocating and actualising extra resource transfers from the 
affluent countries (individuals, governments, civil society, Foundations etc.) to 
developing countries. The Global Fund which is a partnership between governments, 
civil society, the private sector and the people affected by diseases, relies for its 
funding on voluntary financial contributions from rich country governments, social 
sector enterprises, philanthropic foundations and rich individuals, all from the 
developed countries (Global Fund 2015). 
The second effort is the United States’ ‘President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief’ 
(PEPFAR) which is also another major global health actor in health financing among 
poor countries. This is a US government initiative started in 2003 “to help save lives 
of those suffering from HIV/AIDS around the world” (PEPFAR 2015). It relies for all 
its funding on the US citizens and government. Another major source of finance for 
health in the developing world is the Global Vaccine Alliance Initiative – GAVI. 
Since 2002 GAVI has been instrumental in bringing together the public and private 
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sectors “with the shared goal of creating equal access to new and underused vaccines 
for children living in the world’s poorest countries. What is even more important to 
note is that GAVI relies for its funding on the governments and other agencies of the 
developed countries with the five leading contributors being United Kingdom, Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, USA, Norway and Italy (GAVI 2015). However, 
GAVI is slightly different from other organisations with regards to its attitude towards 
the responsibility of developing countries in health financing. GAVI has a co-funding 
policy which requires benefiting countries to contribute to the cost of vaccines they 
receive (GAVI 2015). This is likely to encourage developing countries to increase 
their budgets towards health. But it can as well be asked: given the severity of 
resource scarcity among developing countries how much should they be required to 
contribute if they are to benefit from GAVI funds and by what criteria should it be 
determined. Further still, fundraising campaigns for health R&D to meet special 
health challenges in developing countries are primarily concerned with how to raise 
extra resources for health R&D which is relevant to the special health needs of 
developing countries (WHO 2012). 
It is important to reiterate and emphasise the disclaimer that the various 
recommendations by governments and all other global health actors that gave rise to 
these efforts are by no means wrong. It is true that in the wake of the current global 
inequalities in the distribution of health opportunities, especially health resources, and 
in virtue of real scarcity of health resources among the developing countries, the 
affluent countries need to increase their resource transfers to the developing countries. 
As a matter of fact, the general poor performance of countries with regards to ODA 
disbursements is a legitimate cause of worry in its own right and, therefore, it is a 
worthwhile endeavour to enquire into why this is the case and devise the ways and 
means to increase affluent countries compliance with ODA. Later I enquire into this 
question of why obligations of countries have been largely futile. 
However, this trend which emphasises obligations of affluent countries and ignores 
the potential obligations of developing countries is another cause of worry. My own 
worry about this trend is different from the one expressed by the UN. The UN’s 
concern is with the sustainability of progress towards the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) if the responsibility of developing countries 
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is not addressed, and instead the efforts continue to rely almost entirely on donor 
resources. The UN has cautioned that “A dependence on aid is akin to ‘putting all 
one’s eggs in the same basket’ and leaves countries exposed to sharp fluctuations in 
the overall volume of aid as well as donor preferences in terms of the purposes to 
which aid is put” (UNDP 2011, 146). The UNDP has observed that “The recent 
slowdown in development cooperation funds from the so-called ‘traditional’ donors is 
indicative of the fragility of international aid and of internationally agreed promises to 
increase it” (UNDP 2011, 150). However, my major concern is that the above trend 
misses the ideas of ‘complementarity of obligations’ and ‘equitable distribution of 
burdens and, therefore, does not guarantee equity in global health financing as I 
demonstrate later.  
1.5.4.2 Towards Equity in Global Health Financing
From the point of view of the crucial importance of the concept of the 
complementarity of HIC and LIC government obligations in the pursuit of justice in 
global health, it is important to note that while the above strategies for health 
financing in developing countries and calls to increase ODA continue, there is need to 
explore possible obligations of LICs. Since the idea of equitable distribution of 
burdens implies that obligations of external actors (affluent countries) are not 
unlimited, there is an additional question that needs to be posed and answered. How 
much, or, what proportion (of what is needed) should high income countries be 
morally required to transfer to the developing countries and how should it be 
determined given that equity requires a proportionate distribution of burdens towards 
a given end? Put differently, given that the obligations of affluent countries are not 
unlimited as to how much they can be morally required to transfer to developing 
countries ‘below what point in terms of amounts of resources transferred to the 
developing countries should affluent countries be morally blamed for acting unjustly 
and how should this level be determined if equity in global health financing is to be 
achieved’? The same question could as well be posed from a poor country 
perspective. That is to say: ‘In view of the levels of resource scarcity among 
developing countries, how much can they be morally required to contribute towards 
meeting the cost of guaranteeing their citizens a globally accepted minimum level of 
health opportunities?  
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The latter version of the question recognises the reality of resource scarcity among 
LICs, but at the same time the question implies that there ought to be a level of health 
financing which should be a stringent moral requirement for developing countries 
and, of course taking into account their resource capacities. Further, these questions 
emphasise the point that in an effort to achieve justice in global health, particularly 
equity in global health financing, it is necessary that the burden of contributing 
resources to cover the minimum health opportunities be shared proportionately 
between donor country governments and aid-recipient country governments. In this 
case proportionality consists taking into account the different resource capacities of 
different governmental actors in the allocation of the burden of global health 
financing. 
The question regarding how much resources ought resource-poor countries to 
contribute  is undertaken in agreement with WHO’s Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health which observed that “For countries at all levels of economic 
development, increasing public finance to fund actions across the social determinants 
of health […] is fundamental to welfare and health equity […] (Marmot, Friel et al. 
2008, 12). But still, in the same spirit as the trend in discussion of general obligations 
has shown above, with regard to health the WHO has emphasised that “In the case of 
poorer countries, it implies much greater international financial assistance” (Marmot, 
Friel et al. 2008,12). However, still in this case as in the case of general obligations of 
countries for global justice, the WHO does not specify how much or what proportion 
each set of actors (donors and aid-recipient country governments) should contribute if 
equity in health financing is to be achieved. Before answering this question it is 
important to first examine the impact of the present health financing practices among 
developing countries on the possibility of achieving global health equity, particularly 
financial equity. 
1.5.5 Health Financing among LICs and the Possibility of Equity in Global 
Health Financing 
The above analysis of the requirements of global distributive justice with particular 
regards to health is based on a claim that on top of achieving a certain minimum of 
health opportunities in form of health goods and services for all individuals globally, 
the task of achieving this minimum ought not to impose disproportionate burdens on 
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any of the parties involved. In this case the parties concerned are all individuals 
globally, albeit, through the agency of their national governments. In the case of 
health financing this means that health financing burden (in a global context) should 
be shared equitably at three levels: within LICs (between individuals/households); all 
health-aid recipient country governments; and, between aid-recipients’ (LIC) 
governments and donor (HIC) governments.  
Since the thesis of this work is that resource-poor countries should bear certain 
stringent obligations in ensuring equity in global health, it is necessary to show how 
inequity between poor countries themselves would persists if this they were to be 
exempted from fulfilling certain uniform minimum obligations for global health 
financing. In order to examine the current health financing practices between LICs 
themselves and the possible impact of the practices on the possibility of achieving 
global health equity, I will use the statistics provided by the 2012 Global Health 
Expenditure Atlas (WHO) 2012, particularly those for the WHO Africa Region. 
1.5.5.1 Inequities in Health Financing within and between Countries
The WHO has recommended that all national governments need to increase the 
amount of resources they allocate to health (WHO 2010). This recommendation is 
mostly relevant to developing countries (both low and middle income countries) 
where health expenditure per capita is still much lower than the global average. The 
recommendation that LMICs increase their domestically generated resources to health 
is derived from a claim that LMICs give low priority to their health sectors in national 
budgets, yet the health sectors play a crucial role in ensuring well-being as well as 
speeding up economic growth (WHO 2001). However, my concern about health 
financing among LMICs is that on top of most LMICs giving a comparatively low 
priority to the health sectors, there are wide divergences in priorities different 
countries give to health as reflected in their national budgets. What I intend to show 
below is that these divergences (within LMICs) in themselves are an obstacle to 
ensuring equity in global health financing.  
What needs to be emphasised again is the claim which I will demonstrate later that 
global health equity, especially equity in health financing, requires equity within and 
between countries. With regards to LMICs alone, equity ought to be understood at 
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two levels: equity within a country and equity between those who compete for 
external resources (LMICs) to the extent that if different countries claim different 
amounts of resources from external actors, each country’s claim should be 
proportionate to the claims of other countries by virtue of each country’s resource 
capacity. I will use the table below (Table 1) to highlight the moral necessity of 
focusing on obligations of aid-recipient countries in ensuring equity in global health, 
particularly global health financing. 
The table below and the discussion that follows are intended to give a rough picture of 
the inequities in health financing within the WHO African region. What is mostly 
crucial to note about the table below is the wide inter-country divergence regarding 
‘Who Pays What Per cent of THE (Total Health Expenditure) for health’. This is the 
basis of the discussion of the inequity in health financing between and within low and 
middle income countries. 







THE per capita 
(US$) 








Algeria 5 310 -  178 21 78 1 
Angola 4 322 42.7 123 18 82 0 
Benin 753 38.6 31 47 50 3 
Botswana 7 403 - 190 8 73 19 
Burkina Faso 590 39.8 40 36 51 13 
Burundi 179 33.3 21 38 38 24 
Cameroon 195 38.9 61 66 30 4 
Cape Verde 780 50.5 155 27 75 0 
Central African 
Republic 
457 56.3 18 61 35 3 
Chad 676 39.8 31 73 25 2 
Comoros 736 64.4 33 33 67 0 
Congo 2 943 47.3 72 53 47 0 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
199 44.4 16 38 43 22 
Equatorial 19 998 - 896 22 76 2 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
Guinea 
Eritrea 448 -  12 52 48 0 
Ethiopia 321 33.6 16 37 54 9 
Gabon 8 643 41.5 302 47 53 0 
Gambia 459 47.3 26 24 51 25 
Ghana 1 283 42.8 67 27 59 14 
Guinea 467 39.4 23 88 11 1 
Guinea-Bissau 551 35.5 47 66 10 24 
Ivory Cost 1 127 41.5 60 77 22 1 
Kenya 775 47.7 37 43 44 13 
Lesotho 982 52.5 109 16 76 7 
Liberia 246 38.2 29 35 33 32 
Madagascar 422 44.1 16 27 60 13 
Malawi 389 43.9 26 11 60 29 
Mali 636 33.0 32 53 47 0 
Mauritania 967 40.5 43 44 53 3 
Mauritius 7 485 - 449 62 42 7 
Mozambique 410 45.7 21 14 72 15 
Namibia 5 330 63.9 361 7 58 34 
Niger 354 34.6 18 41 51 8 
Nigeria 1 239 48.8 63 59 38 3 
Rwanda 530 50.8 56 22 50 28 
Sao tome & 
Principe 
1 256 50.8 90 54 38 8 
Senegal 1 033 40.2 59 35 55 10 
Seychelles 10 826 65.8 368 6 92 2 
Sierra Leon 325 35.4 43 76 11 9 
South Africa 7 255 63.1 649 17 44 39 
Swaziland 3 073 51.5 203 15 64 21 
Togo 531 39.3 41 47 44 9 
Uganda 519 44.3 47 50 22 28 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
514 37.6 31 14 67 19 
Zambia 1 237 57.5 73 26 60 13 
Zimbabwe - - - - - - 
Source: Constructed using 2010 Health Financing statistics provided in the WHO Global Health 
Expenditure Atlas 2012. GINI Coefficients are from the World Bank (2013). 
*GINI Coefficient is a “Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or 
households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute 
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equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality” (World Bank 2013). Therefore, the higher the GINI 
Coefficient in a given country, the higher the income inequality and vice versa. 
*1 means Total Health Expenditure of a given country. 
For better understanding of the impact of the nature of health financing among 
countries (as shown in Table 1) on the possibility on equity in global health, it should 
be recalled that the major source of inequities in health and health financing is 
reliance on Private Health Expenditure (PHE) for health, particularly Out-of-Pocket 
Payments (OPP) by households and, or individuals. Note should also be taken that the 
size of household expenditure as a proportion of Total Health Expenditure (THE) in 
turn depends on the contribution of the public sector and other external sources of 
health finances to THE for a given country in a given year. This means that the lower 
the contribution from the public sector (a combination of domestic and external 
sources) to THE, the higher the contribution of household expenditure to THE and, 
therefore, the deeper the inequities in health financing and access to health services. 
Therefore, that is why in this analysis the main attention is on “who pays what per 
cent of THE for health” and the GINI Coefficient (income inequality) of different 
countries in the Table 1. Probably it is not obviously intelligible to most people how 
PHE on health determines equity in health financing and access to health services and 
how GINI Coefficient is another additional factor to consider in the whole process. 
Below I give a brief highlight on how PHE impacts on equity in both health financing 
and access to health services. 
1.5.5.2 How Does PHE Impact on Equity Within Countries?
Within a single country, PHE leads to inequity in both health financing and access to 
health services. This is because different individuals and/or households have very 
unequal incomes as reflected in GINI coefficient column in Table 1. In addition to 
wide income disparities, individuals and household are exposed to very unequal 
health risks and actual morbidities, all of which mean that some 
households/individuals need to pay more than others in order to have equal chances of 
survival and well-being like everybody else. In both of these cases (unequal incomes 
and health risks/needs) poor individuals and households are the disadvantaged group. 
It might be asked whether PHE for health in itself leads to inequity in health 
financing. From an ideal point of view, PHE for health in itself does not lead to 
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inequities in health financing or access to health services. However, the only
circumstances under which PHE (household expenditure) would not lead to inequities 
in health would be in a kind of ‘utopia situation’ where every individual in a country 
has exactly the same income, exactly equal health needs, exactly equal geographical 
distance and transport costs to health facilities among other health-related costs. 
Hence, given the real socio-economic circumstances as we know them, PHE for 
health services, especially among LMICs, automatically leads to deeper inequities in 
health financing as well as access to health services.  
For the purpose of illustrating how the obvious impossibility of this ‘utopia situation’ 
automatically leads to deeper health inequities within developing countries, especially 
those shown in Table 1, I will hold two false assumptions one at a time. These 
assumptions are false because for each of them one of its conjuncts is false. The first 
assumption is that all ‘individuals in a country have exactly the same level of income 
and/but unequal health needs.’ The second assumption is that ‘all 
individuals/households have exactly the same health needs and/but unequal incomes.’  
In the first case (equal income but unequal health needs) high reliance on PHE implies 
that even though people have exactly the same income they will spend different 
proportions of that income on health because they have unequal (more) health needs. 
Those with high health needs will make a disproportionately higher contribution to 
general health financing (THE) in relation to those with low/few health needs. In the 
second case too (unequal incomes but equal health needs), even if people have exactly 
the same health needs, reliance on PHE means that those with low incomes will spend 
a much higher proportion of this income if they are to have equal access to the health 
services they need as everybody does. The same explanation would go for all other 
relevant assumptions such as ‘all things being equal except distance and transport 
costs to health facilities and other health expenditures’. In short, inequality in any of 
these relevant variables and the extent of that inequality contributes to inequity in 
health financing and access to health services when there is PHE for health services. It 
is important to emphasise that within developing countries, these inequities are 
extreme in number and depth. 
As shown in Table 1, within WHO Africa Region there is a very high reliance on 
household expenditure (PHE) on health, yet income inequalities (GINI Coefficients) 
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are also very high. For example, with regard to PHE as a proportion of THE, in at 
least twenty-seven countries PHE is 30% and above. In thirteen countries it is above 
50%, while in Guinea, a country with the highest PHE in the region (in the year 
considered), household expenditure on health contributes as high as is 88% of THE, 
while the GINI for the same country stands at a high rate of 39.4 per cent. 
Further, inequities in health financing and access to health services within most 
developing countries are worsened by the fact that health priority setting mechanisms 
(allocation of the available meagre resources) in most of these countries favour the 
rich (Peters, Garg et al. 2008). This further means that unless developing countries 
fulfill certain obligations, for instance obligations relating to equity in health resource 
allocation, even the funds raised from the current efforts to increase ODA will not 
guarantee for most LMIC citizen access to the targeted minimum health opportunities. 
Hence, within the developing countries alone equity in health financing should be 
reflected in resource mobilisation as well as the allocation of those resources.  
Therefore, since justice in global health aims at guaranteeing a certain minimum of 
health opportunities, and given that there cannot be any ‘utopia country’ as 
hypothesised above, inequities in health financing at a domestic level can only be 
avoided or at least significantly reduced by ensuring that there is no PHE for the 
minimum health opportunities targeted by justice in global health. That is to say, if 
any part of the minimum health opportunities is left to be financed by PHE, then the 
idea of guaranteeing this minimum will be defeated and it will, therefore, remain 
extremely difficult to achieve justice in the global distribution of minimum health 
opportunities. This means that in order to avoid the current inequities in health 
financing (and resulting inequities in access to health services) in countries which 
have not yet achieved a certain minimum health expenditure per capita (or health 
opportunities), the whole cost for minimum health opportunities must be covered by 
public funds; that is, domestically generated public funds plus external funds (from 
obligations of HICs).
1.5.5.3 Inequity between Developing Countries
The concern about equity in health financing between developing countries (or all 
health-aid recipient countries) arises from the fact that ultimately all these countries 
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compete for limited external resources in order to cover their deficits towards the 
global minimum. And given the limited nature of these (international resources) it 
means that if country ‘A’ gets it (resources) then country ‘B’ must miss it. Again, as 
mentioned earlier, the moral reasoning here is that given the differences in resource 
capacities of different potential aid-recipient countries, each country’s size of claim to 
external resources should be proportionate in relation to the claims of other countries. 
That is to say, countries with higher resource capacities (higher GDP per capita) 
should not claim as much health-aid per capita as those with poor resource capacities 
(lower GDP per capita).  
For instance Table 1 indicates that some governments with high GDP per capita 
contribute negligible proportions to their THEs on health. This means that such 
governments and their citizens bear a relatively light burden of health financing than 
their counterparts with lower GDP per capita since the latter have to contribute bigger 
proportions of their incomes in order to achieve the same health opportunities like 
those in better-off poor countries. This further means that each LIMC governments’ 
decision regarding what percentage of its domestically generated resources it should 
allocate to health has a direct impact (strain) on the limited international health 
resources. Hence, a country which allocates to its health sector less than an optimal of 
its available resources imposes part of what it should have been its responsibility to 
other global health actors. This is because the rest of the global actors must work to 
ensure that they guarantee a certain minimum level of health opportunities to 
individuals in that country. Of course it is not clear here what constitutes the optimal
or how to determine the optimal amount of the available resources. However, there 
can be a level of health financing as a proportion of the total budget expenditure 
which can be regarded as an optimal allocation to health. I will return to the issue of 
optimal resource allocation later (see the article in chapter four) on “Obligations of 
low income countries in ensuring equity in global health financing”(Barugahare and 
Lie 2015)). Therefore, there is need for a mechanism for allocating obligations for 
health financing between countries in a manner that is consistent with the ideas of 
‘complementarity of HIC and LIC obligations’ and ‘equitable distribution of 
burdens/costs, between individuals globally, although through the agency of their 
governments. 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
1.5.6 Summary 
What can be inferred from the above analysis so far is that whereas it is necessary to 
increase health resource transfers from the affluent to resource-poor countries in order 
to guarantee LIC citizens’ access to the minimum health opportunities, the 
achievement of equity requires that this campaign also be looked at from the 
perspective of developing country obligations. It could be true, as indeed most views 
suggest, that affluent countries are not doing enough in terms of health resource 
transfers to the developing countries, but the concept of equity suggests that their 
(HICs) responsibility is not unlimited. At the same time, it could also be true that 
LMICs are not doing what is optimal within their specific resource contexts and, 
therefore, they need to increase their own investment in health. But given the severity 
of resource scarcity in most of these countries, still the concept of equity in a global 
context suggests that they can only do so much. However, so far there is no agreed 
mechanism for determining the size of each actor’s (national governments) financial 
responsibility in efforts to guarantee to all individuals the required minimum level of 
health opportunities. For that matter, the trend in discussions regarding how to 
achieve justice in global health needs to take certain issues seriously. I will briefly 
explain at least three of these issues or questions below and these questions form the 
basis of my further enquiry in the chapters which follow. 
1.5.7 The Way Forward with Global Justice in Health
On the question regarding ‘whether closing the health gap between and within 
countries in a generation is feasible’ the WHO’s Commission on Social Determinants 
of Health has cautioned that: 
“If we continue as we are, there is no chance at all. If there is a genuine desire to 
change, if there is a vision to create a better and fairer world where people’s life 
chances and their health will no longer be blighted by the accident of where they 
happen to be born, the colour of their skin, or the lack of opportunities afforded to 
their parents, then the answer is: we could go a long way towards it” (2008, 23).  
This caution can be interpreted to imply that all efforts made for achieving global 
health equity (or global social justice in general) are dependent on a presumption of “a 
genuine desire to change” both at domestic and international levels. This genuine 
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desire to change is the fundamental condition that must be fulfilled if there is to be 
any hope for global health equity. This desire can be interpreted as the actors’ 
collective political will at both domestic and international levels to fulfil specific 
obligations necessary for the achievement of global health equity or global social 
justice. 
In this regard, therefore, since there is a lot of evidence that most countries are not 
fully complying with their obligations to ensure global justice, effort should be made 
at exploring countries’ obligations for global distributive justice have for the most part 
remained futile despite wide political recognition of these obligations and what ought 
to be done about it. 
Secondly since the ideas of ‘complementarity of obligations’ and ‘equitable sharing of 
costs’ suggest that that LIC obligations are inevitable in the pursuit of global justice, I  
dedicate one chapter to exploring general the general nature of obligations of poor 
countries in the pursuit of global justice. My most important concern in this regard 
(chapter) is not to provide a list of specific poor country obligations which are 
uncontroversial, although I attempt to do so in specific reference to Uganda. Rather 
my major aim is to provide the kind moral and practical reasoning which should guide 
an enquiry into such possible obligations. 
Thirdly, with specific regards to global health (financing), the most relevant and 
urgent question is ‘how should domestic obligations of developing countries be 
understood in relation of external actors, specifically obligations of external country 
governments?’ More specifically, how should the obligation of financing global 
health be shared between high income countries and low income countries if equity in 
global health is to be achieved? 




The whole project towards guaranteeing to all global individuals a certain minimum 
share of goods and services in the name of global justice must take recognise the fact 
there are already certain obligations that seem to enjoy wide political recognition. At 
the same time it is crucial to note that despite this wide political recognition of these 
obligations, these obligations have for the most part remained ineffective. Both 
affluent and resource poor-countries flout these flout these rules and yet no sanctions 
or even threats of sanctions follow such defiance. The consequence of this futility of 
these obligations is that the success of the project of global justice continues to hang 
in balance. This issue of great importance because the practical impact of whatever 
obligations defended in this work and related works depend on the possibility of a 
successful implementation or fulfilment of these obligations. Therefore, unless we 
come close to an understanding of why current obligations of countries towards global 
justice have for the most part remained ineffective, then the understanding of 
countries’ obligations aimed at in this and several related works will not have the 
expected impact. For that matter, therefore, in this chapter I attempt to provide an 
understanding of the futility of countries’ obligations in ensuring global justice. This 
discussion takes into consideration the fact that obligations of countries for global 
distributive justice are mainly framed as human rights obligations, specifically 
countries’ obligations relating to the respect, protection and promotion of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR). Given that ESCR are broad, it is not possible to 
make reference to all ESCR. I will limit my discussion on the futility of countries’ 
obligations to obligations with respect to the health rights of low income country 
citizens or obligations of countries to ensure justice in the distribution of global health 
opportunities. Further, since health opportunities are broad in their number and scope 
I will draw my illustrations from health financing as one of the key determinants of 
the health opportunities available to any population group. Further still, the following 
disclaimer regarding my attempt at providing an understanding of the futility of these 
obligations should be taken seriously: even though my account might be no fully 
convincing to some, it makes a crucial point. The crucial and undeniable point is that 
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there is a deep problem with the level of countries’ compliance with their obligations 
and this stands in the way of all efforts towards global justice and in the particular 
case of this work, this futility stands in the way towards justice in the way health 
opportunities are distributed globally. Hence, the emphasis of this chapter is that it is 
necessary to enquire into the ultimate explanation behind the futility of countries’ 
obligations towards global distributive justice. 
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Abstract 
Background: Although health is a right of all individuals without any distinction, the 
realisation of this right has remained very difficult for the marginalised populations of 
poor countries. Inequitable distribution of health opportunities globally is a major 
factor in explaining why this is the case. Whereas the Protection, Promotion and 
Fulfilment of the health rights of developing country citizens are a joint responsibility 
of both domestic and external governments, most governments flout their obligations. 
Even though a lot of effort has been dedicated to reaffirming and interpreting these 
obligations the fundamental questions regarding why these obligations have 
nevertheless remained largely unfulfilled, as well the normative question of what 
ought to be done about it, have been largely ignored. 
Discussion: We treat issues of ‘health rights’ and ‘justice in global health’ as having 
unity of purpose – guaranteeing basic health opportunities to the marginalised 
populations. We identify two sets of reasons for the failure of obligations for global 
distributive justice in general: a set of ‘superficial reasons’ and a set of ‘fundamental 
reasons’ which account for the superficial reasons. In order to overcome these reasons 
we propose a strategy which consists in specifying a number of minimum and less-
demanding obligations for both external and domestic governments to guarantee to all 
individuals a certain threshold of material and social well-being particularly health 
goods and services. We argue that these minimum obligations can be freely accepted 
and fully complied with or enforced with “a thin system of enforcement” if the 
minimum is to be guaranteed. We envisage that once the initial global minimum has 
been achieved, further obligations can be allocated in the same manner, if necessary, 
and the health rights of the marginalised populations and global justice in general can 
be achieved in such an incremental manner. 
Conclusion: The futility of countries’ obligations for the health rights of the global 
poor as is the case for global distributive injustice is because of political will to 
specify and enforce such obligations. Minimum obligations should be specified and 
enforced with a “thin system” which is consistent with principles of national 
sovereignty and autonomy.  
Key Words: Health opportunities; Marginalised populations; Right to health; Global 
distributive justice; Obligations; Low Income Countries; Developing countries 
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Background 
Although health is a right of all individuals without any distinction, the realisation of 
this right has remained extremely problematic for most citizens of developing 
countries. Inequitable global distribution of health opportunities in form of health 
resources (and other social determinants of health) is one of the major impediments to 
the realisation of health rights of globally marginalised populations, and majority of 
whom live in Low Income Countries (LICs) and some many more in Middle Income 
Countries (MICs). The problem of unfilled health rights of these populations has a 
moral dimension because it is a typical case of global distributive injustice. But 
important to note is that this problem is bound to persist given the current practices in 
the global distribution of health opportunities particularly health resources. Therefore, 
given the close connection between fairness in the distribution of health resources and 
the realisation of health rights, we place our discussion of the futility of countries’ 
obligations for health rights in the broader context of global distributive justice and 
countries’ domestic and extraterritorial obligations to ensure justice in the global 
distribution of opportunities for survival and well-being. On the basis of principles 55 
and 56 of the UN Charter (CHAPTER 1945); the wide recognition of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.7 of GNP (Assembly 1970); the nature 
and scope of countries obligations for the realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ESCR) as interpreted by The Limburg principles (Principles 2004) especially 
paragraph 26, our discussion naturally covers both domestic and extraterritorial 
obligations for global distributive justice which are for the most part are framed in a 
human rights language. Our point of departure is a key note that despite the current 
wide political recognition of countries’ joint responsibility to ensure global 
distributive justice of which health is one dimension, most countries do not fully 
comply with their obligations and, consequently, global distributive injustice has 
continued to deepen. Whereas this fact and its consequences for the current status and 
trend in the distribution of global health opportunities and consequently health rights 
of LIC citizens are well known, the hard question regarding why most countries do not 
fully comply with their obligations has been largely avoided. This paper examines the 
reasons why, to a larger extent, most countries’ obligations have remained futile. After 
accounting for this futility, we go ahead to propose what ought to be done about this 
situation in order to achieve justice in global health with positive impact on the 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
realisation of the health rights of LIC citizens and, ultimately in other dimensions of 
human well-being.  
In this analysis our major concern is with the dimension of global justice which has 
been labeled as “global social justice” by the United Nations (UN)(UN 2006), and 
more specifically labeled “global distributive justice” by Charles Beitz(Beitz 2005) 
and, how the latter affects the realisation of the health rights of marginalised 
populations of developing countries. Our discussion is based on the thinking that 
“social justice derives from equality of rights for all peoples and the possibility for all 
human beings, without discrimination, to benefit from the economic and social 
progress disseminated and secured through international cooperation” (emphasis 
added) (UN 2006). The discussion also reflects a recognition that “[…] The 
international human rights system is an important way of advocating for or enforcing 
fairer distribution of resources in the world” (UN 2006). Hence, we are here treating 
human rights obligations and obligations defended in philosophical debates about 
global social justice as flip sides of a coin in pursuit of global distributive justice 
and/or in particular the realisation of the health rights of the marginalised populations. 
We shall examine the question we have posed above at two levels: the first level 
consists of reasons that can be regarded as ‘superficial reasons’. These reasons arise 
from the lack of precision and rigour, deficiencies that are evident in current 
obligations as well as their lack of an enforcement mechanism. The second level is a 
set of ‘fundamental reasons’ which account for the superficial reasons. The analysis 
ends with a normative case for a piecemeal strategy that will ensure an incremental 
achievement of global distributive justice leading to consistent progress in the 
realisation of the health rights of marginalised populations in the long-run. Central to 
the strategy we propose is the adoption of Martha Nussbaum’s “minimal conception 
of social justice” (Nussbaum* 2004) as key to understanding the requirements of 
global distributive justice and showing how it can be used to achieve global 
distributive justice in a piecemeal manner. In particular the extrapolation of 
Nussbaum’s concept of the “minimum” is more relevant in discussion of the right to 
health in light of the concept of “Core obligations” of States Parties outlined in 
paragraphs 43-45 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) General Comment number 14. In our discussion we shall draw our 
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specific examples and illustrations from literature regarding efforts to fulfill the health 
rights of LIC citizens and global health in general. 
Preliminaries 
Our discussion focusses on the basic health rights of the 'global poor' not the world's 
population at large. Since our discussion is grounded in social justice and the basic 
rights of the marginalised populations, we need to focus on the rights of the global 
poor who suffer most from current global distributive injustices and hence cannot 
realise their right to even basic health services. In our analysis we will not be 
concerned with the question of whether there are morally binding transnational 
obligations for distributive justice (or for the fulfillment of Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCR)). This issue is a background question for the kind of analysis 
we are engaged in here. Although there still persist some theoretical controversies on 
this question, we treat this question as settled with an affirmative answer. We base our 
enquiry on the implied acceptance of these obligations by countries as reflected in 
their various political commitments, such as Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
ratification of the relevant human rights instruments among others by almost all 
countries. Our view is that these political commitments can be interpreted as promises
made by countries to implement obligations suggested by those documents and 
instruments. There are several views that have convincingly demonstrated that such 
promises give rise to morally binding obligations on the promisor because they confer 
(moral) rights to the promisee (Raz 1986, Goodin and Pettit 2006, Goldman 2015). 
There are a number of financial and other kinds of promises by developed countries to 
developing countries in the spirit of international cooperation with a view of ensuring 
global distributive justice, and these are expressed in various ways (1970, Pearson 
1970, 2005). However, despite these political commitments by virtually all countries 
in the world, global distributive injustice seems to deepen even further and it is this 
situation that leads us to the question of why this is the case. 
To illustrate briefly the extent of the futility of extraterritorial obligations we can turn 
to a summary of countries’ compliance with ODA targets.  With respect to High 
Income Countries (HICs), most of them have largely not fully fulfilled their 
obligations emanating from ODA promises. In its 1969 Report, the Pearson 
Commission recommended in reference to HICs that “… Public or government 
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assistance in the form of grants, or low or interest-free loans should make up 0.70 per 
cent of the gross national product by 1975 and in no case later than 1980 (Pearson 
1970). The UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution confirming this target as the 
minimum of ODA as early as 1970 (Assembly 1970). Although this target was 
initially controversial in the opinion of some countries, it eventually gained wider 
acceptance by a majority of member countries (Assembly 1970). Whereas the 
acceptance of this target constituted a promise to the developing countries, very few 
developed countries that accepted this target thereby making a promise to LIC citizens 
have ever reached this target. By 2009 the highest ever registered ODA as an average 
percentage of Gross National Incomes (GNIs) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
was 0.33% in 2005 (DAC 2010), while the lowest went as low as 0.22% in 1997 
(OECD 1998). The fact that the highest percentage of ODA disbursement ever 
registered is less than half of the one recommended or promised (0.70%) is evidence 
that these obligations have failed to a large extent. The consequence of this situation 
has been shown to be the continuously deepening global inequities in the global 
distribution of wealth, health as well as general quality of life (well-being) (Pogge 
2010). This extent of futility of countries’ obligations for global distributive justice 
partly explains the persisting difficulty in fulfilling the health rights of developing 
country citizens and other marginalised populations. 
Discussion 
Even though there are many categories of human rights obligations under the two 
major categories – so-categorised as positive and negative obligations – our 
discussion is exclusively concerned with the ‘positive obligations’ and in particular 
the joint obligation of all countries to contribute health resources sufficient to 
guarantee a certain minimum level of health opportunities to all individuals globally. 
We emphasise the concepts of ‘guaranteeing’ and the ‘minimum’ as key in 
demonstrating the futility of current obligations. In this regard, our account for the 
futility of current obligations consists in identifying reasons why existing obligations 
and their various interpretations do not, in practice; and cannot, in principle, 
guarantee to the global poor access to a certain minimum level of health goods and 
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services and, why it is extremely difficult to judge States Parties as having made 
negligible or no effort towards that end. 
Reasons forthe futility of current obligations 
A critical examination of the various attempts to explain the futility of current 
obligations of countries for global distributive justice or fulfilment of ECSR (Eide, 
Krause et al. 1995, Schachter and Joyner 1995) reveals two levels or categories of 
reasons which can explain why most of these obligations go unfulfilled.  One category 
of these reasons is read directly from the manner in which current obligations are 
framed. We call these reasons ‘superficial reasons’. However, a deeper analysis 
reveals that there are other reasons which explain the existence of these ‘superficial 
reasons’. We call these reasons ‘fundamental reasons’.  With regard to superficial 
reasons one finds that by way of their phrasing and various attempts at interpreting 
them, current obligations are deficient in precision and rigour regarding specific 
actions that both domestic and external governments must take to ensure the 
realisation of global distributive justice and consequently the health rights of LIC 
citizens (or ESCR in general). The second superficial reason is the absence of an 
enforcement mechanism for these obligations. These two factors or reasons constrain 
the stringency of these obligations as we shall illustrate shortly with a specific case of 
the right to health, hence their failure to guarantee to the global poor certain minimum
level health goods and services. With regard to fundamental reasons, we offer two 
explanations: lack of political will to specify and enforce morally binding obligations 
of global distributive justice and pessimism about the desirability and feasibility of a 
coercive global enforcement mechanism for these obligations. 
Superficial reasons for the futility of current obligations 
As mentioned above there are two superficial reasons that explain the futility of 
current obligations for global distributive justice as well as human rights obligations 
particularly those relating ESCR: lack of precision or specificity of these obligations 
on the one hand, and lack of an enforcement mechanism on the other. We shall take 
lack of enforcement as self-evident and at the same time treat its consequence for 
countries’ compliance with their obligations as self-explanatory. That is to say, lack of 
any perceived threat in case of non-compliance with these obligations provides a 
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strong temptation for governments to do as little as they wish or nothing at all with 
regard to their obligations, particularly domestic resource allocations (in the case of 
LICs) and international resource transfers (in the case of HICs). Therefore, a detailed 
analysis of the superficial reasons will be on, first, illustrating how vagueness (lack of 
precision and specificity) and lack of rigour in current obligations of countries to 
fulfill the health rights of citizens of developing countries make it easy for countries, 
whether HIC or LIC governments, to defy their obligations. Secondly, apart from lack 
of any perceived threat in cases of non-compliance (because of no enforcement), what 
makes this breach quite tempting and easy is the lack of specific and objective 
grounds for holding countries morally blameworthy if they do not fulfil their 
obligations. 
To begin with, an examination of obligations of external parties (HICs) relating to 
health financing in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) (obligation to assist) 
reveals that the promises embedded in acts of countries’ ratifying the various human 
rights instruments are vague promises; vague enough to deny the purported 
obligations the rigour expected of obligations of justice. Current obligations are 
characterised by a number of exception clauses which leave these obligations open for 
interpretation as to what countries are morally required to do in respect of the health 
rights of people outside their countries. It is this challenge that makes it difficult to 
objectively judge any external governments as morally guilty of not fulfilling its 
obligations whenever they either do too little or nothing at all to ensure that individual 
outside their countries realise their health rights as social justice requires. First, with 
regard to constrained rigour of these obligations it is important to see how these 
obligations have been interpreted. External obligations (to assist) have been 
interpreted as follows:  
For the avoidance of any doubt, the Committee wishes to emphasize that it is 
particularly incumbent on States Parties and other actors in a position to assist, to 
provide international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical 
which enable developing countries to fulfil their core and other obligations (emphasis 
added) (UN). 
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Whereas the use of expression “incumbent on” seems to make this obligation rigorous 
enough, its stringency is severely diminished by an addition of a proviso “those in a 
position to assist”, yet, without going ahead to specify how, in case of non-
compliance, it could be objectively determined whether a given State Party was in 
position to assist or not. Even if the reasoning which grounds these obligations in 
promises might allow the promisor (HIC) to be automatically released from her 
obligations if it is established that she is genuinely unable to fulfil her promise, in this 
case there is no objective mechanism by which to make such determinations. 
Therefore, even if there were an enforcement mechanism for this obligation it would 
be practically impossible to objectively claim that a State Party has refused to honour 
its obligation. It is left to the State Party to decide whether it is in position to assist or 
not. For this reason the gist of the status quo is that HICs can, or may, transfer some 
of their resources to any of the LMICs or even a fellow HIC whenever they feel they 
want to do so. Therefore, it can be inferred that if “obligations to assist” are 
understood as obligations of justice which are meant to be stringent (and potentially 
enforceable), then the human rights discourse does not effectively impose on HIC 
governments any obligations of justice which can guarantee to citizens of developing 
countries the realisation of their right to basic health opportunities. That is, given the 
framing of current obligations to assist, external actors (HICs) bear no obligation (in a 
strict sense of obligations of justice which are potentially enforceable) relating to 
international resource transfers to LIMCs and this partly explains why most of these 
obligations have remained futile while at best international resource transfers are 
treated as charity. 
It is not only the HICs which have flouted their obligations for global distributive 
justice particularly for the fulfilment of LIC citizens’ right to health. Most LIC 
governments can be implicated in what may count as injustice in health care and a 
violation of health rights of their own citizens. The futility of LIC governments’ 
obligations particularly human rights obligations to their citizens can also be 
attributed the vagueness and lack of rigour which characterise them. 
In the case of LIC obligations to ensure social justice through the Promotion, 
Protection and Fulfilment ofEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights particularly the 
right to health (UN), Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR obligates each State Party to take 
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the necessary steps “to the maximum of its available resources” to the realisation of 
these rights (emphasis added). This has been interpreted to mean that:  
In order for a State Party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum 
core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort 
has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations (UN).
  
In addition the World Health Organisation (WHO) has emphasised that in determining 
the violations of the right to health “it is important to distinguish the inability from 
unwillingness of a State Party to comply with its obligations under article 12 [of the 
ICESCR]” (WHO). A further proviso is that “If resource constraints render it 
impossible for a State Party to comply fully with its Covenant obligations, it has the 
burden of justifying thatevery effort has nevertheless been made to use all available 
resources at its disposal […] (emphasis added) (UN). This interpretation is 
reproduced in the Maastricht Guidelines on violations of ESCR (par. 13) (van Boven, 
Flinterman et al. 1998), where the burden of proof of inability falls on the State Party. 
It is import to bear in mind that this clause also applies to HIC obligations to assist. 
Further, regarding the determination of violations of obligation to fulfil, it has been 
interpreted that violations of obligation to fulfil occur through, among other things, a 
state’s “insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources; […]” (emphasis 
added) (UN). What is crucial to note is that the essence of providing these various 
interpretations of these obligations is that they should be neither vague nor ambiguous 
as to what they require of State Parties with a hope that such clarity will induce wide 
compliance with these obligations. However, these obligations as interpreted in 
General Comment 14 of ICESCR and other Principles and Guidelines ((van Boven, 
Flinterman et al. 1998, Principles 2004) still fail to overcome their vagueness, lack of 
stringency and some of these interpretations have produced contradictions as their 
critical examination shows below. 
Whereas at first reading the above statements of obligations seem precise and rigorous 
enough, a critical examination of these phrases reveals serious problems with regards 
to their precision and rigour. In the first place, how much, or what percentage, of a 
country’s resources (GDP or annual budget) allocated to health shall be accepted as 
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the maximum of resources available at its disposal to fulfil the right to health? On this 
fundamental issue of “to the maximum of its available resources”, paragraph 26 of 
the Limburg Principles clarifies that “Its available resources refers to resources within 
a state and those available from international community through international co-
operation and assistance”. However, still there is no suggestion as to how much of 
such external resources LICs are entitled to or how to determine such amounts of 
resources. At present it is up to each State Party to decide what constitutes this 
maximum. This discretion is directly implied by paragraph 71 of the Limburg 
Principles. However, the limit of the ‘margin of discretion’ given to States Parties in 
the above-mentioned paragraph (in determining violations) is indeterminate; this limit 
is a sort of thing about which reasonable people can disagree. For example, in 
Uganda, whereas there has been wide public and expert protest against the 
government’s neglect of the health sector in budget allocations, there is no 
authoritative point of reference as to what minimum percentage of the national budget 
must be allocated to health (Odaga and Lochoro 2006, Mugerwa 2010, Mugerwa 
2012, Naturinda 2012). Further, even though the WHO has observed and 
recommended that all health-aid recipient countries (in the WHO Africa region) need 
to increase percentages of their domestically generated annual budget resources to 
health, there is no specific level (percentage of GDP or annual budget) recommended 
(WHO 2011). Therefore, current obligations of countries do not place any country 
under any obligation to allocate a certain minimum of their financial resources to the 
health of their people and this partly explains why it has remained very difficult for 
citizens of LICs (such as those of Uganda) to realise their basic health rights. 
Further, instead of clarifying obligations, some efforts at interpreting these obligations 
have produced contradictions with some of the key principles for implementation of 
these obligations. One glaring contradiction pertains to the essence of distinguishing 
between inability and unwillingness to fulfill obligations. By making reference to 
paragraphs 25 – 28 of the Limburg Principles, Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Maastricht 
Guidelines on violations categorically exclude ‘lack of resources’ as a valid excuse 
for failure of a State Party to fulfil its obligations. So, if the essence of determining 
violations is either that a State Party be reprimanded or be made to suffer sanctions, 
how morally justified would the international community be in reprimanding or 
punishing a State Party which is, because of resource scarcity, unable, rather than 
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unwilling, to fulfil its core minimum obligations ? Is the negation of ‘resource 
scarcity’ as an excuse limited to determining violations relating to obligations of ‘non-
discrimination’ and ‘equity in resource allocation’ and the like? In literature there is 
nothing to suggest this limit. 
Secondly, regarding the need to distinguish inability from unwillingness of States 
Parties to comply with their obligations in the process of determining violations of 
health rights, this requirement calls for precision in judging countries on their 
performances in order to be able to objectively say that country ‘A’ is able but 
unwilling or country ‘B’ is willing but unable to fulfill their obligations, particularly 
health financing. The required precision in distinguishing between inability and 
unwillingness presumes the existence of a mechanism by which to make this precise 
distinction, yet, such a mechanism does not exist. Therefore, with regard to resource 
allocations it is technically impossible to objectively judge any country as unwilling or 
unable to comply with its obligations. Hence, the seeming stringency of this 
obligation again vanishes with the impossibility of objectively judging any 
government as either unwilling or unable to guarantee certain levels of health or 
health opportunities to its citizens.  
In the case of HICs, it becomes impossible to objectively claim that a country has 
flouted its obligation by transferring low or no amounts of health resources to LMICs. 
The question here would be: ‘how much is such a State Party morally required (or 
legally obliged) to transfer to LICs and how should it be determined’? In the existing 
literature, particularly on obligations and their various interpretations (with exception 
of ODA targets), it is extremely difficult, if possible at all, to find an answer to this 
question. The consequence of this is that lack of an impartial basis for assigning moral 
blame to governments for their unwillingness to ensure a just level of health 
opportunities for individuals globally which is in line with their right to health, leads 
to complacence among most governments. Even if the ODA target mentioned earlier 
were to be accepted as the actual size of positive extraterritorial obligations, current 
lack of coordination in international resource transfers implies that still inequitable 
distribution of global health resources would persist with its consequence on the 
realisation of the health rights of most LIC citizens.  Generally, even if there were to 
be an enforcement mechanism for this obligation, this lack of precision as to how to 
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distinguish between countries’ inabilities and unwillingness to comply with their 
obligations would make it extremely difficult to hold any government accountable. 
Another attempt at précising LIC government obligations to ensure the realisation of 
the right to health by guaranteeing a certain minimum level of health to their citizens 
has been through the definition of “Core obligations” of States parties as listed in the 
ICESCR, General Comment 14, Paragraphs 43 to 45. But still these core obligations 
in general simply specify what types of services people must have access to while 
remaining noncommittal on how much resources or what percentage of national 
budget (or even what percentage of external resources) ought to be committed to such 
services, below which the governments can be objectively regarded as unwilling to 
fulfil its obligations. The “minimum core obligations” as interpreted by Maastricht 
Guidelines on violations still do not define the minimum in, for example, Nussbaum’s  
terms of “some appropriate threshold level” in her idea of the “minimal account of 
social justice” (Nussbaum* 2004). This kind of minimum which makes reference to a 
specific threshold would be a determinate level of, for example, a minimum global 
health-resource per capita which must be fulfilled through domestic and 
extraterritorial obligations. We return to this issue later.  
What is noteworthy about core obligations is the addition of “the right to health 
indicators and benchmarks”  as operationalised in specifying targets for health-related 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs Four to Six). We can see, of course, how 
health indicators come close to a definition of a specific threshold, albeit at the level 
of population health.  However, in order to see how these core obligations and health 
indicators and benchmarks fail to guarantee precision which is necessary in order to 
objectively hold governments accountable, it is important to look at health indicators 
in relation to their resource/financial implications. 
Bearing in mind that “the right to health does NOT imply the right to being healthy”
(emphasis in original) (WHO), specific health indicators and benchmarks in 
themselves are neither a sufficient nor necessary criterion for judging a government’s 
performance on its obligations. This is because the above disclaimer (what the right to 
health does NOT imply) entails that poor population health outcomes do not 
constitute conclusive evidence that a State Party has not done the best it can in its 
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specific resource context; nor would it be automatically inferred from improvements 
in these indicators that a State Party is performing to the best of its efforts in its 
specific resource context. With reference to the latter case what is implied is that the 
concept of “progressive realisation” of the right to health (ICESCR Art.1 (2)) towards 
“the highest attainable standard of health” (Organization 1989) entails that even if a 
country has achieved the prescribed health indicators by investing less than the 
maximum of its available resources (assuming it is possible to objectively determine 
the maximum), such a country will still be violating the health rights of its citizens 
(because it is unwilling to give them more health opportunities towards the highest 
attainable standard of health), and this also counts as a social injustice by such a 
government. Even though setting population health indicator targets is very important 
for health policy and program evaluations and appraisals etc., without specifying the 
precise level of investment in health for each country especially LICs, the idea of “the 
right to health indicators” in itself does not help in objectively judging governments’ 
performance. This situation makes futile mainly obligations of LIC governments to us 
their citizens (like the Uganda example has shown) who have no influence on our 
governments’ decisions including budget allocations. 
Finally, the recognition by the UN Committee on ESCR of extraterritorial obligations 
relating to ESCR promises hope with regard to countries’ compliance with their 
obligations. However, the impact of this recognition, especially on international 
resource transfer, will largely depend on the precision regarding who (State Party) 
should transfer how much resources to whom; or on the recognition and 
implementation of a mechanism such as that we proposed elsewhere (Barugahare and 
Lie 2015). However, this explicit recognition is crucial for the negative obligations of 
countries and their international companies (not to violate ESCR of citizens where 
they operate), and to provide clear complaint mechanisms for those who think that 
their rights have been (positively) violated as reflected in the Committee’s concluding 
observations on the second periodic report of China (UN 2014). 
In summary, the above examination reveals that current obligations of countries to 
fulfil the health rights of LIC citizens and thereby ensure justice in global health are 
not yet obligations in the real sense of obligations of justice which specify moral 
requirements on the part of obligation bearers and moral rights on the part of those for 
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whose benefit such obligations are borne. The lack of specificity in current obligations 
means that there are no objective grounds for judging any State Party as having 
flouted its positive obligation particularly relating to resource allocation or transfer. 
This situation is worsened by the fact that there is no enforcement mechanism for 
these obligations. But as the analysis above has shown, it would still be pointless to 
have an enforcement mechanism if it is still impossible, as it is now, to objectively 
and precisely judge any country as having flouted its obligations. The ultimate 
consequence of these two weaknesses is that currently governments perceive no 
impending threat whenever they contemplate flouting their obligations, whether the 
threat would be in form of moral blame or a number of sanctions. At best current 
international resource transfers are treated as charity which falls under the category of 
duties of humanity rather than obligations of justice and, therefore, cannot guarantee
the fulfilment of the relevant basic rights. This further implies that LIC citizens have 
no way of actively claiming any external resources as their entitlement to which they 
formally have a moral right because the sizes of such claims are currently 
indeterminate. On the other hand, domestic governments of LICs as the Uganda 
example has shown, are reluctant to allocate extra resources to health even though the 
experts, policy makers and the general public claim that the government has such 
capacity. Therefore, at a superficial level these can be said to be some of the reasons, 
and arguably major ones, that account for the futility of current obligations of 
countries for global distributive justice, particularly the fulfilment of health rights of 
marginalised populations such as most citizens of developing countries. But as said 
earlier there are underlying reasons which explain lack of precision and rigour in 
current obligations as well as lack of any enforcement mechanism in case of non-
compliance with these obligations. This is the category of reasons which we have 
called ‘fundamental reasons’. 
Fundamental reasons for the futility of obligations for global distributive justice 
The superficial reasons for the futility of countries’ obligations for justice in global 
health have been shown to consist in evident lack of precision, stringency and 
enforcement. However, these weaknesses are not spontaneous. The futility of general 
obligations of countries for global distributive justice and fulfilment of ECSR for that 
matter, is systematic. At a fundamental level, lack of specificity, rigour and 
enforcement of these obligations is a symptom of general lack of political will on the 
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part of countries (or State Parties) to specify and enforce these obligations. This 
means that these obligations are as vague, open (for interpretation), and unenforceable 
as they are intended to be. The second fundamental reason, and specifically a reason 
for lack of an enforcement mechanism, is general pessimism regarding both the 
desirability and feasibility of coercive enforcement of these obligations. We later 
show that these fundamental reasons are not insurmountable and that there are good 
reasons to reject or circumvent them if we want to gain any hope for realising the 
health rights of LIC citizens and global distributive justice in general. 
There is general lack of political will on the part of Sates Parties to specify and 
enforce obligations of global distributive justice and this directly and negatively 
affects the realisation of the health rights of marginalised populations in LMICs. The 
evidence for the general lack of political will to specify actions which countries must 
take as a moral requirement (especially domestic resource allocations or international 
resource transfers) on their part to fulfill their obligations for global distributive 
justice can be seen in the common theoretical denial that such obligations do exist at 
all. In discussions of obligations of countries for global distributive justice there is a 
widely shared claim that robust principles of distributive justice and their consequent 
obligations do not go beyond national borders (Dworkin 1986, Miller 1993, Rawls 
1993, Blake 2001, Nagel 2005, Daniels 2008). Among these authors Norman Daniels 
in particular imports this way of thinking into discussions regarding justice in global 
health.  In consideration of the spirited arguments that these authors have put up in 
defense of this position on the one hand, and the current attitude towards ODA as 
reflected in the practice of treating international resource transfers as charity on the 
other, it is not unreasonable to assert that these views have significantly influenced 
politics and policy, especially among external obligations bearers (donor countries). 
So it is very difficult to claim that reluctance to propose and implement an 
enforcement mechanism is an oversight, nor is it lack of cognitive capacity to state 
these obligations in a more specific and stringent manner, yet, this is necessary if 
basic health rights of LMIC citizens are to be guaranteed. Rather it is due to lack of 
political will that obligations are not framed and treated as real obligations of justice 
are supposed to be; that is, precise and potentially enforceable. 
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For our purpose, however, since we have taken it for granted that such obligations 
exist then there should be other reasons why those who believe that such obligations 
exist have not succeeded (or are also unwilling) in specifying and enforcing such 
obligations. These reasons can be traced from the importance all countries attach to 
the political values of national sovereignty and autonomy. Therefore, another 
fundamental reason for the futility of current obligations is that bearing in mind the 
political values of national sovereignty and autonomy, countries are unwilling to give 
up their freedom of deciding how to manage their affairs domestically, such as budget 
allocations in the case of LIC governments; and how much of their resources they 
must give out in ODA or any other forms of bilateral or multilateral assistance in the 
case of HIC governments. In this case the worry is that by specifying what countries 
must do in terms of domestic budget allocations and international resource transfers 
with a possibility of enforcing such decisions, countries are robbed of their 
sovereignty and autonomy in deciding for themselves on these matters. Therefore, the 
current phrasing – vagueness and constrained rigour – of obligations of distributive 
justice as well as those relating to ESCR particularly international resource transfers 
as well as reluctance to propose and implement an enforcement mechanism is a 
politically cautious way of going about transnational requirements for global 
distributive justice. Countries are generally not willing to dispense with their freedom 
to decide at their convenience (and bearing in mind their special political interests) 
what they can do as their contribution towards global distributive justice or what they 
must give out in respect of the ESCR of people who are not their citizens in case of 
HICs; or how to manage domestic affairs in the case of LICs. 
The other fundamental reason for the futility of current obligations is a corollary or an 
extension of the one above. It has more to do with the desirability and feasibility of 
enforcement of these obligations against principles of national autonomy and 
sovereignty. In light of the reason given above in respect to unwillingness to specify 
what countries must do in respect of global distributive justice – the desire to maintain 
their sovereignty and autonomy – a global enforcement mechanism of obligations 
becomes undesirable. But further, the reluctance to propose and implement an 
enforcement mechanism for transnational obligations of global distributive justice can 
also be attributed to pessimism regarding its feasibility. In the view of the UN, for 
example: 
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[…] there is an inherent futility in working to achieve greater equality between States in terms 
of development when there is no authority able to enforce measures that would ensure the 
realization of such an objective. The United Nations does not possess such authority. 
International organizations with greater power and influence in economic and financial 
matters, in particular the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have different mandates. A world government with an 
enforceable mandate to ensure equality and justice between its constituents is not on the 
immediate horizon (UN 2006). 
This lack of effective (and legitimate) institution to enforce transnational obligations 
seems to be one of the major sources of pessimism about the feasibility of enforcing 
obligations of global distributive justice in the same manner as it happens at a national 
level (through taxation and redistribution). But it can as well be said that the required 
institution or agency for enforcement can be created only if there is general, or at least 
a widely shared, political will to do so. Therefore, for as long as such an enforcement 
agency does not exist, then it is because there is not yet willingness to create it.  
But apart from lack of an existing authority to enforce obligations of global 
distributive justice, the undesirability of such an institution has something to do with 
the strong desire for political sovereignty and autonomy. There are serious doubts 
regarding whether it can be possible to have a truly democratic and fair global 
institution to do the enforcement. There are some views that there is particularly fear 
of the threat of imperialism especially against weaker states (Nagel 2005, Dahl 2010, 
Kymilcka 2010). Nagel in particular points to a dilemma stemming from ‘the need for 
effective institutions and the threat of expanding tyranny’. In his view “fortunate 
nations” fear such developments. “They therefore face the problem of how to create a 
global order that will have its own legitimacy, but not the kind of legitimacy that 
undermines strict limits on their responsibilities  [for the well-being of non-
compatriots]” (Nagel 2005). In a footnote he adds that “The undemocratic rulers of 
many poor nations have strong reasons of a different kind to protect their sovereign 
authority against international encroachment (emphasis added)” (Nagel 2005). This is 
an emphasis of the importance all countries attach to national autonomy and 
sovereignty which, most countries believe, will be eroded to some great extent by way 
of specifying and enforcing transnational obligations of distributive justice to which 
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obligations for the health rights of LIC citizens belong. It is these political 
circumstances that account for the general lack of specificity and rigour in obligations 
of global distributive justice as well as reluctance to propose and implement an 
enforcement mechanism which might guarantee wider compliance with these 
obligations.  
Therefore, whereas there is intellectual capacity to develop mechanisms for specifying 
and enforcing obligations of countries for global distributive justice, there are deeper 
reasons why the current obligations are vague and unenforceable. It is due to a 
combination of these superficial and fundamental reasons that obligations of countries 
for the health rights of most marginalised populations have remained futile for the 
most part. But the question arises: if current obligations are not divested of the 
conditions that cause their futility, what is the future of global distributive justice? 
Can the marginalised populations hope to realise even their basic health rights in these 
circumstances which do not guarantee anything to them? Judging from the current 
daunting performances of most countries on their obligations and the consequent trend 
in global distributive justice particularly the global mal-distribution of health 
opportunities as seen in the current trends in global health resource allocation (WHO 
2012, WHO 2014) it is obvious that unless the current conditions or reasons which 
explain the futility of current obligations are circumvented, there is no hope that either 
the marginalised populations will realise their health rights or global justice in general 
can ever be achieved. 
The way forward 
Given the above account for the futility of current obligations for global distributive 
justice, and given that it negatively affects the realisation of the health rights of 
marginalised populations such as the majority of citizens in poor countries, the natural 
thing to do as a way forward is to provide a way of reasoning that evades the current 
reasons for the futility of these obligations. In the first place, from the above 
discussion it has been shown that all fundamental reasons for the futility of current 
obligations of countries for global distributive justice have something to do with fear 
of potential erosion of national sovereignty and autonomy. However, in her response 
to the unwillingness to specify and enforce obligations of global distributive justice 
stemming from a desire to maintain national autonomy and sovereignty, Martha 
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Nussbaum has convincingly argued that “[…] there is not any reason why a thin 
system of global governance, with at least some coercive powers, should not be 
compatible with the sovereignty and freedom of individual nations” (emphasis added) 
(Nussbaum* 2004). However, in her view the enforcement is supposed to apply to a 
broader spectrum of all relevant actions as may be required for the achievement of 
global justice in general, rather than immediate redistribution of resources or health 
resources in particular. She espouses a very simple, democratic, and yet potentially 
feasible model of enforcement like one suggested by Thomas Pogge for enforcing his 
Global Resource Dividend (GRD) proposal (Pogge 2008). In respect of this view it 
ought to be added that not only is it possible to enforce obligations of global 
distributive justice without jeopardising national sovereignty and autonomy, there are 
also good reasons for moving away from relying on charity (or perfectly voluntary 
ODA disbursements), to specific and enforceable obligations of distributive justice 
among all global actors, particularly national governments. 
The first reason for shifting from charity or perfectly voluntary ODA disbursements 
has been offered by Nussbaum in her agreement with Liam Murphy (Murphy 2000). 
Nussbaum’s view is that exclusive reliance on voluntary philanthropy has a problem 
of failing to equitably distribute the burden of alleviating poverty and suffering 
especially if only a few have to contribute all that is necessary to solve the problem 
and she rightly observes that “Any system of voluntary philanthropy has this 
problem”(Nussbaum* 2004). The second reason is David Hume’s view regarding why 
we must move away from benevolence to justice. In his view benevolence is inspired 
by moral impulse and circumstances of unlimited abundance and, is therefore, 
unreliable [especially in the current global scarcity of resources] (Hume and 
Beauchamp 2006). Thirdly, and extrapolating Hume’s view, our view is that a system 
of global philanthropy cannot guarantee the realisation of the basic health rights of 
marginalised populations or a fair global distribution of the basic means of survival 
and well-being. Lastly we hope that it is possible to agree on certain minimum 
obligations, enforcement of which can be readily accepted by virtue of the minimal 
burden they impose on external actors. This is especially possible if it could be 
demonstrated that these obligations impose a proportionate or fair burden on external 
actors a and also such obligations lie within the resource limits of individual LICs. We 
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can arrive at such obligations through the adoption of what has been termed “a 
minimal conception of social justice” (Nussbaum 2003). 
One of the major reasons (not mentioned above) for the futility obligations for the 
health rights of marginalised populations is that all ESCR require resources (positive 
steps) and given the reality of resource scarcity in the world it would be a slippery-
slope choice to make ESCR rights justiciable rights or any measures aimed at 
guaranteeing their fulfilment. This excuse can be overcome by the extrapolating 
Nussbaum’s “minimal conception of social justice” into reasoning about the 
feasibility of guaranteeing basic health rights for the marginalised populations. The 
gist of the idea of “a minimal account of social justice” in Nussbaum’s view is that “a 
society that does not guarantee these [fundamental entitlements/capabilities] to all its 
citizens, at some appropriate threshold level, falls short of being a fully just society, 
whatever its level of opulence” (Nussbaum 2003). Notwithstanding the ‘possible 
overstatement of this position with regard to judging a society as unjust b, particularly 
due to genuine and severe resource constraints among most developing countries, 
Nussbaum’s view is still very crucial in understanding the goals and limits of global 
distributive justice, particularly the idea of basic health goods and services which are 
supposed to be guaranteed to all individuals as a matter of right. When applied to 
global distributive justice, “a minimal conception of distributive justice” means that 
global justice does not aim at achieving a perfectly equal distribution of resources 
between the global rich and the global poor. Rather, global distributive justice on this 
account asks for a guarantee to all global citizens “some appropriate threshold level of 
capabilities” [56]. The concept of the minimum has been variously implied as what is 
morally required for a just level of material and social well-being – for example, the 
concept of “minimum core obligations” used the human rights discourse; the 
Millennium Declaration, particularly MDGs targets and the WHO’s concept of the 
minimum health care by targeting everybody’s access to an “Essential Health 
Package” (Nussbaum* 2004) especially in low income countries, among others. The 
implication we draw from the “minimal conception of social justice” is that external 
obligations do not have to be as demanding as they are currently thought to be by 
those who are skeptical about morally binding transnational obligations for global 
distributive justice. The various views against such obligations usually seem to imply 
that such obligations are too much to ask. Therefore, the power of the concept of the 
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“minimum” is that these obligations can reasonably be accepted and fulfilled with “a 
thin system” of enforcement and in some cases no enforcement at all. 
Therefore, with specific regards to justice in global health with special reference to 
health financing in order to fulfil t health rights of marginalised populations of LICs, 
what needs to be done is to specify obligations for each set of actors, that is, donor and 
recipient countries. Our discussion has been intended to demonstrate that this 
specificity (and potential enforcement) is critical step if a certain minimum is to be 
guaranteed. The task of specifying these obligations requires first of all establishing 
the total cost of ensuring a minimum distribution of health goods and services in each 
country (to which all individuals should have a right) and ultimately the total cost for 
all countries. It is this total cost that should be equitably shared by the two sets of 
actors by specifying exactly what portions external and domestic governments are 
jointly morally required to contribute in order to cover the cost of the minimum health 
opportunities which constitute the basic health rights of marginalised populations. 
After this step, each set of actors should find a mechanism for equitably sharing their 
quota of the burden, taking into consideration differences in resource capacities of 
different actors within each set of actors.  
This can be briefly illustrated. Even though the WHO provides an estimate of US$ 44 
as a minimum health expenditure per capita needed by citizens of LICs to achieve the 
initial minimum or just health opportunities (basic life-saving services), so far there is 
no suggestion as to how the burden of raising this amount for each individual should 
be divided between LIC and HIC governments. We have proposed and elaborated 
such a mechanism elsewhere (Barugahare and Lie 2015). Once such specification has 
been made in a manner that is acceptable as equitable between HIC and LIC 
governments, it is reasonable to expect that each party will fully comply with its 
obligations without coercion or with the most minimum coercion.  But even in the 
absence of enforcement, it will moreover be possible to objectively identify and 
assign moral blame to States Parties that flout their very specific obligations.  Once 
the initial minimum of health opportunities or health rights has been achieved in this 
manner, more incremental obligations can be agreed upon and implemented in a 
similar manner. Therefore, “a minimal conception of justice” which yields potentially 
less demanding obligations, especially extraterritorial obligations, along with “a thin 
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system” of global enforcement, it is possible to significantly reduce global health 
injustice by being able to fulfil the basic health rights of marginalised populations of 
LICs in an incremental manner while bypassing the deeply controversial theoretical 
and technical difficulties. 
Lastly it is crucial to caution that in order to guarantee the legitimacy of these 
obligations; they cannot be determined arbitrarily and simply imposed on States 
Parties. The process of determining specific obligations of each country or State Party 
has to be democratic (involving country representatives); evidence-based especially 
regarding the optimum resource-capacities of different countries; multidisciplinary in 
nature involving economists; health economists; human rights lawyers; professional 
ethicists and all relevant experts. 
Conclusion 
Current obligations of countries for global distributive justice have been largely futile 
and this explains why it has remained difficult for LIC citizens to realise their health 
rights. This futility affects both domestic and extraterritorial obligations. At a 
superficial level the futility of countries’ obligations for global distributive justice can 
be attributed to the vagueness and lack of rigour that characterise them as well as their 
lack of enforcement. However, a deeper examination of these reasons reveals that the 
weaknesses within these obligations are not spontaneous. They are due to lack of 
political will to specify and enforce obligations. Further, reluctance to propose and 
implement an enforcement mechanism for these obligations is due to pessimism about 
the desirability and feasibility of a global enforcement system which is feared to erode 
countries’ national sovereignty and autonomy, and at worst lead to imperialism. 
However, in the current global political circumstances there is a lot evidence that 
there can be “a thin” and yet effective system of enforcement which is consistent with 
countries’ rights to national autonomy and sovereignty. Given the “minimal 
conception of social justice” we should agree on less-demanding obligations which 
guarantee, for example, a certain minimum amount of health goods and services 
(expressed as minimum health expenditure per capita per country) to all marginalised 
populations. We envisage that such obligations will be easily fulfilled with minimum 
or no enforcement at all. With regards to health financing, since it is possible to know 
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the required minimum health expenditure per capita of citizens in LICs, the obligation 
to meet these costs should be equitably apportioned between LIC and HIC 
governments by specifying exactly what portion each actor should contribute, taking 
into account the optimal resource capacity of each set of actors and individual actors 
within each set. Other obligations, especially of LIC governments should also be 
specified which, if fulfilled, would ensure efficient and equitable health systems 
domestically and globally. Such a strategy will go a long way towards fulfilment of 
the health rights of LIC citizens. 
Endnotes 
aIn this case proportionality (fairness) of the burden takes into the optimal resources 
available to each set of actors (i.e. HIC Vs LICs). Our view is that once it can be 
demonstrated that LICs have already borne the maximum burden they can by using 
the maximum of their available resources to fulfill their citizens’ health rights, then it 
most likely that HIC governments will be morally compelled to fulfill their quota of 
obligation.
bNussbaum’s categorical disregard for “the level of opulence” of a society can be 
controversial if it is stated without further qualification. This is especially so if she 
means that to qualify as just all societies must, with or without foreign assistance; 
ensure a certain threshold level of material and non-material entitlements to all 
citizens. Levels of poverty (at a national level) in most poor countries may make it 
difficult to achieve a certain minimum level of material well-being without external 
assistance even though their internal arrangements are just. In such a case it might be 
problematic to judge such a society as unjust for the mere reason that they cannot 
afford the threshold for all their citizens. 
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Chapter 3 
Obligations of low income countries to facilitate the achievement of global 
distributive justice 
Earlier I proposed that at a general level distributive justice requires that potential 
beneficiaries of redistribution to bear and fulfil certain obligations. For that matter the 
discussion in this chapter shows that there can be very good reasons to specify and 
implement poor country obligations in ensuring global distributive justice. These 
reasons are both of moral and practical categories. As the reasoning given earlier 
goes, the potential impact of the contribution of developing countries in facilitating 
the achievement of global distributive justice depends on what goes on within 
developing countries, specifically regarding the management of the external resources 
they receive (on behalf of their citizens). One of the major insights of this chapter is 
that whatever goes on in poor country governments regarding the management of 
external contributions either facilitates or frustrates efforts towards global distributive 
justice. Further the concept of equitable distribution of burdens, as it has been 
privileged in this work as a requirement in the pursuit of distributive justice, suggests 
that the discourse on global distributive justice needs to ask whether there can be 
things poor (or LMIC) governments can, or ought to, be morally required to do, or not 
to do in order to contribute in the pursuit of global distributive justice. Hence, here we 
can explain at least two major reasons for an enquiry into possible obligations of 
resource-poor countries in the pursuit of global distributive justice. 
The first reason for enquiring into possible obligations of resource-poor countries in 
efforts to ensure global distributive justice is to ensure that the fulfilment of external 
obligations will have the desired impact on the lives of those for whom such resources 
are intended (ordinary citizens of LICs); that is to say, requiring resource-poor 
country governments – agencies through which external actors attempt to improve 
distributive justice – to make it possible for such external assistance to tilt the scale of 
global distributive justice in favour of poor country citizens. In this consideration, and 
basing on some evidence from Uganda (and a few more poor countries), the 
discussion in this chapter proposes an obligation relating to countries’ moral duty to 
deliver external aid to its intended beneficiaries. So far there is evidence that most of 
them (poor country governments) do not do so. Basing on the same idea of facilitating 
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the achievement of global distributive justice, this chapter proposes that developing 
country governments ought to be morally required to manage external resources in a 
manner that enables external actors’ efforts to tilt the scale of distributive justice. 
Such an obligation relates to the moral requirement on the part of resource-poor 
country governments to ensure due diligence. 
Secondly, other than being morally required to take actions that have the potential to 
maximise possible improvements in global distributive justice from external efforts 
(resources), this chapter also propose that resource-poor country governments should 
bear stringent obligations relating to the principle of non-maleficence in dealing with 
fellow poor countries and indeed all other countries. As the discussion will show, the 
argument of this obligation does not imply that high income countries are exempted 
from this obligation, nor should the argument be interpreted to mean that this 
obligation implies that poor countries are currently not under such an obligation. 
Rather, the concern about this obligation is that when poor countries, as the example 
of Uganda versus the Democratic Republic of the Congo will show, act in 
economically harmful ways towards other poor countries the burden of fixing the 
damage usually falls back to those who did not cause the harm, but those who have 
the means to fix the destitution arising from the damage done by a poor country. So 
the essence of this obligation is that whereas this obligation is incumbent on all 
countries, since poor countries cannot afford reparations to the benefit of their victims 
then the global community should be more proactive in enforcing such an obligation 
upon poor countries. 
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Abstract 
Obligations of global justice rest mainly on the global rich but also to a lesser 
extent on the global poor. The governments of poor countries are obliged to fulfil 
requirements of non-aggression, good governance and decency and all other 
requirements which will make it easy to achieve global justice. So far obligations of 
poor countries seem to be taken as given yet the behaviours of governments in poor 
countries and occurrences therein attest to the contrary and this suggests a need to 
mainstream these obligations in discussions about global justice. If poor countries do 
not live up to these requirements they are obstacles to the realization of global justice 
and act unjustly in relation to citizens of rich countries which provide them with aid. 
Uganda is taken as a case in point. 
Key words: Global Justice; obligations; poor countries; Uganda. 
Introduction and Background 
The existing literature on global justice reflects the dominant attention given to what 
the rich countries should do in order to alleviate poverty and suffering among the 
global poor. This discussion has proceeded at the expense of debates about potential 
obligations of poor countries themselves. Some of the contributors to the global 
justice debate such as Fiona Terry (2000), William Easterly (2006) and Paul Collier 
(2008), among others, have hinted at the need to explore obligations of poor countries. 
In their works they allude to something along the lines of, “part of the solution for 
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poverty in poor countries lies within the poor countries themselves.” However, the 
conclusions reached by each of them do not explicitly emphasize the obligations of 
poor countries in global justice. This trend risks encouraging complacency among 
resource-poor countries like Uganda in the implementation of global justice. In this 
paper, the argument is not that the contents of present works on global justice are 
wrong regarding obligations of rich countries; nor is it that some of these contributors 
would deny the importance of obligations of poor countries in ensuring global justice. 
Rather the argument of this paper is that the current debate focuses on what rich 
countries should do while this alone is unlikely to result in global justice. Therefore, 
for practical and moral reasons, in addition to the obligations of rich countries, the 
debate needs to mainstream reflections on possible obligations of poor countries and 
on what should be done if they do not fulfill these obligations. The trend of thinking 
beyond obligations of rich countries in ensuring global justice is not unprecedented. 
Recently, using South Africa as a case study Nicola Barsdorf argued that middle 
income countries have moral obligations to help solve some of the problems afflicting 
poorer countries (2012). Drawing on this background, this paper argues for three 
kinds of obligations of poor countries in ensuring global justice: 1) Obligations of 
international justice (non-aggression); 2) The obligation of effective management of 
aid resources; and3) The obligation to exercise due diligence (decency). We will 
begin by giving a brief survey of the ongoing discussion about obligations for global 
justice with the intention to show that, despite wide recognition of the importance of 
poor country obligations, these obligations have continuously failed to reach the same 
level of prominence as those of rich countries.
The On Going Debate 
To begin with, Peter Singer in two essays: Famine, Affluence and Morality (1972) and 
The Singer Solution to World Poverty (1999); and in his book One World: The Ethics 
of Globalization(2000), is primarily concerned with justifying the moral obligations 
of rich countries to give aid to the global poor. Singer discusses at length what citizens 
and governments of affluent countries can do in order to ensure global justice. At the 
same time, however, he recognizes the importance of obligations of poor countries for 
utility reasons yet he does not pursue this subject at length.
On the other hand Thomas Pogge portrays global justice mainly in terms of the 
negative duties of affluent countries in ensuring global justice. He argues that: 
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[…] we [the rich] share responsibility not only for the damage authoritarian rulers[in poor 
countries] can do to the interests of “their” people, […] our governments have instigated violent 
installation of many oppressive rulers in poor countries [...] and have fostered a culture of 
corruption […]” (2008: 29).  
In Pogge’s view, “it is quite possible that within a different global order national 
factors[in poor countries] that tend to undermine the fulfillment of human rights 
would occur much less often or not at all” (2005: 22). Like Singer, Pogge hints at the 
obligations of poor countries, in particular the duty of governments in poor countries 
to oppose the global institutional order that is sustained by powerful governments in 
the North and global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, he does not dedicate sufficient 
space to this subject. 
David Miller is also concerned with the issue of “what responsibilities do we 
have towards the global poor? What must we do for them as a matter of justice?” 
(2007: 231).As an allusion to the obligations of poor countries, Miller cautions that 
human beings should be treated “both as agents capable of taking responsibility for 
the outcomes of their actions and as vulnerable and needy creatures who may not be 
able to lead decent lives without the help of others” (2007: 237, (italics in original 
text). By emphasizing their agency Miller clearly says that citizens of poor countries 
have the capacity to take decisions and assume responsibility for their outcomes. This 
is a clear indication that he believes that obligations of poor countries are an important 
complement to those of rich countries for the achievement of global justice. Yet 
Miller does not mainstream this subject inhis work either. 
Further, in The problem of Global Justice, Thomas Nagel castigates the 
current unjust international order, which he rightly blames on the affluent countries. 
His arguments that “[t]he global economy, within which the familiar inequalities are 
now generated, requires a stable international system of property rights and 
contractual obligations that provide the conditions for international commerce” (2005: 
137). In Nagel’s view it is a duty of affluent countries to reform the rules of 
international trade to the benefit of poor countries. 
Further suggestions regarding the need to explore obligations of poor countries 
in global justice can be found in the works of Terry (2000), Easterly (2006), and 
Collier (2008).From her experience of how aid to refugees in poor countries is 
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mismanaged, Fiona Terry, in Condemned to Repeat? The paradox of humanitarian 
action, concludes that “[i]f international agencies [and all donors] are to meet the 
needs of the populations in crisis, their[donors] organizational behavior must adjust to 
the wider political and socio-economic contexts in which aid occurs.” Yet, from her 
research findings which led her to draw this conclusion, a complementary conclusion 
can also be drawn: If international agencies are to meet the needs of populations in 
crisis in poor countries, poor countries must bear astringent obligation not to 
mismanage aid resource. Hence, even though Terry does not explicitly suggest the 
need for poor countries to bear some obligations, her findings clearly suggest this 
need. 
Furthermore, in The White Man’s Burden, Easterly sets out to investigate 
“[w]hy the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good,” 
(2006: 115) and comes to the conclusion that “[i]t is all about [bad] politics” in poor 
countries; and this blame is shared by International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which 
he accuses of “coddling awful gangsters who just call themselves a government” in 
poor countries (Easterly2006: 152–153). His point concerns the complicity between 
government bureaucrats of poor countries, multinational corporations and IFIs. The 
implication being that in order to break down the complicity between the 
representatives of rich countries and government bureaucrats of poor countries it is 
important that, for example, Pogge’s argument for negative duties on the part of rich 
countries be supplemented with duties imposed on poor country governments to desist 
from complicity. 
Further still, even though Collier’s The Bottom Billion: Why are poor 
countries failing and what can be done about it (2008) does not deal with explicit 
obligations of poor countries and these obligations are not given any direct or 
considerable attention, on many occasions he does allude to something along those 
lines, however. For example, while he believes that one of the challenges for Africa’s 
development is bad governance which needs external help in the form of technical 
assistance, he cautions that this kind of aid can only be effective if the political 
conditions in the benefiting country are favorable(Collier 2008: 108–115). In other 
words, if any kind of aid to poor countries is to be effective, governments of poor 
countries have a duty to create favorable conditions for such aid.
Generally, there is a great deal of evidence that most contributors to the debate 
about global justice recognize, in the back of their mind, the importance of obligations 
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of poor countries in ensuring global justice. Yet at the same time it is also evident that 
a discussion of these obligations is far less developed than that of the obligations of 
rich countries. Since, like those sampled above, most contributors imply that 
obligations of poor countries are also important for purposes of effectiveness and yet 
then fail to dedicate sufficient attention to such obligations, there is a need to bridge 
this gap. Accordingly, this work should be seen as supplementary to their contribution 
to the debate rather than as a criticism of their work. 
Poor Countries’ Obligations Relating to International Justice 
Obligations of international justice are understood here as treaty obligations and 
prohibition of interventions in legitimate internal affairs of other countries. In 
principle they apply equally to both poor and rich countries. For this reason it may be 
tempting to take these obligations for granted in relation to poor countries and negate 
the need for special discussion. However, this would only ring true under international 
law. As international law is quite complex and difficult to implement, these 
obligations would benefit from being integrated into debates about global justice 
founded on diffuse pressure to secure compliance. Hence, the obligations of poor 
countries in international justice need to be emphasized and made more stringent than 
they currently are in discussion of global justice — as illustrated below using the duty 
of non-aggression. 
The popular discussion on international justice concentrates on demonstrating 
and castigating the guilt of rich countries in international justice. As shown above, this 
has been the primary concern of key contributors to the global justice debate (Miller 
2007;Nagel 2005; Pogge 2001, 2005, 2008, among others). Don Scheid has argued 
that “A great part of global justice must concern itself with the use of force, especially 
the aggressive use of force. In the quest for global justice and international 
governance, one strategy is to impose legal constraints on the use of force by 
outlawing acts and wars of aggression”(2003).  But even for a case as clear as the 
prohibition of aggression, the popular debate about global (social) justice is silent 
when it comes to obligations of poor countries incases of non-aggression. In this 
section we want to show that even though poor countries are victims of global social 
injustice, they are also at times perpetrators of injustice against other poor nations and 
states. Therefore, in the pursuit of global justice, there is a need to seriously evaluate 
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the moral dilemma of dealing with harmful victims.2We will use Uganda as a case to 
illustrate this point. 
Poor Countries, Armed Aggression and Global Justice
In considering the case of armed aggression in a paper discussing issues related to the 
ethics of underdevelopment, mal-development and associated injustices, it is 
important to concede that issues of social justice are often treated separately than 
those of conflict and post-conflict situations. However, a country that engages in 
destructive armed aggression against another deprives its victim of material 
livelihoods and socially afflicts its citizens, thus affecting their material and social 
well-being, which are key indicators on their Human Development Index (HDI). The 
comparison of inter-country HDI is the most important criterion in assessing the status 
of global justice. Hence, if the focus of debates about social justice is the analysis and 
assessment of the causes and solutions of global inequalities in material and social 
well-being, then all relevant factors that directly affect economic and social well-
being ought to be accounted for and examined. One major factor in this category is 
armed aggression. 
The Uganda-Democratic Republic of Congo Case 
Between 1997 and 2003, the Ugandan army (Uganda People’s Defense Forces – 
UPDF), invaded the Democratic republic of Congo (DRC), ostensibly to fight the 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) who were rebelling against the Ugandan 
government. But contrary to their claimed excuse the army looted minerals, timber 
and other resources, destroyed the livelihoods of the local citizens, conscripted 
children into the army, as well other crimes including rape. They also committed other 
offenses including facilitating rebel activities in the regions they invaded 
(International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2005). 
According to the findings of the ICJ, “THE COURT,” by sixteen votes to one, 
Finds that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively extending 
military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated on the territory 
of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of 
non-intervention; (ICJ 2005: 280). 
Further, by the same vote (16:1) it was agreed that: 
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The Republic of Uganda, by the conduct of its armed forces, which committed acts of killing, 
torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the Congolese civilian population, destroyed 
villages and civilian buildings […] violated its obligations under international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law (ICJ 2005:280). 
In addition, the international Court of Justice found that: 
[…] the Republic of Uganda, by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural 
resources committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and by its failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying power in 
Ituri district to prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources,
violated obligations owed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under international law; (ICJ 
2005: 280-281). 
Uganda was found guilty of so many counts of injustice that they cannot all be listed 
here. Ultimately, the International Court of Justice in the vote of sixteen to one 
unanimously, “[f]inds that the Republic of Uganda is under obligation to make 
reparation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the injury caused; [...]” (ICJ 
2005: 281). The reparation was set at $10 billion USD; this implies that as a result of 
the invasion by Uganda, DRC loss of property, life, and well-being was valued at $10 
billion USD. While of course this seems to be an issue which can be addressed purely 
by International Law, it is important to show how incorporating this subject in 
discussions about global justice would be instrumental in efforts towards achieving 
global justice. 
As mentioned above, the issue of armed aggression becomes of interest in the 
debate about global justice due to its direct effect on material and non-material well-
being of the victims. Since this issue was left purely to the realm of international law 
it may have been considered a settled question, yet no justice has been achieved thus 
far as long as Uganda lacks the capacity, or is unwilling, to pay the reparation. 
However, if this had been stated in advance as a stringent obligation of social justice 
upon Uganda, social pressure exerted through diplomacy would very likely have, to a 
large extent, played a preventive role in the first place. Therefore, regarding the 
characterization of the specific obligations of poor countries in ensuring global 
justice, it can be said that since the level of material and nonmaterial well-being are 
key proxies for global justice, it is important that poor countries’ obligation to desist 
from armed aggression against other nations and states should be made more stringent 
because such aggression directly tilts the balance of global justice against victims. Of 
course this obligation is borne by the rich countries too, but the point here is that since 
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there is evidence that through the violation of this obligation some poor countries 
have exacerbated the material and social well-being of others, hence in the discussion 
of the obligations of poor countries this obligation warrants special emphasis. 
The implication of the above case is that failure to fulfill obligations of 
international justice (for example of non-aggression) and the consequent damage 
leads to injustice against those who must repair the damage through relief and 
development aid. For example, since Uganda could not alleviate the deprivation in the 
DRC as it lacked the requisite resource capacity to do that, then, following David 
Miller’s criteria for assigning remedial responsibility in global justice (2007), the 
natural place to look is the agent with the capacity to alleviate the harm – the 
governments and citizens of affluent countries. However, if the citizens of affluent 
countries are subjected to enforceable obligations to provide aid for alleviating harm 
inflicted by other countries in this way, it constitutes a clear injustice, especially if no 
sanctions are meted out against perpetrators for flouting their obligations. It is for this 
reason that when thinking about global justice, poor countries must bear the positive 
as well as negative obligations of international justice. If poor countries fail on these 
counts then they ought to suffer the sanctions attached to corresponding obligations. 
However, in dealing with harmful victims like Uganda, sanctions imposed for 
failure on their obligations are likely to engender moral dilemmas. It raises other 
issues pertaining to the relations between the citizens of poor countries and their 
governments. Ordinarily, when one speaks of the duties and responsibilities of poor 
countries, these should be duties and responsibilities of the governments and the 
citizens jointly. However, this would only be the case if governments of poor 
countries were as representative as those of the democratic and affluent countries, 
such that the actions and inactions of governmentsare influenced, and therefore owned 
by their citizens. This dilemma does not only arise in the implementation of 
international justice obligations, but also in many other instances. We will return to 
this and other challenges towards the conclusion. 
Obligation Pertaining to Aid 
In discussing strategies for global justice, obligation to aid is dominant. However, aid 
can be a double-edged sword for and against poor countries. Whereas aid can provide 
immediate relief to the global poor, it can also be abused by aid-givers to create an 
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exploitative dependency relationship between the poor and the rich and in this way 
uphold global injustices. However each of these two possibilities depends on how aid 
is conceived. If aid is conceived as charity, it can easily be abused to uphold global 
injustices. But on the other hand if it is understood as a right of needy people 
worldwide and is organized in the form of, for example, Pogge’s concept of the 
Global Resource Dividend (GRD) (Pogge 2008), then it would be very difficult to 
abuse. In this paper, aid is understood in the latter sense. Besides, giving aid is just 
one of the duties and obligations of rich countries and these other duties and 
obligations should forestall the misuse of aid by its givers in this way. 
Whereas generally the economics of “Trade not Aid” is based on valid 
arguments in relation to the sustainability of development of poor countries, aid may 
still be an inevitable obligation in global justice. In order to understand the 
inevitability of aid in efforts to achieve global justice, Miller’s point about 
vulnerability mentioned above needs to betaken seriously. This is because it is a self-
evident truth that even if all countries observed requirements of international justice, 
fair trade regimes and so forth, many people around the world would still remain 
below the material and social threshold needed for ensuring the level of well-being 
that is considered just. Local conditions – natural and those amenable to human 
efforts, market failures, technical and technological deficits etc. – would still render 
citizens of some countries socially and economically vulnerable, especially those in 
low-income countries. This fact leads to a moral requirement on those who have 
surplus resources to transfer some of these to those who are in need. To emphasize the 
importance of aid in global justice David Miller emphasizes that in order to determine 
the extent of global liabilities on nations and states, “we need the idea of a global 
minimum – a set of basic human rights which must be protected for people 
everywhere regardless of circumstances” (2007: 266). Charles Jones too defends basic 
human rights as the “moral minimum” required for the implementation of global 
justice (1999: 50–84). All these imply the stringency of the obligation to give aid as a 
matter of right of the poor. 
Conversely, however, Terry (2000), Easterly (2006), Collier (2008) and many 
others have been concerned with the effectiveness of aid in poor countries and are all 
highly skeptical. Their analyses indicate that, for aid to be effective, certain conditions 
must exist within poor countries; or to put it differently, for such aid to be effective, 
governments of poor countries ought to bear and fulfill some relevant obligations. 
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This point serves to reemphasizes the main point of this paper; that is, the obligations 
of poor countries and discussions about them are important supplements to those of 
rich countries if the mission of global justice is to be achieved and be achieved justly. 
Hence, drawing on evidence-based skepticism about the effectiveness of aid in poor 
countries, the point of this argument is that when governments of poor countries 
receive aid they incur obligations pertaining to the effectiveness with which such aid 
is managed; and that failure to meet such obligations ought to attract all sanctions 
available against governments. But there also lingersa question regarding whether or 
not rich countries should withhold aid to poor countries should the governments of the 
latter fail to fulfill their obligations. We will come back to this question later. 
Obligation of Effective Management of Aid 
In conceiving the obligations of poor countries, one of the relevant (hypothetical) 
questions to ask is: “What if the aid they receive from affluent countries as a result of 
rich countries fulfilling their obligation to aid, never trickles down to its intended 
beneficiaries or is never converted into the desired well-being for ordinary citizens?” 
The implication here is that governments of poor countries are representatives or 
agents3 of their citizens who bear an obligation to deliver aid to the citizens who are 
the intended beneficiaries as effectively as possible. In other words, the right to aid 
resides in the citizens not their agents (governments). This implies that even if 
governments of poor countries fail when it comes to this obligation, this does not 
exempt the affluent countries from giving aid to those they owe it to – the ordinary 
poor citizens in poor countries. Instead, the failure of poor country governments to 
fulfill this obligation adds another duty to aid givers: that is, to find other feasible 
channels through which to fulfill their obligations. 
The obligation to effectively manage aid is important for both practical and 
moral reasons. From a practical point of view, this is necessary as a complement to 
that of rich countries giving aid. In other words, for aid to make any impact on the 
lives of the poor, the governments concerned must be able and willing to convert it 
into desired well-being. From a moral point of view, if governments of poor countries 
behave as economic ‘black holes’ by way of mismanaging aid resources, then this will 
impose an unjust magnitude of burden on those who bear the obligation to give aid. 
(This point will be given more emphasis in arguing for the next obligation below.) It 
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is these two reasons that would justify sanctions against poor country governments 
that fail to meet this obligation.
Contributory Negligence and the Duty of Due Diligence 
The Principle of Contributory Negligence 
Contributory or comparative negligence is a juridical principle. It means carelessness 
or lack of vigilance on the part of the plaintiff which (carelessness) has contributed to, 
and is in whole or in part the cause of the injury or harm he [or she] complains of, as 
having been caused to him [or her] by the defendant’s fault. Contributory negligence 
is one’s failure to avoid getting hurt by the defendant or it is the fault of the claimant 
in the very occurrence of the accident (GLH 1982: 587). The principle implies that 
failure by a person to exercise reasonable care for the safety of either himself [or 
herself] or his [or her] property so that he [or she] becomes blameworthy in part or in 
whole as an author of his [or her] own harm does not impose liability on the 
defendant. Therefore, under the principle of contributory negligence, justice demands 
that before the potential obligation bearer (defendant) is assigned the duty to 
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compensate the victim, it should be inquired into to establish whether there was 
anything the victim of harm could have been reasonably expected to do in order to 
avoid harm suffered or mitigate its severity. On this account, the potential victims of 
injustice are believed to have a duty to exercise due diligence or reasonable care in 
order to avoid or mitigate harm to themselves. The implication of this principle is that 
it would be an injustice to assign a hundred percent obligation to rectify the harm to 
the obligation bearer (defendant), although part of the harm can be attributed to the 
negligence of the victim. 
The principle of contributory negligence, sometimes called comparative 
negligence, arises in debates about global justice out of the following hypothetical 
question: “Is there anything poor countries can do or avoid in their governance to 
reduce their suffering so that they require less or no aid at all?” If this question is 
answered in the affirmative, then there should be an obligation of poor countries to 
exercise reasonable care4 or due diligence; that is, given evidence of rampant 
contributory negligence in poor countries, the specific obligations of poor countries 
arising from the question posed above would be that governments in poor countries 
have a duty and obligation to ensure due diligence in managing the economies of 
these countries. The relevance of this obligation or duty in relation to poor countries is 
based on the assumption (to be proved below) that governments of poor countries 
display what would constitute avoidable negligence or recklessness in the 
management of their affairs. 
It is important to note that a discussion of this principle and its arising duty 
takes into account the fact that factors that cause and worsen global injustice are both 
local and international or global in nature; these being both natural and those 
amenable to human efforts. Hence, the argument being advanced here is that 
irrespective of whether the causes of global injustice are local or international; natural 
or purely dependent of human efforts, the exercise of reasonable care by the poor 
countries in the management of their affairs can facilitate efforts to mitigate them, 
eventually leading to global justice. 
Extrapolating the Principle into Global Justice Debate 
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Charles Jones accepts that the rich should have an enforceable obligation in 
implementing social justice. However, he argues that “[i]n addition, avoidable 
activities which make it less likely that poor countries can meet their own citizens 
rights-claims could be disallowed, thus enabling those states to fulfill their obligations 
with less positive aid from other states” (1999: 70). By arguing that certain activities 
be disallowed in developing countries, Jones implies that in poor countries there are 
activities which can be regarded as reckless or not prudent enough to the extent that 
they stand in the way of ensuring that their citizens enjoy material and social 
conditions comparable to those which global justice intends to achieve for them. But 
in addition to Jones’ negative requirement of refraining from harmful activities, poor 
countries can also be required to take certain prudent positive steps (activities) with 
diligence, incumbent in their obligations in ensuring global justice. Both these 
positive and negative steps should be those that, if taken, would forestall most of the 
causes of global injustice, whether these be domestic or international; artificial or 
natural. This argument implies that governments who flout these obligations would 
henceforth be liable to corresponding sanctions. Therefore, the principle of 
contributory or comparative negligence and its arising duty of exercising due 
diligence can be legitimately extrapolated into the debates of global justice. 
Should Poor Countries Bear Duties of Due Diligence?
Looking at the argument raised by Jones above through the lens of the principle of 
contributory negligence, the answer to the question above depends on whether there is 
evidence that governments in poor countries are not diligent (decent) enough by way 
of what might be called recklessness in their governance systems. Should this issue 
prove to be the case, then at least two negative outcomes would arise: the first one is 
that, even if obligations of rich countries are met, they would not achieve global 
justice; secondly, it would be an injustice to coerce citizens of the rich countries to 
transfer resources to governments of poor countries in what may seem like rewarding 
recklessness. In light of the above question, the quality of governance in poor 
countries seems to point directly to the need to emphasize their duty to ensure due 
diligence. 
To begin with, O’Neill raises the issue of population explosion in poor 
countries and argues that this worsens their already dire situation (O’Neill 1986: 158). 
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O’Neill’s claim is corroborated by population growth statistics in poor countries, 
which show that globally the highest population growth rates are recorded in poor 
countries. For example, according to population growth statistics for 2011, Uganda 
has the fifth highest population growth rate globally at 3.2 % per annum, after the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) (4.9 %); Bahrain (4.8 %); Zambia (4.2 %) and Niger 
(3.5 %) (World Bank 2013). Elsewhere, Uganda is ranked third globally with an 
annual population growth rate of 3.576 % after Zimbabwe (4.31 %) and Niger (3.643 
%). Generally, African countries which are most burdened by poverty and disease top 
population growth rate rankings (NationMaster2013). O’Neill’s argument is based on 
the assumption that population explosion has a negative impact on the socio-economic 
well-being of people (in terms of income, savings, health etc.). If this assumption is 
correct then in order to improve socio-economic conditions in poor countries (such as 
household savings and health conditions) poor countries should bear the obligation of 
reducing their population growth rates. 
However, the argument about population control as presented by O’Neill 
above can arguably suffers from two potential doubts: One is that it appears to put the 
cart before the horse. This is because in some cases population growth seems to be 
dependent on economic and social development and therefore very difficult to control 
in itself; that is, low birth-rates being regarded as a consequence of improved socio-
economic conditions especially health care and education. However, at the same time 
it is possible that low population growth rates are a precondition for improvement in 
standards of living. It is plausible to argue that a poor country that prioritizes 
population control in its resource allocation and public policy will quickly reduce both 
government and household expenditures and at the same time reduce pressure on the 
limited social services. The second potential problem may arise from the legitimacy of 
authoritarian and corrupt governments in poor countries to enforce population control. 
But since such enforcement would be in the best interest of the citizens, then this 
could be allowed for and count as at least one credit to such governments. 
Further, some of the practices in poor countries, especially those pertaining to 
governance, justify the imposition of the duty to exercise due diligence. Drawing from 
the general criticism against aid raised by Terry, Easterly and Collier among others as 
pointed out above, the factors which undermine the effectiveness of aid can be 
exemplified in specific countries. These factors count as failure to exercise due 
diligence among poor countries. For example, Uganda which relies heavily on the 
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Global Fund and other external aid sources for the health sector has several times 
been implicated in what can count as negligence. This is evidenced by very high 
levels of corruption with impunity. In this case, high levels of corruption with 
impunity constitutes clear failure of the principle of due diligence on the part of 
government. There are some particular popular cases that confirm this failure: In 2007 
it was discovered that “[a]s thousands of Ugandans die every day of HIV/Aids and 
malaria, drugs worth about UGX 4 billion [around $1.6 million USD]are rotting [have 
expired] in the National Medical Stores Entebbe” (Nandutu 2007). It was also 
revealed that “[s]tolen government drugs [are] repackaged and resold to National 
Medical Stores” (Ayebazibwe 2012). Other poor countries have been found guilty too 
and they have also been either asked to refund the Global Fund money or forfeit 
subsequent rounds of funding. These include Pakistan, Ukraine, Myanmar, Senegal, 
Chad, Nigeria,Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Togo, to mention but a few (IRIN 
2009). 
To further illustrate the point, one can look at a sample of Uganda’s “Nine 
Corruption Scandals to Look Back at” (New Vision, 2014). According to this 
research, in only nine corruption cases, at least $0.42 billion USD was lost in the 
hands of different public officials; the majority of these were politically exempt from 
liability resulting in no hope of recovering the money. Generally, according to the 
results of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for countries over the years, there is a 
high correlation between being a corrupt country and being a poor country. Even if it 
is arguable whether corruption at a national level is a cause or an effect of poverty, it 
seems to make better sense to argue that corruption is an obstacle to social, economic 
and political development and it takes political will to successfully fight corruption.
In light of these and potentially more pieces of evidence, the principle of 
contributory negligence points to the need for poor countries to bear a moral 
obligation to exercise due diligence in managing their affairs. The pragmatic value of 
this obligation is that it would make concerned obligation bearers more vigilant and 
prudent in managing their affairs. This will in turn reduce their chances of being 
harmed by other agents’ behaviors or natural factors. Furthermore, from a moral point 
of view it would be an injustice to ask other obligation bearers, particularly citizens of 
rich countries, to incur costs which are a result of avoidable omissions and 
commissions on the part of governments of poor countries, if there are no efforts to 
hold perpetrators accountable. By and large, ignoring the principle of contributory 
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negligence and its arising duty to exercise due diligence in global justice debate would 
lead to complacence, and more recklessness on the part of the governments of poor 
countries, making it more difficult to achieve global injustice. Therefore, poor 
countries ought to bear an obligation/duty to exercise due diligence in order to 
mitigate the level of injustice they suffer and also reduce the liability of other agents. 
Some Potentially Persistent Challenges 
The question of obligations of poor countries in global justice is quite complex and 
this paper does not claim to provide an exhaustive and uncontroversial account of 
them. But certainly from the above discussion it has transpired that there is a need to 
mainstream a discussion of these obligations into debates about obligations of global 
justice. In this effort, however, challenges lurk that need critical attention. Most of the 
challenges will potentially arise in the implementation of these obligations. One of 
these is how to hold governments of poor countries accountable should they flout 
these obligations, without harming the interests of their needy citizens. We have 
treated governments and citizens of poor countries as two different entities as most of 
these governments lack legitimacy in the sense of not being truly representative of the 
interests of their citizens. Hence, since obligations of poor countries need to be 
enforceable in order to be effective, the mode of their enforcement ought to draw a 
clear line between the obligation bearer (governments)and the intended beneficiaries 
of global justice. This in turn implies that even if poor country governments flout their 
obligations, rich countries retain their obligations to the citizens of poor countries.  
From the above, another challenge in the conception and enforcement of 
obligations of poor countries arises in the case of their governments failing to fulfill 
their obligations: that is, how can the rich countries fulfill their obligations to the 
global poor without doing so through the agency of their governments? Could this be 
done through Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)? However, whereas the community 
of civil society would promise an effective channel, the successful operation of civil 
society in any country still to a great extent depends on the smooth relations between 
the two. But since some CSOs (such as the UN and Red Cross) have immunity against 
government interference, it would be possible to bypass potential sabotage from 
uncooperative governments. 
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One may well wonder: How can one assign obligations to countries like 
Uganda that do not fulfill any, or at least most, of the requirements of good 
governance? Would it not be a waste of time? Yes, it may appear so, especially if 
there are no means to enforce such obligations internationally. But since obligations 
of justice are (here) meant to be enforceable and all obligations of poor countries 
argued for above point to the requirements of good governance, assigning 
governments of poor countries related obligations seems not to be in vain. 
Finally, from our arguments above, the ordinary citizens of poor countries 
seem to be completely exempt from bearing any obligations. This exemption is also 
potentially controversial. From the point of view of the importance of human agency, 
it can be interpreted as an assault on the autonomy of citizens in poor countries. It is 
therefore a worthwhile exercise to consider the possibility of such obligations (for 
citizens). These obligations might relate, for example, to their vigilance and support 
for the civil society and their compliance with the positive and negative prescriptions 
to them relating to actions that are aimed at improving their conditions, hence making 
it easier for them to approach the material threshold which global justice aims at. But 
since the performance of individual citizens depends on the effectiveness of public 
institutions, it is proper to prioritise discussion of obligations of their governments. 
All these issues (and probably more) are unsettled questions in the conception and 
implementation of obligations of poor countries in ensuring global justice; however, 
they cannot be sufficiently adjudicated in the limited space of this paper. Accordingly 
these challenges need to be born in mind in the discussions of obligations of poor 
countries in global justice. 
Conclusion 
The obligations of poor countries are crucial for the achievement of global justice, yet 
these obligations are largely side-stepped in current discussion. At best, as is the case 
with many authors, these obligations are simply alluded to and this can reduce their 
stringency. In the first place, by engaging in aggression against other states, poor 
countries deprive their victims’ material livelihoods and social well-being – both of 
which have serious ramifications on a global justice scale. Secondly, although not the 
most important condition for the development of poor countries, obligation to aid is 
crucial in global justice, yet experience shows that its effectiveness is not guaranteed 
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due to moral weaknesses in poor country governments. For this reason, when 
governments of poor countries receive aid, they ought to incur stringent obligations to 
effectively manage such resources to the benefit of its intended beneficiaries. Thirdly, 
given the available evidence about the poor quality of governance in most poor 
countries it has been shown that poor countries are morally liable to bear the duty of 
exercising due diligence in the management of their affairs. Finally, it is important to 
emphasize the point that, the discussion in this paper does not constitute a denial of 
the importance of the obligations of rich countries; rather it is an emphasis of the 
additional obligations of the governments of poor countries. If we emphasize the 
obligations of the governments of rich countries and neglect those of poor countries, it 
will not be possible for the citizens in poor countries to benefit from the efforts of rich 
countries and it will engender injustice against citizens of affluent countries. 
1. Rich countries too, may, or actually do, engage in armed aggression, but the 
concern of this paper is the obligations of poor countries. 
2. By harmful victims, we mean victims of global injustice (poor countries), but 
whose domestic and international behavior is harmful to their citizens and other 
countries, as we illustrate using the case of Uganda. This creates a dilemma as to 
whether such harmful victims deserve positive actions such as aid from the affluent 
countries. 
3. By saying that governments of poor countries act as agents of their citizens, we are 
not committed to saying that such governments are representative in a truly 
democratic sense. Rather, we mean that whatever such governments receive or do is 
all purportedly done in the name of their citizens.
4. According to Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill (1981–2005), ‘Reasonable Care’ 
refers to the degree of caution and concern for the safety of oneself and others that an 
ordinarily prudent and rational person would apply in the circumstances. 
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Chapter 4 
Implementing Low Income Country Obligations: an illustrative case from global 
health financing 
The discussion above (chapter three) and in the preceding chapter (two) suggest and 
defend both the moral and practical necessity of poor country obligations in the 
pursuit of global distributive justice. The major point of chapter two was that 
countries’ obligations (both rich and poor) have remained futile for the most part and 
this poses a threat to all efforts towards global distribute justice. This futility has been 
attributed to lack of enough specificity in the manner such obligations are framed. 
These obligations do not state with precision what each global actor (in this case 
national governments) is morally required to contribute (especially in terms of 
resources) towards the achievement of global distributive justice, and/or the fulfilment 
of some basic economic and social rights. But most importantly in chapter two it has 
been argued that if this futility of obligations is to be avoided by specifying each 
actor’s contribution, then there is need for an elaborate mechanism which can be used 
to proportionately distribute the burden of guaranteeing all individuals a certain 
threshold share of global resources. On the other hand, chapter three has demonstrated 
the reasoning which ought to underline an enquiry into poor country governments’ 
obligations in facilitating and contributing to the achievement of global distributive 
justice. However, this chapter too has not proposed how some or any of these 
obligations should be specified and operationalised. On the other hand, the major 
conclusion of chapter one was simply an affirmation of morally binding (and 
potentially enforceable) transnational obligations of distributive justice upon all 
individuals globally though the agency of their governments. Chapter one too did not 
make any concrete proposal as to how these obligations should be specified and 
implemented. 
On the basis of this background, and in regard to the two major concepts that have 
been proposed to guide thinking about poor country obligations in the pursuit of 
global distributive justice – that is, the complementarity of obligations of both rich 
and poor country governments on the one hand and, equitable distribution of burdens
on the other – this chapter proposes a mechanism by which these two concepts can be 
operationalised. The major idea of this chapter is that operationalising these two 
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concepts starts with an affirmation of the moral and practical necessity of stringent 
resource-poor country obligations in the pursuit of global distributive justice. This 
chapter uses the case of current efforts towards justice in the global distribution of 
health opportunities (and by extension global distributive justice in general) to 
demonstrate how the two concepts proposed can be operationalised. Specifically this 
chapter proposes that the starting point is to agree on the global minimum distribution 
of health opportunities (in form minimum health expenditure per capita for each 
country) which should be guaranteed to all individuals as a matter of right. Secondly, 
the chapter proposes that the cost of this minimum should be divided equitably 
between the poor and rich country governments. For the purpose of emphasising poor 
country governments’ obligations, the division of the burden of contributing such 
resources should begin with specifying the optimal contribution which can reasonably
be expected from each of the poor country governments in contributing towards 
meeting the minimum health needs of its citizens. In this case, it is proposed that the 
reasonableness of expectation should be determined by the resource capacity of each 
country. According to the mechanism proposed in this chapter, the amount of 
resources which go beyond each poor country government’s resource capacity should 
be the ones that constitute morally binding obligation of external actors, specifically 
affluent country governments. 
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Abstract 
Background: Despite common recognition of joint responsibility for global health by 
all countries particularly to ensure justice in global health, current discussions of 
countries’ obligations for global health largely ignore obligations of developing 
countries. This is especially the case with regards to obligations relating to health 
financing. Bearing in mind that it is not possible to achieve justice in global health 
without achieving equity in health financing at both domestic and global levels, our 
aim is to show how fulfilling the obligation we propose will make it easy to achieve 
equity in health financing at both domestic and international levels. 
Discussion: Achieving equity in global health financing is a crucial step towards 
achieving justice in global health. Our general view is that current discussions on 
global health equity largely ignore obligations of Low Income Country (LIC) 
governments and we recommend that these obligations should be mainstreamed in 
current discussions. While we recognise that various obligations need to be fulfilled in 
order to ultimately achieve justice in global health, for lack of space we prioritise 
obligations for health financing. Basing on the evidence that in most LICs health is 
not given priority in annual budget allocations, we propose that LIC governments 
should bear an obligation to allocate a certain minimum percent of their annual 
domestic budget resources to health, while they await external resources to 
supplement domestic ones. We recommend and demonstrate a mechanism for 
coordinating this obligation so that if the resulting obligations are fulfilled by both 
LIC and HIC governments it will be easy to achieve equity in global health financing. 
Conclusion: Although achieving justice in global health will depend on fulfilment of 
different categories of obligations, ensuring inter- and intra-country equity in health 
financing is pivotal. This can be achieved by requiring all LIC governments to 
allocate a certain optimal per cent of their domestic budget resources to health while 
they await external resources to top up in order to cover the whole cost of the 
minimum health opportunities for LIC citizens. 
Key Words: Obligations; Low Income Countries; Global health; Equity; Justice; 
Developing countries.
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Background 
The Alma Ata Declaration (1978) categorically stated that “the existing gross 
inequality in the health status of the people particularly between developed and 
developing countries as well as within countries is politically, socially and 
economically unacceptable and is, therefore, of common concern to all countries” 
(emphasis added) [1]. Following this declaration there has been wide recognition of 
shared responsibilities for global health implying that all countries – High Income 
Countries (HICs), Middle Income Countries (MICs) as well as LICs – have a joint 
responsibility for improving global health with equity as one of the overarching goals. 
However, currently the actual proposals regarding obligations of countries to 
contribute to efforts towards global health equity largely ignore specific obligations of 
LIC governments, particularly obligations relating to health financing a. The 
negligible attention given to LIC governments’ obligations is evident in a number of 
global initiatives aiming at improving health opportunities of citizens in poor 
countries. Some of these initiatives include the proposed Framework Convention on 
global health [2]; the Global plan to combat neglected tropical diseases [3]; and the 
Global strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual 
property [4]. Further, the findings and recommendations of the Commission on 
intellectual property rights, innovation and public health [5]; the Report of the 
consultative expert working group on Research and Development: Financing and 
Coordination [6] among others are all concerned with international health resource 
transfer from HICs to LICs.  So far it seems to be taken for granted that LIC 
governments are doing everything possible within their limited resource contexts to 
fulfill the health needs of their citizens. But whereas it is necessary to mobilize 
external resources to fill the health-resource-gaps in LICs, a lot of evidence has 
suggested that there is need to think about possible obligations of LICs themselves in 
health financing [7-13].  All these authors point at various weaknesses in health 
financing within LICs which cause health inequities within those countries. It is also 
important to note that these domestic inequities are usually reproduced in the general 
global health picture whenever international health comparisons are made. With very 
good reasons all the above authors strongly imply that most LIC governments behave 
as if they are unwilling rather than unable to equitably fulfil the health needs (or 
rights) of their citizens through, among other things, equitable health financing. 
Drawing from these views our argument is that these weaknesses in health financing 
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within LICs can be significantly reduced if LIC governments fulfill certain obligations 
relating to health financing. We argue and recommend that LICs should bear an 
obligation to allocate a certain minimum percentage of their domestic resources to 
health, while external resources should be used to top up whatever shortfall remains in 
order to achieve a certain minimum level of health opportunities for all individuals. 
For the purpose of implementing the obligation we are proposing we will recommend 
a specific mechanism for reducing intra-country inequities and show that this will at 
the same time reduce inequities in inter-country health financing.  
After some conceptual clarifications we begin by providing evidence of low priority 
given to health sectors in LICs’ budget allocations, and we later use this evidence as a 
basis for defending the view that in the pursuit of global health equity LIC 
governments should fulfill the obligation we are proposing. We then begin our main 
discussion by stating and explaining the obligation of LICs which we are advocating. 
We go ahead to recommend a mechanism which helps to reveal, understand and 
mitigate the existing inequities in health financing between and within LICs as well as 
between all countries rich and poor. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this 
mechanism in determining LIC and HIC governments’ fair and optimal financial 
obligations for health financing and go ahead to show how fulfilling the resulting 
obligations by each country will lead to equity in global health financing as one of the 
steps towards global health justice. 
Underlying concepts 
In this paper we shall understand health inequity in general as undeserved inequalities 
in health status or access to health services which can be reduced by human efforts. 
By global health inequity we mean health inequity among individuals irrespective of 
national borders, or health inequities between and within countries. Equity in global 
health financing will be understood here as an inter- and intra-country proportionate 
distribution of the financing burden for a certain minimum level of health 
opportunities for all individuals globally by taking into account differences in 
resource capacities of different countries. By Global Minimum Health Expenditure 
(GMHE) per capita we mean the average cost of financing an ‘Essential Health 
Package’ per person per year in each country, or as we call it, ‘a certain minimum 
level of health opportunities per capita’. Our concept of the “minimum” follows from 
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the WHO concept of an ‘Essential Health Package’ which is supposed to be a 
guaranteed minimum of “a limited list of public and clinical interventions which will 
be provided at primary and/or secondary level care” for citizens of LICs (emphasis in 
original) [14].  Other ideas which point to the concept of the “minimum” include 
“Universal Coverage” for all people which “does not necessarily mean coverage for 
everything …” [15]; the ‘progressive realization of the right to health’; ‘Essential 
Medicines/Drugs’ among others. All these concepts imply that there is a certain 
minimum of health opportunities that should be seen as a right of every individual 
globally as recommended by the Alma Ata Declaration’s concept of Primary Heath 
Care [16]. The reasoning in our discussion reflects a view that if individuals are not 
assisted to realise this moral right yet it is within the means of obligation bearers (both 
HIC and LIC governments), then such obligation bearers are acting unjustly. Since we 
propose that the cost of covering this minimum be shared equitably between HICs and 
LICs (taking into account the resource capacity of each of them) then if such a 
minimum is not covered, then it will be possible to identify the source of injustice by 
looking at which actor(s) refused to fulfill their quota of obligation. But most 
importantly our concern in this paper is that the minimum health opportunities should 
be fully and equitably financed by public resources from both LICs and HICs without 
any private health expenditure (PHE). Therefore, in our discussion Global Health 
Justice is, or consists in, guaranteeing a certain minimum level of health opportunities 
to all individuals globally and ensuring an inter- and intra-country equitable sharing of 
the burden to that effect. 
Evidence of low priority given to health sectors in LIC budgets 
There are suggestions that LIC governments allocate a lesser percentage of their 
annual domestically generated budget resources to health than they should, and could 
afford. For instance, considering the World Health Organisation (WHO) Africa 
Region, Africa’s annual average budget allocation to health as a percentage of total 
government budgets is 8.7 per cent compared with Europe’s 14.8per cent and the 
Americas’ 16.8 per cent [17]. By the year 2001 the African Heads of States and 
Governments of African Union member states had realised that they were allocating 
negligible percentages of their budgets to health amidst increasing amounts of 
resources needed to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Tuberculosis and other 
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communicable diseases.  Having realised these financing gaps in the health sectors 
across Africa due to low priority given to health budgets, they all committed 
themselves to allocating at least 15 per cent of their annual budgets to health in what 
they called the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related 
Infectious Diseases[18]. However, since 2001 few African countries have reached this 
target; and currently the trend is regressing. For example, the WHO revealed that “19 
of the countries in the region who signed the declaration allocate less now than they 
did in 2001” [19]. Only four countries (Rwanda, Botswana, Zambia and Togo) 
fulfilled their commitment to the Abuja declaration’s 15 per cent [20]. 
In reaction to this relapsing trend, there is a view that Africa needs to improve on the 
laudable Abuja commitment and progress from “just 15% to ‘15% plus” by doubling 
per capita investment in health, and also more in crucial social determinants and 
pillars of health [21]. Further, the WHO has recommended that increased priority 
should be given to health from the general budget and/or debt relief funds. From the 
analysis undertaken for the World Health Report of 2011, “it is clear that some 
countries need to increase their own investments in health either through reallocation 
within their own general budgets or by making larger claims on their funds from debt 
relief which are to be preferentially allocated to social spending” [22]. For example, in 
Uganda it has been observed that the health sector is unnecessarily neglected and as a 
consequence the Uganda health sector has been found to be in a very sorry state, 
unnecessarily [23-25].  But despite repeated pleas with the government to increase 
resources to the health sector, “the government has continuously shown unwillingness 
to make the health sector its priority in budget allocations”[26]. 
This alleged avoidable lack of sufficient funding for health within developing 
countries by the LICs themselves is the background for our argument that in addition 
to discussing obligations of HIC governments to, among other things, transfer health 
resources to LMICs, complementary obligations of the latter should also be 
emphasised. This is because from the point of view of fairness – as it has been argued 
in the case of human rights obligations – “a sound case for transnational obligations 
cannot be made, intellectually or politically ” [and in this case morally], without 
eventually defining the scope and limits of national obligations” [27]. But most 
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importantly as our view is that it will remain extremely difficult to achieve justice in 
global health unless obligations of LICs are identified and implemented. 
Discussion 
LICs’ minimum financial obligation for health
The obligation of LIC governments we are arguing for is that all LICs should allocate 
a certain uniform minimum percentage of their domestic budget resources to their 
health sectors as their contribution to cover part of the cost of the minimum health 
opportunities for each of their citizens. In this paper we do not intend to recommend 
the actual percentage of domestic budgets which all LICs should allocate to their 
health sectors. This is because such a recommendation will have to be evidence-based 
taking into account the resource capacities of different countries and other relevant 
factors, all of which are beyond the means and resources of this paper. However, we 
will use a hypothetical percentage and then proceed to recommend and demonstrate a 
mechanism for dividing proportionately between HIC and LIC governments, the total 
cost (financing burden) of meeting these minimum health opportunities and this 
mechanism takes as its point of departure the optimal size of LIC governments’ 
obligation. 
In order to get to the root of the obligation we are proposing for LIC governments and 
how it will ensure equity in global health financing, we will take as our point of 
departure the estimate provided by the WHO of the cost of resources needed to 
provide basic life-saving services (health opportunities) per person per year in 
developing countries which is US$ 44 per person per year [28]. The obligations of 
LIC governments and external governments should be specified in terms of 
percentages of this cost, beginning with an optimal size of LIC governments’ 
obligations. This implies that all countries which need external health resources in 
order to achieve the targeted minimum of health opportunities (expressed as GMHE 
per capita) should allocate a certain specific optimal percentage of their domestically 
generated annual budget resources to their health sectors in order to fulfill their quota 
of health financing obligation. Basing on the deficits that will remain after fulfilling 
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this (LIC) obligation it will make it easy to determine the exact size of the obligations 
of external governments.  
For its effectiveness, this obligation presumes and recommends coordination in global 
health financing especially in international health resource transfers. Coordination is 
crucial because it has been observed that uncoordinated health financing between 
countries has no capacity to achieve global health equity and at the same time it has a 
high potential of deepening the existing inequities [29]. However, coordination in 
financing global health partly requires a mechanism for determining international 
obligations owed to each country, particularly those in need of external resources to 
cover the minimum health opportunities per capita.  But again as a point of emphasis, 
in order to determine the needed resources from HICs to LICs it is important first of 
all to determine an optimal level of health financing that can be reasonably expected 
from LICs by virtue of their resource capacities. It is this level that should constitute 
their (LICs) obligation, while the deficit that remains constitutes the size of external 
obligations. Fulfilling these obligations will lead, at least in principle, to inter- and 
intra-country equity in financing the global minimum of health opportunities that 
should be guaranteed to all individuals globally as a matter of right. For the purpose 
of implementing this obligation we recommend and illustrate a mechanism proposed 
by Ooms and Hammonds [30] for determining the size of HIC obligations in fulfilling 
the right to health for citizens in LMICs. We will later illustrate how fulfilling the 
resulting obligations leads to equity in financing global health. 
A mechanism for achieving equitable burden-sharing in global health financing 
The point of departure for Ooms and Hammonds is a challenge set by Norman 
Daniels in his book Just Health [31]. After defending the ethical appropriateness of 
shared responsibilities for health at a national level, Daniels expresses pessimism at 
the possibility of extending the ethical principles he used to a global level [30] and 
sets this as challenge for those interested in global health justice. In Taking up 
Daniels’ Challenge, Ooms and Hammonds propose a mechanism for determining the 
amount of financial resources HICs should transfer to LMICs in order to realise the 
right to health b. It should be noted that whereas Ooms and Hammonds’ emphasis is 
on HIC obligations to ensure the fulfilment of the right to health in LMICs, our 
emphasis is on the obligations of LICs themselves in ensuring global health justice, 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
particularly equity in global health financing. Their mechanism implies that 
determining a reasonable size of financial obligations of LIC governments entails that 
what remains is a fair size of HIC obligation. Hence, whereas Ooms and Hammonds 
use this mechanism in their argument for, and illustration of how to determine HIC 
obligations to ensure the right to health, we will adopt this mechanism in our 
argument for, and illustration of, how determining and implementing LIC obligations 
will ensure equity in global health financing. 
Ooms and Hammonds show that given that the amount of resources needed for each 
individual to ensure a just level of health [opportunities] is known, if all LICs 
allocated a certain minimum percentage of their GDP to health, it would be easy to 
determine the deficit for each individual in that country in order to reach the targeted 
minimum of such health opportunities in form of GMHE per capita’. In turn the total 
of these individual deficits would constitute the size of international health assistance 
owed to each poor country. Their hypothetical illustration is summarised as follows: 
If [poor] Country A has a GDP per capita of about US$333 and commits 3% of this 
amount, or US$10 per person per year on the distribution of health related goods, 
then the global obligation towards country A is limited to ensuring that it can achieve 
health-related goods distribution worth US$40 per person per year, assuming that this 
financing level [US$40] is what it takes to realize the core content of the right to 
health. Hence the international obligation to such a country would be an equivalent of 
US$30 per person per year. And if Country B has a GDP per capita of US$1,000, and 
commits 3% of that amount (or US$30 per person per year) on health-related goods, 
the global responsibility towards B would be the equivalent of US$ 10 per person per 
year. Then, if Country C has a GDP per capita of US$2,000, and allocates 3% of that 
amount (or US$60 per person per year) on the distribution of Health-related goods, 
then there would be no global responsibility towards C [30]. 
This mechanism implies that once the obligations of LICs we are proposing are 
fulfilled, the size of each LIC’s claim on international health resources will be directly 
proportional to its level of poverty. That is to say, poorer countries will be morally 
entitled to more health-aid per capita compared to countries which are better-off (such 
as MICs). This will ensure proportionate sharing of the burden of financing the 
targeted level of health opportunities for all individuals globally. It will mean that this 
minimum level of health opportunities is one-hundred percent publicly financed from 
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contributions of domestic governments and external governments. At this point there 
will be no financial barriers to such minimum health opportunities at the point of 
service delivery as well as financial inequities between individuals which normally 
arise from private health expenditures and more especially Out of Pocket Payment 
(OPP). 
Generally, what Ooms and Hammonds have done is to show that it is possible to 
provide a reasonable way of specifying and coordinating international obligations to 
provide health aid. Below we show how, basing on our proposed obligation, this 
framework can be used to identify lack of equity in health financing between LICs 
themselves and between HICs and LICs in their effort to meet the health needs of LIC 
citizens. 
Some preliminary points 
First, whereas Ooms and Hammonds use the percentage of GDP in illustrating the 
mechanism for determining the size of HIC obligations, in our illustrations we will 
use the percentage of domestically generated annual budget resources. This is 
because the percentage of GDP devoted to health is much broader.  GDP does not 
usually indicate the actual public resources available for health spending in a given 
financial year, and it also includes private contributions (PHE) which we seek to 
avoid in financing the targeted minimum of health opportunities. Therefore, since our 
concern is with the actual amount of public resources that can be made available from 
a certain percentage of the budget, instead of using ‘GDP per capita’ we will use 
‘domestic annual budget per capita’. We will exemplify our illustrations by 
considering health financing in two countries from the WHO Africa region – Uganda 
and Kenya. In subsequent examples we will use a few more countries in the same 
region that receive external health resources. Secondly, whereas the WHO estimates 
the average cost of basic life-saving services per person per year at US$44, the actual 
cost in different countries will obviously vary depending on the specific needs of each 
country, local costs of services among others. This means that in some countries the 
actual cost will be less than, and in some others above, US$44. In our illustrations we 
use a higher hypothetical figure of US$60 in order to account for these variabilities 
and the potential need for the minimum health opportunities to go beyond simply life-
saving services. But whatever the actual cost per country may turn out to be, it should 
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depend on evidence from country-specific studies. And in order to ease our 
illustrations we shall use a uniform cost of the minimum services (US$60) in all our 
examples since this does not affect the validity of the obligation we are proposing and 
the mechanism we are recommending. 
Current inequities in health financing between countries 
Table 1 demonstrates the current inequity in health financing between Uganda and 
Kenya as a result of the different percentages of their domestically generated annual 
budget resources allocated to health. 
Table 2: Inequitable health financing due to unequal budget allocations to health 























Uganda 152 7.4 11.25 60 48.75 
Kenya  226 5.4 12.20 60 47.80 
Source: Constructed on the basis of figures from Uganda’s Health Sector 
Performance Report, 2012/13 and Kenya National Health Accounts 2009/10. 
¤ Total Budget Per Capita has been calculated using Actual Health Expenditure 
(from public domestic resources) for each country as a percentage of total domestic 
budgets (without external funds). 
Table 1 shows that Kenya’s Total Budget per capita for 2009/10 (excluding aid) was 
around US$226 and only 5.4 per cent of it was allocated to health, generating 
US$12.20 per person. In the case of Uganda the domestic budget was around US$152 
per person, and 7.4% of this was allocated to health leading to US$11.20 per person. 
This means that if we assume the average cost of the minimum health opportunities to 
be US$60 in both countries, it means that in order to reach this target Kenya will need 
extra US$47.80, while Uganda’s deficit will be US$48.80. But since Kenya is 
wealthier (higher GDP/budget per capita) than Uganda, Kenya can allocate to health a 
smaller percentage of its budget than Uganda to reach the same absolute per capita 
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contribution or even higher as table 1 shows. This implies that these two countries are 
carrying disproportionate burdens in financing the global minimum health 
opportunities. This is an example of inter-LIC inequity in global health financing. 
Hence, in order to equalise the financing burden between the two countries there is 
need to specify an optimal percentage of domestic budget resources which all LICs 
should allocate to their health sectors and then proceed to calculate the shortfall for 
each of them needed from external health resources. This will ensure that each 
country’s size of claim on external resources is proportionate to its level of poverty 
and in relation to claims of other health-aid seekers. For example, if LIC financing 
obligation was to be set at Kenya’s 5.4 per cent (in table 1) the whole of the current 
shortfalls for both countries (and even more) would become a HIC obligation. If it 
were set at Uganda’s 7.4 per cent, Uganda would receive the whole of her current 
shortfall from external resources, while Kenya would be entitled to less than it could 
claim if the minimum were set at 5.4 per cent. Yet, if the Abuja Declaration’s target of 
15per cent referred to earlier were to be accepted as an optimal financial obligation 
for LIC governments, then the resulting lower deficits to reach the GMHE per capita 
would entail that both countries would have to contribute additional resources to 
cover part of their current shortfalls, but Kenya would have to contribute 
proportionally more compared to Uganda given her higher GDP. In other words, by 
equalising these countries’ burden of health financing, their current relative claims on 
international resources change in favour of Uganda which currently bears a 
disproportionate burden in relation to Kenya. The moral essence of this point is that 
since justice requires proportionate distribution of burdens/costs, this change in 
relative claims which is in favour of Uganda is morally justified and necessary. 
Earlier we mentioned that there is a widely shared view that most LIC governments 
allocate negligible percentages of their annual domestic budgets to health. Therefore, 
if this is true, then it implies that if the whole of LICs’ current shortfalls is demanded 
from HICs, there will be disproportionate burden sharing between LICs and HICs 
because LICs are imposing part of their obligation onto HICs. Hence in our next 
illustration we shall use a higher percentage which was recommended by the African 
Heads of States and governments.  In the view of the African Heads of States and 
Governments as expressed in the Abuja Declaration of 2001, arguably, African 
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countries have the capacity to allocate at least 15 per cent of their annual budgets to 
improving health. So, for the purpose of this illustration we will assume 15 per cent of 
domestically generated annual budget resources as the optimal financial obligation for 
LIC governments. We will use it to demonstrate how fulfilling our proposed LIC 
government obligation leads to inter-LIC equity in global health financing c and 
equity between HICs and LICs. However, there are a few important points to note 
about the Abuja target of 15 per cent. First, the Abuja Declaration does not specify 
whether 15 per cent is of the total government budget including external resources, or 
if it is a percentage of domestically generated resources only. Secondly, in the 
Declaration there is no independent justification of 15 per cent from the point of view 
of resource capacities of countries. Failure to take into count resource capacity might 
explain why most African countries have not lived up to their commitments, hence 
suggesting the need for an evidence-based financing target. But despite all these 
issues, for the limited purpose of our illustration we shall take this 15 per cent as a 
percent of domestically generated budget resources agreed upon by all actors. 
Table 3: The effect of standardising financing obligation at Abuja’s 15% on 
inter-country financing equity
Country Total Budget 
per capita 
(US$) 
Current domestic % of 
budget and resulting 
absolute per capita US$ 
(X% = US$) 
Absolute US$ from 15 





Deficit (US$)  
per capita to reach 
GMHE (US$ 60) 
Uganda 152 7.4% = 11.2 22.8 60 37.2 
Kenya 226 5.4 % = 12.2 33.9 60 26.1 
Rwanda 130 23.3% = 30 19.5 60 40.5 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
6943 7.0%  = 486 1041 60 No Deficit 
Tanzania 126 11.1% =14 18.9 60 41.1 
Namibia 2400 6.5%  = 156 360 60 No Deficit 
Source: Constructed from National Health Expenditure Statistics for Uganda and Kenya (table1); 
and Estimates for the rest of the countries’ Annual domestic budget per capita has been calculated 
basing on the 2010 Health Expenditure Per Capita as percentage of Annual health budget (without 
foreign resources) Provided by Afri-Dev. Info. 2013. (Post Abuja+12) 2013 Africa Health 
Financing Scorecard – Featuring Year 2000 to 2010 Indicative Progress Summary. 
Table 2 shows how much health aid would need to be contributed by international 
donors if one sets a uniform obligatory level (obligation) of health financing for LIC 
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governments as percentage of their domestic annual budget at 15 per cent. For the two 
countries considered earlier (Uganda and Kenya) for example, their deficits will fall. 
In the case of Uganda it will decline from US$48.8 (in Table 1) to US$37.2 (Table 2); 
while for Kenya it will reduce from US$47.80 (Table 1) to US$26.1 (Table 2).  This 
shows that the two countries would increase their respective domestic contributions 
by different absolute amounts as a result of increasing their budget percentages to 
health. Kenya would contribute an additional 21.7 US$ (US$ 33.9 – 12.2) and Uganda 
11.6 US$ (US$ 22.8 – 11.2). The impact of this obligation on justice is that by doing 
their best in health financing, LICs will reduce the burden of health financing 
currently borne (or expected to be borne) by HIC citizens. In other words, on top of 
all LICs bearing an equal burden of financing the minimum health opportunities per 
capita, the resulting deficits will be a fair size of obligation for HICs since LICs will 
have reached a level where they are unable, rather than unwilling, to allocate more 
resources to health.  
Further, given that LIC governments need to increase their domestic contribution to 
health [15], it will be possible to save external resources that are now going to 
countries (LMICs) d that have the capacity to afford the global minimum of health 
opportunities per capita without international resources if such countries fulfilled their 
15 per cent or whatever the size is of this minimum obligation will turn out to be. 
Such countries would be, for example, Equatorial Guinea and Namibia in Table 2, 
since they would have “No Deficit”. With the possibility of coordinated global health 
financing, especially external health financing to cover the GMHE per capita, it would 
be possible to redirect some of the external resources currently going to countries like 
Equatorial Guinea and Namibia to countries which, even after allocating 15 per cent 
or more of their domestic budgets to health, such as Rwanda, cannot raise the needed 
GMHE per capita estimated at US$60. The underlying moral reasoning here is that it 
is unjust to give assistance to countries which are, or can be, above the targeted 
threshold of health-opportunities without assistance before sufficient assistance is 
given to others which have not yet reached, and cannot reach, the same threshold 
without extra assistance by virtue of their more constrained resource capacities. In 
other words among LMICs there are some countries which are capable of fully 
financing the minimum health opportunities for their citizens without external 
assistance yet such countries are currently receiving health aid before poorer ones get 
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what they need. Our view is that when such countries claim external resources before 
worse-off countries get enough to cover their minimum health opportunities, then 
such claims (by better-off countries) are unjust. So far this category of moral 
reasoning is evidently lacking in the current manner in which global health is 
financed, particularly international health resource transfers. This poses a serious 
threat to the efforts and hope of achieving global health equity. 
Presently, if we go by actual health financing statistics among WHO African region 
Member States, in 2010 Equatorial Guinea and Namibia allocated only 7 per cent and 
6.5 per cent respectively of their annual domestic budgets’ resources to health and 
they were able to raise as high as US$486 and US$156 per person respectively; yet at 
the same time, between 2000 and 2010 Equatorial Guinea received a cumulative total 
of US$30.50 million from the Global Fund alone; while Namibia received US$187.72 
million [20]. Hence, from the point of view of what constitutes just or unjust claims 
on external resources as described above, the amount of Global Fund resources 
claimed and received by Namibia and Equatorial Guinea constituted unjust claims on 
international health resources. This is especially the case because there are some 
economically worse-off countries which could not raise the GMHE per capita even if 
they allocated as high as 23 per cent of their annual budgets to health (Rwanda); and 
also the amount of health aid they received could not enable them reach the GMHE 
per capita of US$60. Therefore, since equitable distribution of burdens is a relevant 
factor in the pursuit of justice in global health, our mechanism implies that Namibia 
and Equatorial Guinea should not have received external health resources before 
Rwanda received what it needed to reach the U$60 target. In this case Rwanda and all 
countries which our mechanism places in a Rwanda-like situation bore a 
disproportionate burden compared to Namibia and Equatorial Guinea in attempting to 
cover the cost of the global minimum level of health opportunities. Further since the 
GMHE per capita for each country is expected to cover the basic life-saving services 
it means that citizens of Rwanda on one hand, and those of Namibia and Equatorial 
Guinea on the other, had unequal access to these life-saving services. This illustrates 
the kind of financing inequities that would be avoided if all LMIC governments were 
required to allocate a specific optimal percentage of their annual (domestic) budgets 
to health as we are proposing in respect to LICs. 
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Again, going by the figures provided by the 2013 African Health Financing 
Scorecard, it would have been possible to save and redirect Global Funds totaling to 
at least US$1.02 billion from just 12 of these (African) countries. It should also be 
noted that this amount would have been saved at the current health financing levels 
(below 15 per cent) of these 12 countries. This implies further that instead of asking 
the entire deficit for the rest of LICs from the HICs, if a mechanism like this had been 
followed in resource fundraising and disbursement, the burden of HIC citizens could 
have been reduced even further and would be even fairer. At this point it is important 
to reiterate our disclaimer that the 15 per cent which we have used in this illustration 
does not have to be the actual size of LIC governments’ financing obligation. Rather, 
it has been used to show how the obligation of LIC governments to allocate a certain 
uniform percentage of their domestically generated budget resources to health along 
with mechanism we have recommended have the capacity to lead to equity in global 
health financing. 
One objection to our argument could be that HICs should not reduce their transfers to 
better-off poor countries which do not fulfill their obligations in order to be able to 
increase their (HICs) transfers to poorer countries that are in greater need. Rather, it 
may be recommended in this objection that HICs should continue to support the non-
compliant better-off countries and at the same time increase their transfers to poorer 
countries. However, this objection ignores the fact this strategy rewards non-
compliance and, therefore, maintains inequities in international health financing. This 
is so because there is evidence that for each dollar they receive in form of health aid, 
some LIC governments reduce their health expenditure from their domestic resources 
[28, 32]. This is corroborated by the evidence provided by the 2010 African Financing 
Scorecard which shows that between the year 2000 and 2010, presumably due to the 
Global Fund and GAVI funds effect, health financing as percentage of domestic 
budget resources declined in 12 African countries [20]. It is important to note, 
however, that the decline in domestic funding in the wake of increased external 
resources could also be attributed to a number of macro-economic goals especially 
IMF budget ceilings in LICs [33]. However, IMF recommends ceilings for general 
social sector spending implying that if health is prioritised within social sector budget 
allocations there will be no need for extra fiscal space to accommodate an increase in 
health budgets. But even if we work within an IMF imposed budget ceiling, this does 
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not refute our general claim that we should agree on a level of domestic health 
spending, whatever that is, and use that level to work out an equitable distribution of 
international transfers of aid. 
By and large, the illustrations above show, by the specific examples of Uganda and 
Kenya, that even though the burden borne by Uganda in financing health is higher 
than that of Kenya, Uganda still has lower health expenditure per capita from public 
funds than Kenya yet both countries compete for the limited external health resources 
without any assurance that Uganda will be given priority to Kenya in external 
resource (per capita) disbursements. This situation obtains between majority of 
LMICs. This means that the size of Kenya’s claim on international health resources is 
unfair in relation to that of Uganda. In relation to HICs it is an unfair claim because 
Kenya is doing less than it can by virtue of its resource potential for health financing. 
To put it differently, when LICs allocate less than what might turn out to be their 
optimal obligation and then claim the entire deficit from HICs they (LICs) end up 
unfairly imposing part of their justified burden to citizens of both HICs and other 
LMICs. The whole problem of lack of uniform and stringent obligations of LIC 
governments in financing health leads to a disproportionate sharing of the burden of 
financing global health leading to inequity in global health financing. However, 
fulfilling LIC governments’ minimum financial obligations for global health as 
proposed here along with the mechanism we have recommended will lead to equity in 
financing global health, in particular the essential (minimum) health package for all 
individuals globally; that is, financing equity between LMICs themselves, and 
between LMICs and HICs. 
LICs’ financing obligation and intra-LIC equity 
In the discussion above we have illustrated how the obligation of LIC governments to 
allocate a certain uniform minimum percentage of their domestic budget resources to 
health can be effective as a mechanism for guiding equitable health resource 
contributions and disbursements globally, leading to inter-country equity. Now we 
will illustrate how, in principle, this obligation leads to equity in domestic health-
financing and then suggest additional obligations that would make such equity a 
reality. 
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There is ample evidence that in nearly all LICs public spending on health 
disproportionately benefits wealthier citizens and also that health financing is very 
disproportionate in favor of the rich [7, 9, 10]. This is inequity in health financing and 
it strongly determines how much PHE as a financing mechanism is relied on in such 
health systems. In some LMIC health systems PHE as a percentage of Total Health 
Expenditure (THE) surpasses the total contributed by both public and donor 
contributions to health spending e. This situation obtains in the financing of all health 
services even beyond the minimum health packages. And given the very high income 
inequalities in most LICs, the obvious consequence of high dependency on PHE, 
especially out of pocket payments, is that poorer individuals carry a disproportionate 
burden of financing the minimum health opportunities  and, at the same time, they 
have very unequal access to these basic life-saving services. 
In this illustration an important reiteration is that in order to guarantee the targeted 
minimum of health opportunities to all individuals, the whole cost for this minimum 
should be covered by public resources (contributed by both HIC and LIC 
governments) so that there will be no PHE for such services, at least at the point of 
service delivery.  With regards to the impact of private health expenditure on health 
equity, the picture among most LICs is grim. In Uganda, for instance, PHE 
contributes about 50 per cent of THE, against 22 per cent and 28 per cent from 
domestic public and donor sources respectively[28, 34]. For Rwanda in 2006 these 
figures were 28 per cent, 19 per cent and 53 per cent respectively [35]; while for 
Kenya the same figures were around 36.7 per cent, 28.8 per cent and 34.5 per cent for 
private, public and donor funding respectively for the financial year 2009/10 [36].  
Hence, with GINI co-efficiencies as high as 50.8 per cent for Rwanda in 2011 [37]; 
42.5 and 44.3 for Kenya in 2008 and Uganda in 2009 [38] respectively, it means that 
the higher the PHE as percentage of national THE, the deeper the inequity in health 
financing. And as long as these domestic inequities remain within LICs, the 
consequence will remain – as Amouzou and others have discovered – that “economic 
inequalities with respect to health [U5MR] within developing countries contribute 
much more to the global health gap than might appear to be the case at first glance; 
[…]” [39]. In this regard it is important to note that reducing health disparities by 
economic status in LICs primarily requires intra-country equity in health financing 
which reduces the health costs of the poor through cross-subsidies and, therefore, 
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facilitates equal financial access to health services for all. This will be possible if LICs 
fulfil their minimum financing obligation. 
In this paper we have been concerned with global health equity defined as access by 
everyone to a minimum level of health services. We recommend that the whole cost 
of the global minimum health opportunities per capita for each country be covered by 
pooled public resources (domestic plus external resources). Once this has happened 
there will be no PHE for this minimum, at least at the point of service delivery. Since 
our current concept of ‘global health equity’ neither targets equality in access to the 
highest health opportunities globally, nor the same health opportunities for LIC 
citizens as those of HIC citizens but a rather significantly lower minimum of health 
opportunities for all individuals, then as long as this minimum is financed equitably 
there will have existed global health equity as we have defined it.   
Certainly there are other health costs other than those at the point of service delivery 
such as transport costs, time lost in caring for a family member, hours of work lost by 
patients etc. But all the same the obligation we have proposed will at least ensure 
equity in health financing at the point of service delivery which mostly hinders access 
to health services within LICs. With due regard to other sources of health inequities at 
a domestic level, given that most of these inequities have a financial implications we 
envisage that promoting and ensuring equity in health financing within LICs is the 
first necessary step in the right direction which should be followed by other domestic 
measures. Such measures may include ensuring efficiency, reducing geographical 
inequities, equitable priority-setting between health interventions (for diseases that 
mostly affect the poor versus those that affect the rich, or by sex, age etc.) etc., all of 
which will finally remedy the ills of inequity in global health which arise from 
domestic contexts. Therefore, given that an argument for this obligation presumes 
efficiency and equitable mechanism in health resource allocation among others and all 
of which are not true in most LICs, these two along with other requirements would 
constitute additional obligations for LIC governments as we have argued elsewhere 
with respect to general obligations for global justice[40]. 
In summary, if all LICs are required to allocate a uniform optimal percentage of their 
domestic budgets to health, fulfilling the resulting obligation by each country and 
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using the resulting deficits to determine the sizes of HIC governments’ obligations to 
each LIC will have two kinds of effects: the pragmatic effect and fairness effect. From 
a pragmatic point of view, it will facilitate coordination in global health financing 
which is necessary to avoid the current duplications arising from uncoordinated 
international health resource transfers. It will ensure easy monitoring of international 
health resource flows so that health resources are directed to where they are mostly 
needed. Its fairness effect consists in ensuring equitable health financing between all 
countries and within countries for a certain minimum levels of health opportunities for 
all individuals globally. 
Potential controversies 
One of the potential controversies likely to emerge in implementing LIC obligations 
in health financing is how to deal with cases where poor countries do not to fulfil their 
obligations. The first issue is: what should be done if LICs refuse[41] to fulfill their 
obligations? Should the deficits resulting from this refusal be added to HIC obligation 
for the sake guaranteeing the targeted minimum? We believe that the answer should 
be no, for at least two reasons. First, it would encourage complacency among LIC 
governments if there is an automatic mechanism for covering deficits arising from 
refusal to fulfill their obligations. There will be no motivation for LIC governments to 
increase their domestic budget allocations to health. Instead the motivation might be 
in the opposite direction since the lesser the domestic resources they allocate to 
health, the more they would get in international health resource assistance. Rather, 
what needs to be emphasised here is that the argument for this obligation is based on 
the WHO premise that “Every country could raise additional domestic funds for 
health or diversify their funding sources if they wished to” (emphasis added), for 
example, by giving higher priority to health in their domestic budget allocations [15]. 
Following this premise we hope that it is possible to persuade LIC governments to do 
so even if it might require some minimum diplomatic nudging. On the other hand, if 
failure to fulfil their obligations is due to genuine scarcity of resources (inability) – 
say, due to deteriorating economy, unexpected epidemic such as the recent Ebola or 
war situations etc. which limit the capacity of countries to meet their obligations, then 
whatever deficits arise from such situations would justly be shared by all parties, or be 
responded to as a humanitarian situation. The second reason is that requiring HICs to 
cover deficits which arise out of LIC governments’ refusal to fulfill their obligation 
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constitutes injustice against citizens of HICs and will, therefore, make global equity in 
health financing impossible since HIC citizens would have to contribute more than 
their proportionate percentage.  
The second controversial issue is whether HICs should continue to fulfil their 
obligations of assistance even if LIC governments refuse to fulfill theirs or, whether 
international health resource transfers should be construed as rewards to those LICs 
whose governments fulfill their obligations. We want to emphasise that fulfilling 
obligations of HICs should not depend on whether LIC governments fulfill their own 
obligation, nor should international health funds to LICs be seen as a reward for 
fulfilling their obligations. This is because of at least three reasons: one, whenever 
they fulfil their obligations, LIC governments are performing their duty for which 
they do not have to be rewarded. Secondly, international health resources are owed to 
citizens rather than governments of LICs yet citizens in LICs have no significant 
influence, if any at all, on budget allocations of their countries like the Uganda 
example has revealed. Hence, even though governments in LICs refuse to fulfill this 
obligation their citizens would retain their right to international health resources. The 
third reason why HICs should continue to fulfill their obligations to LIC citizens even 
if LIC governments refuse to fulfil their quota of obligations arises from the crucial 
importance of health in protecting the sanctity of human life and its dignity as well as 
the centrality of health in ensuring other dimensions of human well-being. Hence, if 
HICs refuse to fulfill their obligations to the citizens of LICs in such circumstances 
they would be subjecting the citizens of LICs to a ‘double-jeopardy’. For these 
reasons, HIC obligations to citizens of LICs should remain morally binding even if 
LIC governments refuse or fail to fulfil their financing obligations. 
Conclusion 
Achieving justice in global health requires different categories of obligations both by 
LICs, MICs and HICs. But given that financial resources are pivotal in fulfilling most 
of these obligations, without overlooking other potential categories of obligations our 
view is that in order to achieve global health equity it is important to start with 
ensuring equity in financing global health. Having realised that the current proposals 
and strategies to raise sufficient resources to that effect largely ignore LIC 
governments’ obligations, we have proposed, defended and demonstrated the 
Can Resource-Poor Countries Bear any Obligations for Global Distributive Justice? A Reflection on the Distribution of Global 
health Opportunities
importance of obligations of LIC governments, in particular their obligations 
regarding minimum health financing. All LICs should allocate to health a certain 
minimum percentage of their domestically generated annual budget resources as their 
quota of a global obligation to guarantee to all individuals globally a certain minimum 
level of health opportunities. The mechanism we have recommended for determining 
each country’s obligation in covering the cost of minimum health opportunities along 
with the fulfilment of the resulting obligations will ease coordination in global health 
fundraising and resource disbursements. This will ultimately lead to global equity in 
financing a certain minimum level of health opportunities for all individuals globally. 
However, this obligation can be exploited to wrongly justify withholding international 
health resources to very poor countries, especially to those which are potential 
beneficiaries of redistribution but refuse to fulfill their obligations. But given that the 
obligation to contribute to international health resources is owed to the citizens of 
LICs not governments per se; and given the special nature and value of health in 
protecting the sanctity of human life and its dignity among others, the failure of 
governments of LICs to fulfill their obligations should not exempt HIC governments 
from fulfilling their share of obligations to LIC citizens. 
End notes 
aWe recognise that there are many obligations that are necessary to achieve 
equity in global health but for lack of space we are limiting our current discussion to 
one of them – equity in financing global health. 
bEven though Ooms and Hammonds are primarily concerned with HIC 
obligations to give health aid, their analysis implies a belief that LIC governments 
ought to bear obligations too. 
cWhat we have done here is a hypothetical illustration. We presume (and 
recommend) that the process of determining the actual optimal financial obligation of 
countries and their possible enforcement measures will be evidence-based (especially 
regarding LICs’ resource capacities), participatory and democratic involving all 
concerned countries in respect of the principles of national autonomy and sovereignty 
(and the possible limits of these principles). 
dEven though this argument is centred on obligations of LICs, the mechanism 
suggested implies that this obligation ought to be borne by all countries that rely on, 
or need, external resources to reach the GMHE per capita. 
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e According to the 2012 WHO Global health expenditure atlas, in 2010, within 
the WHO African region alone, in at least13 countries PHE for health is more than 50 
per cent of THE with the highest at 88 per cent in Guinea.
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5.1 General Claim and Nature of Reasoning 
The major contribution of this work is the argument for, and demonstration of, a claim 
that ‘in the pursuit of global justice, particularly justice in global health, there is need 
to identify and implement obligations of resource-poor country (or LMICs) 
governments as necessary complements of those of high income country governments 
in an effort to achieve a global minimum distribution of goods and services. Particular 
concern has been on what it takes to achieve a global minimum distribution of health 
opportunities in form of health of goods and services expressed as the Global 
Minimum Health Expenditure (GMHE) per capita without losing sight of equity. 
Bearing in mind the ethical requirement of ‘proportionate distributions of 
burdens/costs’; and using the case of equity in global health financing as a key step 
towards equity in global health, this work has argued for an obligation of poor 
countries to allocate a certain minimum and uniform percentage of their domestically-
generated annual budget resources to health as they (LICs) await external (donor) 
resources to cover their shortfalls. The key moral reasoning at the heart of this work is 
that in the pursuit of justice, particularly distributive justice, it is not enough to simply 
enquire into what the destitute needs in order to be restored (or lifted) to the desired 
threshold distribution of material and social well-being; but it also requires an enquiry 
into what the victim could have done or can do in order to avoid or mitigate harm the 
gravity of destitution, and, at the same time, make it easy for the system of 
distributive justice to help them reach a position which is regarded as just. This form 
of reasoning about distributive justice entails a presumption against moral 
responsibility on the part of the potential beneficiaries of redistribution in the way 
such destitution arose and, or persists. Any effort towards distributive justice which 
does not reflect this mode of reasoning does not guarantee justice. So, the argument 
for obligation of poor countries (or LMICs) in the pursuit of global justice, 
particularly justice in global health, is based on the claim that current efforts to ensure 
global justice are for the most part silent on stringent obligations of the victims of 
global injustice (LMICs) or what I have called the potential beneficiaries of a global 
redistribution. 
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5.2 Nature and Scope of Discussion 
In this work I have been primarily concerned with what it will take to achieve global 
justice, particularly justice in global health. In order to arrive at what it will take to 
achieve justice in global health, I have placed the pursuit of justice in global health in 
the broader context of global justice. I have started by noting that global justice in 
general requires three categories of obligations: obligations relating to international 
law, obligations relating to the need for (re)designing and implementing a global 
institutional regime which distributes power and opportunities to countries and 
individuals therein equally and, thirdly, obligations necessary in order to offset global 
market failures and other unavoidable factors that cause destitution in the world. I 
have called the latter category ‘obligations of countries for global distributive justice’. 
My position on these categories of obligations has been that all of them must be 
fulfilled if the idea of global justice is to be complete and its aspirations achieved. For 
that matter I have observed that any account of justice that ignores the importance of 
any of these categories (of obligations) remains incomplete, while one that explicitly 
denies the necessity of any of these categories is out rightly flawed. This position 
applies to obligations to ensure justice in all aspects of human life including health. 
That is, the achievement of justice in global health requires that all countries adhere to 
whatever contents of international law relevant to health, ensure that all global 
political/social institutions distribute opportunities for survival and good health to all 
individuals in all countries in a just manner and, finally, all countries bear morally 
binding obligations to contribute to the achievement of the global minimum 
distribution of health goods and services (health opportunities). 
Out of these three categories of obligations I have been primarily concerned with the 
third category of obligations which I have called ‘obligations of countries for global 
redistributive justice.’ I have noted that the weaknesses within the debates about 
general obligations for global distributive justice are reflected in the current efforts to 
achieve justice in global health. Therefore, in order to understand issues (strengths 
and weaknesses) in efforts towards justice in global health, these issues need to be 
understood against the backdrop of the discussion of the general obligations of 
countries for ensuring global distributive justice. The weaknesses identified in the 
current debates about countries obligations for global distributive justice point to the 
necessity of an enquiry into, and implementation of, obligations of resource- poor 
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countries (or LMICs) in ensuring or facilitating the achievement of global justice, 
particularly justice in global health. Within the broader subject of justice in global 
health I have limited my illustrations to obligations relating to equity in global health 
financing as one of the key obligations which must be fulfilled in order to achieve 
justice in global health. Therefore, the particular argument of this work has been on 
obligations of poor countries in ensuring justice in global health, particularly equity in 
global health financing. 
5.3 Issues in Debates on General Obligations for Global Distributive Justice 
Given the nature of the discussion in this work as explained above, the point of 
departure has been an examination of the general trend in discussions about global 
justice, particularly global distributive justice. There have been two concerns about 
the current discussions of general obligations of countries for global distributive 
justice: One has been a tendency to deny the existence of morally binding
transnational obligations for global distributive justice. The second and major concern 
has been an observation that even though the debate about the existence of these 
obligations were to be concluded with an affirmative answer, as I have argued, the 
implementation of this affirmed position in itself does not guarantee the achievement 
of global distributive justice. This is because in ignores corresponding obligations of 
potential beneficiaries of redistribution, a practice that misses the key concepts that 
underlie this work – complementarity of obligations and equitable distribution of 
burdens. 
The dominant issue in these discussions is a debate regarding whether there exist 
morally binding obligations of countries to ensure global distributive justice. Liberal 
cosmopolitans affirm these obligations on the sole basis of our shared humanity. On 
the other hand, without attempting to deny this universally shared metaphysical 
attribute (shared humanity and moral equality), Statists argue that in addition to this 
shared attribute, robust principles of distributive justice and obligations which follow 
from such principles are justified by what is has been called ‘associative duties 
account’. The associative duties account regards a country or a state as an association 
in which people engage in cooperation for mutual benefit and also and where those 
individuals are subjected to the same coercion. According to Statists it is this 
‘cooperation’ and ‘coercion’ in the association that justify the application of robust 
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principles of distributive justice. Their arguments directly imply that there is nothing 
like a global association which might justify the application of the liberal principles of 
justice and the resulting obligations at a global level. However, an examination of this 
debate has revealed that the Statists account for the existence of morally binding (and 
potentially enforceable) obligations of distributive justice at a national level can be 
consistent with morally binding transnational obligations for distributive justice, 
although such obligations may not be as demanding as those at a national level. This 
position has been claimed to fit well with Nussbaum’s “minimal conception of social 
justice” once this conception has been extrapolated to explain the nature and scope of 
current claims of global distributive justice. However, having made some 
observations in the process of affirming this position, one thing has emerged clearly: 
the current trend in discussions of global justice are for the most part blind at what it 
necessarily takes to achieve global justice with equity as the ultimate concern. In 
short, by concentrating almost exclusively on arguments for resource transfers from 
HICs to LICs without enquiring into and enforcing obligations of LIC governments 
themselves, the trend does not guarantee the achievement of global distributive 
justice. It is for this reason that I have found it practically and morally necessary to 
attempt an enquiry into possible obligations of developing countries in ensuring 
global justice, in particular, justice in global health using the illustrations from current 
efforts in global health financing. 
As a matter of emphasis, my arguments in this work should not be interpreted to mean 
that those who are arguing for international resource transfers from HIC to LICs are 
wrong or that their undertaking is unnecessary. It would also be a wrong interpretation 
of my arguments if they are construed to mean that my own undertaking is more 
superior to those who argue for resource transfers from developed to developing 
countries. Instead, my arguments are intended to emphasise the complementary nature
of HIC obligations and obligations of LIC governments to the extent that this 
complementarity is a necessary condition for the achievement of global distributive 
justice. I acknowledge that arguments for international resource transfers are a 
necessary step towards global distributive justice. My recognition of the necessity to 
undertake the task of defending the necessity of resource transfers from the global rich 
to the global poor is based on the real scarcity of resources in developing countries. It 
is also based on the evidence of the historical and current global circumstances of 
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unequal distribution of power (both political and economic), unequal distribution 
opportunities such as trade and finance, the coercive regime of some institutions of 
global and regional governance such the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
regional trade blocs etc. There is no doubt that all these global socio-economic 
circumstances which existed from times of slavery and slave trade, to colonialism and 
the current integration of the global economy impact, mostly negatively, LIC 
governments’ capacity to benefit from their own resources or even undertake certain 
economically productive projects and yet, these same circumstances operate(d) to the 
benefit of HIC citizens whether directly through HIC governments or through 
multinational companies and corporations. I have acknowledged that indeed this 
undertaking is worth pursuing even more vigorously because despite the wide 
political recognition of countries’ joint obligation for global distributive justice 
through international cooperation by almost all wealthy countries, most of them do 
not fully comply with this obligation and the consequence has been the deepening of 
global injustices. It is in this regard that I have attempted to account for the futility of 
obligations of countries for global distributive justice. In this endeavour I have 
attempted to show why both domestic and external obligations have been futile and 
what ought to be done about it if there is to remain hope for global distributive justice. 
Bearing in mind the above global circumstances I have recommended that since these 
circumstances affirm the existence of morally binding obligations of countries for 
global distributive justice, and given the reasons for the futility of these obligations, 
these obligations should be precisely specified and where necessary enforced in order 
to secure wide compliance with them. 
5.4 Major Concern 
The major concern in this work has been an attempt to justify, with illustrations, both 
the moral and practical necessity of conceiving and implementing obligations of poor 
countries (or all countries which need assistance to reach a certain minimum level of 
material and social well-being) in ensuring global justice and in particular global 
distributive justice with the ultimate focus on possible obligations of developing 
countries in the pursuit of justice in global health. The necessity of enquiring into poor 
country obligations has been reflected in in two key ideas: The first idea is the 
‘complementarity of obligations of HICs and (LMICs)’ as a practical necessity if 
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global justice is to be achieved. That is to say that whatever obligations of high 
income countries might be, they must be conceived as complements to those of LIC 
governments. The major reason has been that since external obligations are primarily 
fulfilled through the agency of LIC governments, then it means that unless such 
governments fulfil certain obligations, external efforts cannot improve the life 
opportunities and well-being of the citizens of LICs. With respect to Uganda for 
example, the argument is that given the evidence of, and extent of corruption and bad 
governance and the manner in which these make it impossible for external resources 
to benefit the citizens, poor countries in a Uganda-like situation ought to bear 
obligations for ensuring that external resources trickle down to the poor citizens for 
whom such resources are primarily intended. It should be easy to see how such an 
obligation is a necessary complement to obligation of HICs to transfer resources to 
Uganda if the fulfilment of the latter obligation is to have the intended effect of 
improving the lives of poor Ugandans. The idea of the complementarity of obligations 
of HIC and LIC governments is more of a practical necessity though it has some 
moral connotations. 
On the other hand, the moral necessity of identifying and implementing obligations of 
LICs in the pursuit of global distributive justice arises from the conception of justice 
as equity or the claim that equity is a necessary condition for the existence of 
distributive justice. In this case the concern with equity is two-pronged: equity in 
access to a certain threshold distribution of goods and services (or opportunities for 
survival and well-being) and equity in sharing the burdens, especially costs, of 
achieving the targeted minimum distribution of such goods and services. The 
emphasis of ‘equitable access’ rather than simply ‘equal access’ is a recognition of the 
fact that different people in different contexts (social, economic, geographical etc.) 
need different types and amounts of goods and services to achieve equal levels of 
well-being.17
Further, the concern for equitable distribution of the burdens/costs of ensuring a 
minimum distribution of goods and services for all individuals globally has been the 
most central issue. The key argument has been that ‘on top of ensuring that every 
individual has equal access to the minimum goods and services they need in their 
17 See Amartya Sen’s discussion of the relationship between goods the achievement of functioning 
(beings and doings).  
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special circumstances in order to ensure basic well-being, the costs or burdens to that 
effect must be proportionately shared between all the actors involved’. In this case the 
actors are national governments of all countries as agents of their citizens. The idea of 
proportionality of sharing the burdens in this case is a requirement to take into 
account the resource capacities of different sets of actors (HICs and LMICs) as well 
as differences in resource capacities within each set of actors. It is these two major 
ideas – ‘complementarity of obligations’ and ‘equitable distribution of burdens’, 
which justify the claim of the necessity of obligations of poor countries in ensuring 
global justice, in particular global distributive justice. 
5.5 The case of Global Health Equity 
In order to divest my arguments of abstractions, I have attempted to illustrate my 
argument for obligations of poor countries in ensuring global distributive justice by 
examining current global efforts to ensure justice in global health. I have not provided 
any special justification for choosing health because of two reasons. One is that I have 
taken it for granted that health is pivotal in affecting the survival of human beings as 
well as their well-being. Besides I have taken it as common knowledge that good 
population health has a direct and huge impact on ‘economic growth’ and ‘human 
development’. Other implicit justifications for giving priority to health are the sanctity 
of human life and its dignity all of which are primarily threatened by ill-health. 
Following the above background as the context in which to understand current issues 
in efforts to achieve global distributive justice, I have shown how current strategies in 
terms of proposals and actions aimed at achieving justice in global health suffer from 
the same fate as those in current efforts (debates) for general obligations of global 
distributive justice. In both of these cases the strategies are lop-sided in a sense of 
focusing the whole attention on arguing for resource transfers from high income 
countries to low and middle income countries. I acknowledge the real scarcity of 
health resources among developing countries and I have also pointed at the current 
disproportionate allocation (distribution) of health opportunities globally, particularly 
financial resources, to the disadvantage of the global poor. From this point I 
emphasized the necessity of health resource transfer from the global reach to the 
global poor. However, and most importantly, I noted and went ahead to demonstrate 
how this trend (health resource transfer from the global rich to the global poor) 
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aloneand in itself cannot succeed in achieving justice in global health. The emphasis 
of ‘alone’ and ‘in itself’ implies that health resource transfer from the global rich to 
the global poor is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement of 
justice in global health. In other words, this is an emphasis of the need to treat 
obligations of rich countries and those poor countries as necessary complements in the 
pursuit of justice in global health – both HIC and LICs must fulfil certain obligations 
if justice in global health is to be achieved. 
The centrality of ‘equity’ in the concept of justice has been pivotal in the specific 
illustration regarding obligations of poor (or LMIC) countries in the pursuit justice in 
global health. Using the case of equity in global health financing, I have demonstrated 
that global justice, understood as guaranteeing for every individual a certain minimum 
of health opportunities expressed as GMHE per capita, requires that the cost for 
covering this minimum be distributed equitably between the potential health resource 
donor countries and health-aid recipient countries. The moral reasoning involved in 
this requirement is that even though external actors bear certain obligations to transfer 
resources to the poor countries, such obligations are not unlimited. Justice in this case 
requires that obligations of each set of actors ought to be proportionate in terms of 
each actor’s resource capacity as well as the comparative burdens borne by each actor 
and set of actors. It is in virtue of this insight that a mechanism for ensuring equity in 
global health financing has been proposed. In summary, the mechanism requires that 
all poor (or all potential health-aid recipient) countries bear a stringent obligations to 
allocate a certain minimum and uniform percentage of their domestically generated 
resources to health. Given that it is possible to establish for each country the total cost 
of the minimum health opportunities (whatever the content of this may be), whatever 
deficit remains to cover this total after the absolute figure (US$) from each LIC 
government has been known (from the minimum percentage of its domestically 
generated resources), this specific amount of shortfall should constitute a morally 
binding and potentially enforceable obligations for the external actors (HICs). From 
the argument following the futility of obligations of countries for global distributive 
justice, it is this specificity (precision) of the moral requirements on each actor and set 
of actors with the possibility of enforcement for these obligations that will increase 
the possibility of guaranteeing to all individuals globally a certain minimum level of 
health opportunities expressed as GMHE per capita. 
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I have gone ahead to argue that ‘on top of poor countries being required to act in ways 
that will achieve inter-country equity in health financing, they have another obligation 
to ensure internal or domestic equity in health financing between individuals and/or 
households. This same obligation is achieved through the same mechanism which 
requires all potential health-aid recipient countries to allocate a certain minimum 
percentage of their domestically generated annual budget resources to health. This has 
been shown to work in the following way: bearing in mind that inequities in health are 
majorly associated with health costs, particularly PHE, the whole cost of the 
minimum health opportunities ought to be covered by pooled public resources; that is, 
a combination of domestic resources and external resources. The reason for this has 
been that given the extent of income inequalities in most poor countries accompanied 
by very unequal health needs, any reliance on PHE, however small it is, will lead to 
deep inequities in both access to the targeted minimum health opportunities as well as 
the burden of financing those opportunities. And further, unless domestic equity in 
access to health and health financing is achieved, then it is impossible to achieve 
justice in global health. This is another way of emphasising the complementarity of 
obligations of HIC governments and LIC governments in the pursuit of justice in 
global health. 
5.6 Further Remarks and Recommendations for Further Enquiry 
5.6.1 Going beyond the Hypothetical
In our illustration of LIC governments’ obligations for contributing to or facilitating 
equity in global health we argued that LIC governments should increase the 
percentage of their domestically generated resources to health as a starting point. This 
illustration has been primarily hypothetical intended to show how specifying specific 
uniform targets (percentage of budget) for health financing for all potential health-aid 
recipient governments is necessary to ensure inter-country equity in global health 
financing. The choice of a hypothetical increase in LIC domestic budget allocations is 
informed by the view by expressed by the World Health Organization that LIC 
governments need to increase the amount of their domestically generated resources to 
health as shown earlier. With respect to Africa, the same view (regarding increased 
resource allocations to health) is reflected in the 2001 Abuja Declaration in which the 
African Head of States and Governments observed and recommended that each 
member state should increase their health budgets to health to 15 per cent of their 
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GDP. Further with reference to the sustainability of progress in MDGs, the UNDP has 
cautioned about the danger of poor countries’ overdependence on external resources 
and has therefore suggested that countries need to increase their own investment in 
health as they look elsewhere forward to external assistance. What should be noted 
about all these views and recommendations is that, except the Abuja Declaration, 
none of the rest specifies the actual amount of resources or proportion of annual 
budget that should be allocated to health. Secondly, none of these recommendations, 
including the Abuja Declaration, justifies its recommendations from the point of view 
of countries’ resource capacities. Therefore my recommendation is that as the first 
step towards implementing low income countries’ obligations in health financing, an 
enquiry should be made to establish the actual optimal percentage of domestically 
generated resources within those countries that should be allocated to health. Once 
this optimal level has been agreed upon after taking into consideration the resource 
capacities of LICs, then it will be easy for each country to fulfill its obligations, and 
there will be good reasons for diplomatic nudging against those who will display 
unwillingness to fulfill their quota of obligations. 
Further our illustration used a hypothetical amount of resources necessary to 
guarantee the minimum health opportunities. We have used an arbitrary GMHE per 
capita of US$60; others have used (also hypothetically) US$40, while the WHO 
estimates the “minimum spending per person per year needed to provide basic, life-
saving services” to be US$44. Since the WHO states one figure (US$ 44), it means 
that this is an average cost rather than country-specific cost. Therefore, since the 
mechanism proposed requires establishing the actual cost of providing basic or 
minimum health goods and services and yet these costs differ in many countries or 
regions, there is need to enquire into country-specific, or at least WHO region-
specific, health needs and their costs per person. It is this actual cost per person that 
should be used to determine the total cost required by each country to achieve the 
minimum health opportunities for all individuals in that country. In turn it is this total 
that must be fully covered from the pool of public resources contributed by both 
domestic governments and external governments. 
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5.6.2 Obligations beyond Health Resource Contributions
Within health systems, whether domestically or globally, there are many factors that 
impact on health equity other than health financing. One of these is health resource 
allocation. It is one thing to have the requisite resources in the pubic pool and it is 
another for such resources to be allocated in a manner that will ensure equity in access
to the target health services. Therefore, all things being equal (such as efficiency in 
allocation) governments should bear an obligation to devise and implement health 
resource allocation mechanisms that will guarantee equitable access to the targeted 
minimum health opportunities. Within the concern about equitable access, 
governments should take into account geographical access of health services. 
Generally, since it has emerged clearly that in the pursuit for justice in global health it 
is necessary to specify poor country (or LMIC) government obligations, more studies 
are necessary in order to identify all the relevant obligations of LMIC governments 
which when fulfilled would facilitate the achievement of justice in global health. 
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